nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2011‒04‒16
ten papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. Moeda e ciclo econômico: a perspectiva neoclássica da Escola de Cambridge segundo Pigou. By Sérgio Fornazier Meirelles Filho
  2. A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma By Wu, Haoyang
  3. Marx in 1869: Notebook B113, The Economist and The Money Market Review By João Antonio de Paula; Hugo E. A. da Gama Cerqueira; Alexandre Mendes Cunha; Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak; Leonardo Gomes de Deus; Eduardo da Motta e Albuquerque; Guilherme Habib Santos Curi; Marco Túlio Vieira
  4. Decision Making under Ecological Regime Shift: An Experimental Economic Approach By Kawata, Yukichika
  5. Scrap the lot and start again By Kakarot-Handtke, Egmont
  6. The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy By Michel Grabisch; Lijue Xie
  7. A note on Hubbert's hypotheses and techniques By Pierre-Noël Giraud
  8. What’s Intellectual Property Good for? By Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
  9. Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result By Wu, Haoyang
  10. Why inferential statistics are inappropriate for development studies and how the same data can be better used By Ballinger, Clint

  1. By: Sérgio Fornazier Meirelles Filho (FACE-UFG, Ciências Econômicas)
    Abstract: In this paper we seek to recall the central elements of Arthur Cecil Pigou´s contributions concerning the business cycle analysis. Deserve especial attention in this context his interpretation about the monetary aspects of the cycle and his formulation relative to forced saving theory, subject of intense debate in that period, not only in United Kingdon but also in other parts of western Europe. First of all we present a brief review of Alfred Marshall´s analysis of the cycle to best appreciate, both in theoretical and historical sense, Pigou´s contributions to the progress in this field.
    Keywords: Currency, Savings, Investment, Economic Cycle
    Date: 2011–04
  2. By: Wu, Haoyang
    Abstract: The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will propose an algorithmic model and a non-binding scheme to help non-cooperative agents obtain Pareto-efficient payoffs self-enforcingly. The scheme stems from quantum game theory, but is applicable to the macro world immediately.
    Keywords: Quantum game theory; Prisoner's Dilemma.
    JEL: C72
    Date: 2011–04–05
  3. By: João Antonio de Paula (Cedeplar-UFMG); Hugo E. A. da Gama Cerqueira (Cedeplar-UFMG); Alexandre Mendes Cunha (Cedeplar-UFMG); Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak (Cedeplar-UFMG); Leonardo Gomes de Deus (Cedeplar-UFMG); Eduardo da Motta e Albuquerque (Cedeplar-UFMG); Guilherme Habib Santos Curi (Cedeplar-UFMG); Marco Túlio Vieira (Cedeplar-UFMG)
    Abstract: This paper presents Notebook B113, one of Marx’s unpublished manuscripts, and suggests its importance for highlighting the monetary and financial issues which Marx was investigating after 1867. A combination of deciphering an index prepared by Marx and reading the 1868 editions of The Economist and The Money Market Review may help to improve the understanding of Part Five, Volume III of Capital. A preliminary investigation of Marx’s references to the crisis of 1866 in Notebook B113, and the lack of references to this same crisis in Volume III of Capital supports the conjecture of this paper.
    Keywords: Karl Marx; Friedrich Engels; MEGA
    JEL: B14 B31
    Date: 2011–04
  4. By: Kawata, Yukichika
    Abstract: Environmental economics postulates the assumption of homo economicus and presumes that externality occurs as a result of the rational economic activities of economic agents. This paper examines this assumption using an experimental economic approach in the context of regime shift, which has been receiving increasing attention. We observe that when externality does not exist, economic agents (subjects of experimemt) act economically rationally, but when externality exists, economic agents avoid the risk of a regime shift that would have negative consequences for others. Our results suggest that environmental economics may have to reconsider the assumption of homo economicus.
    Keywords: homo economicus; unboundedly rational economic agents; regime shift; experimental economics
    JEL: C90 D64 Q57
    Date: 2011–04–01
  5. By: Kakarot-Handtke, Egmont
    Abstract: In the wake of the recent financial crisis heterodox economists have taken up a time-honored refrain and proposed to abandon the axiomatic method. The present paper argues that this proposal is self-defeating
    Keywords: Axiomatization; Keynesianism
    JEL: E12 E00 B41
    Date: 2011–03–11
  6. By: Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Lijue Xie (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
    Abstract: Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the most popular solution concept since it is based on some rationality condition. In many real situations, not all possible coalitions can form, so that classical TU-games cannot be used. An interesting case is when possible coalitions are defined through a partial ordering of the players (or hierarchy). Then feasible coalitions correspond to teams of players, that is, one or several players with all their subordinates. In these situations, the core in its usual formulation may be unbounded, making its use difficult in practice. We propose a new notion of core, called the restricted core, which imposes efficiency of the allocation at each level of the hierarchy, is always bounded, and answers the problem of sharing benefits in a hierarchy. We show that the core we defined has properties very close to the classical case, with respect to marginal vectors, the Weber set, and balancedness.
    Keywords: cooperative game, feasible coalition, core, hierarchy
    Date: 2011
  7. By: Pierre-Noël Giraud (CERNA - Centre d'économie industrielle - Mines ParisTech)
    Abstract: Many have attempted to forecast the date of the production peak and the volume of the ultimate reserves of a mineral commodity, using techniques derived from Hubbert's thesis. This note aims at exploring the scientific foundations and therefore the scope of validity of these forecasting techniques. Looking at the basic assumptions of Hubbert's thesis, it concludes that these techniques should not be used to forecast neither the peak (or plateau) of the annual production rate, nor the ultimate reserves of any mineral, unless given exceptional conditions.
    Date: 2011
  8. By: Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
    Date: 2011–04–08
  9. By: Wu, Haoyang
    Abstract: [Moore and Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin's classic paper [Maskin, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38]. A recent work [Wu,, \emph{Inter. J. Quantum Information}, 2010 (accepted)] shows that when an additional condition is satisfied, the Maskin's theorem will no longer hold by using a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this result holds in the macro world by using an algorithmic mechanism. In this paper, we will investigate two-agent Nash implementation by virtue of the algorithmic mechanism. The main result is: The sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation with two agents shall be amended, not only in the quantum world, but also in the macro world.
    Keywords: Quantum game theory; Mechanism design; Nash implementation.
    JEL: D71
    Date: 2011–04–05
  10. By: Ballinger, Clint
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is twofold: 1) to highlight the widely ignored but fundamental problem of ‘superpopulations’ for the use of inferential statistics in development studies. We do not to dwell on this problem however as it has been sufficiently discussed in older papers by statisticians that social scientists have nevertheless long chosen to ignore; the interested reader can turn to those for greater detail. 2) to show that descriptive statistics both avoid the problem of superpopulations and can be a powerful tool when used correctly. A few examples are provided. The paper ends with considerations of some reasons we think are behind the adherence to methods that are known to be inapplicable to many of the types of questions asked in development studies yet still widely practiced.
    Keywords: frequentist statistics; Bayesian statistics; causation; determinism; explanation; spatial autocorrelation; mulitple regression; international development; econometrics; comparative method; datasets; descriptive statistics; tabular analysis; visual analysis; maps; regession modeling; quantitative; qualitative; macrosociology; superpopulations; apparent populations; indeterminism; statistical assumptions
    JEL: B0 C12 C33 C11 P16 A11 O1 C10 F5 C20 C3 C23 C21
    Date: 2011–01–06

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