nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2010‒12‒18
forty-five papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba
  1. Behavioral Economics By Berg, Nathan
  2. Tribute to Paul. A. Samuelson By Vipin Chandran, K.P; Sandhya, P
  3. Evolutionary Games in Economics By Dan Friedman
  4. The Current Financial and Economic Crisis: Empirical and Methodological Issues By Strachman, Eduardo; Fucidji, José Ricardo
  5. As-if behavioral economics: Neoclassical economics in disguise? By Berg, Nathan; Gigerenzer, Gerd
  6. La ricerca economica in Italia tra pluralismo e monismo: i giovani economisti negli ultimi trent’anni By Birolo, Adriano
  7. The Theory of Games and Evolution of Animal Conflicts By J. Maynard Smith
  8. Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Theory By B. Skyrms
  9. Economists on Samuelson and Solow on the Phillips curve By James Forder
  10. Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring By Dilip Abreu; David Pearce; Ennio Stacchetti
  11. Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results By Dan Friedman
  12. The Evolution of Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma By John Nachbar
  13. Genes, Economics, and Happiness By Jan-Emmanuel De Neve; Nicholas A. Christakis; James H. Fowler; Bruno S. Frey
  14. The Classical Theorem on Existence of Competitive Equilibrium By L. W. McKenzie
  15. Ricardo vs. “Ricardian” Model By Morales Meoqui, Jorge
  16. Smith's and Ricardo's common logic of trade By Morales Meoqui, Jorge
  17. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics By D. Foster; P. Young
  18. Decision-making behavior in two-choice uncertain outcome situations By S. Siegel; D. A. Goldstein
  19. Evolutionary Dynamics of zero-sum games By E. Akin; V. Losert
  20. Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications By M. Kandori; R. Rob
  21. What is the Nature and Social Norm within the Context of In-Group Favouritism? By Harris, D.; Herrmann, B.; Kontoleon, A.
  22. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching By Glen Ellison
  23. Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments By R. Boylan; E. El-Gamal
  24. A New Approach to Consumer Theory By K. K. Lancaster
  25. Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium By D. Fudenberg; D. M. Kreps
  26. Learning by Forgetful Players: From Primitive Formations to Persistent Retracts By S. Hurkens
  27. Equilibrium Selection in n-person Coordination Games By Y. Kim
  28. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma By David Kreps; Paul Milgrom; John Roberts; Bob Wilson
  29. The Behavioural Consequences of Unfair Punishment By Michalis Drouvelis
  30. Game theory models for exchange Networks: experimental results By E. J. Bienenstock; P. Bonacich
  31. On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior By E. Dekel; S. Scotchmer
  32. Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality By John Geanakoplos; David Pearce; Ennio Stacchetti
  33. Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept By R. Myerson
  34. Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games By J. Swinkels
  35. Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games By Drew Fudenberg; David M. Kreps
  36. What are we learning from the life satisfaction literature? By Becchetti, Leonardo; Pelloni , Alessandra
  37. Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games By V. Crawford
  38. Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games By D. Fudenberg; E. Maskin
  39. Evolution of Smart n Players By D. Stahl
  40. Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium By E. Kalai; E. Lehrer
  41. Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia By Glen Ellison
  42. On Pseudo-Games By A. Banos
  43. Financial Markets Interactions between Economic Theory and Practice By Nicolau, Mihaela
  44. The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game By Brian Roberson; Dmitriy Kvasov
  45. Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal-Form Games By Paul Milgrom; John Roberts
  1. By: Berg, Nathan
    Abstract: This article describes the emerging subfield known as behavioral economics, which borrows from psychology, empirically tests assumptions used elsewhere in economics, and provides theories that aim to be more realistic and closely tied to experimental and field data. Highlights from the experimental findings of behavioral economics are discussed. The article remarks critically on the role of empirical realism and continued use of as-if methodology in behavioral economics. Problems in normative behavioral economics are given special attention as debates arise concerning how to interpret empirical findings that contradict standard definitions of axiomatic rationality. Ecological rationality, methodological pluralism, and Simon's notion of bounded rationality are considered.
    Keywords: bounded rationality; ecological rationality; Herbert Simon; as-if; survey
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:26587&r=hpe
  2. By: Vipin Chandran, K.P; Sandhya, P
    Abstract: Paul .A. Samuelson, the first American Nobel laureate in Economics and the foremost academic economist of the 20th century. As a graduate student at Harvard, Samuelson studied Economics under Joseph Schumpeter, W.W. Leontief, Goldfried Haberler and the ‘American Keynes’ Alvin Hansen. He was the first American to win to Nobel Prize in Economics; and he is considered to be one of the founders of Neo-Keynesian Economics and a seminal figure in the development of Neoclassical Economics.
    Keywords: Neoclassical economics; Welfare economics; International economics
    JEL: B31 B3 B30 B32
    Date: 2010–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27173&r=hpe
  3. By: Dan Friedman
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:392&r=hpe
  4. By: Strachman, Eduardo; Fucidji, José Ricardo
    Abstract: In this paper we describe the main causes of recent financial crisis as a result of many theoretical, methodological, and practical shortcomings mostly according to heterodox, but also including some important orthodox economists. At the theoretical level, there are problems concerning teaching and using economic models with overly unrealistic assumptions. In the methodological front, we find the unsuspected shadow of Milton Friedman’s ‘unrealisticism of assumptions’ thesis lurking behind the construction of this kind of models and the widespread neglect of methodological issues. Of course, the most evident shortcomings are at the practical level: (i) huge interests of the participants in the financial markets (banks, central bankers, regulators, rating agencies mortgage brokers, politicians, governments, executives, economists, etc. mainly in the US, Canada and Europe, but also in Japan and the rest of the world), (ii) in an almost completely free financial and economic market, that is, one (almost) without any regulation or supervision, (iii) decision-taking upon some not well regarded qualities, like irresponsibility, ignorance, and inertia; and (iv) difficulties to understand the current crisis as well as some biases directing economic rescues by governments. Following many others, we propose that we take this episode as an opportunity to reflect on, and hopefully redirect, economic theory and practice.
    Keywords: Economic Crisis; Financial Crisis; Post-Keynesian; Methodology; Macroeconomics; Economic Theory; Current Monetary; Banking and Financial Issues
    JEL: E44 A11 B41
    Date: 2010–10–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27130&r=hpe
  5. By: Berg, Nathan; Gigerenzer, Gerd
    Abstract: For a research program that counts improved empirical realism among its primary goals, it is surprising that behavioral economics appears indistinguishable from neoclassical economics in its reliance on “as-if” arguments. “As-if” arguments are frequently put forward in behavioral economics to justify “psychological” models that add new parameters to fit decision outcome data rather than specifying more realistic or empirically supported psychological processes that genuinely explain these data. Another striking similarity is that both behavioral and neoclassical research programs refer to a common set of axiomatic norms without subjecting them to empirical investigation. Notably missing is investigation of whether people who deviate from axiomatic rationality face economically significant losses. Despite producing prolific documentation of deviations from neoclassical norms, behavioral economics has produced almost no evidence that deviations are correlated with lower earnings, lower happiness, impaired health, inaccurate beliefs, or shorter lives. We argue for an alternative non-axiomatic approach to normative analysis focused on veridical descriptions of decision process and a matching principle – between behavioral strategies and the environments in which they are used – referred to as ecological rationality. To make behavioral economics, or psychology and economics, a more rigorously empirical science will require less effort spent extending “as-if” utility theory to account for biases and deviations, and substantially more careful observation of successful decision makers in their respective domains.
    Keywords: bounded rationality; ecological rationality; as-if; fit; prediction; decision; process
    JEL: B1 B4
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:26586&r=hpe
  6. By: Birolo, Adriano
    Abstract: Taking as good the famous definition of economics attributed to Viner, “Economics is what economists do”, it is surprising to see how little the history of economics has addressed the matter of what economists actually do, above all outside the USA. The vast mass of data on research output which has recently become readily accessible and arrangeable are allowed in this contribution to put into focus (to sharpen) the Italian “representative” economist, at the first rung of the academic ladder, the “Researcher” (ricercatore), in three subsequent periods over last 30 years, 1984 – 2005. With the aim, on the one hand, to trace out the evolution of the scientific profile from the beginning of the 1980s until the end of the period; on the other hand, to verify whether the progressive internationalisation of the profession, the increasing influence of the Anglo-Saxon way of organising research with the introduction of evaluation criteria taking into account the prominence achieved by publications have effectively modified the subjects and methods of research. An extensive database of publications of three cohorts of young economists at the first step of the academic career has been construded. The publications has been classified on the basis of the research structure in economics prevailing at the edge of the 1980s, thus to outline from the inside the evolution of our research model. The outcome: that research model has lost the most part of his pluralistic peculiarities to close in significantly the monistic Anglo-Saxon model. Not a result unexpected; the novelty to emphasize is that the change appeared not step by step but all of a sudden at the transition from the 1980s to the1990s. The publications of the last cohort don’t do anything but conferm that change. Even whitin this metamorphosis, however, the research model that young researchers currently carry out, shows a specificity of the old one: the prominently role, even in the international comparison, of the History of economic analysis that, just about lone, supports the fleg of the pluralism. Other research areas that were typical of and characterized the Italian research model, also in the international research market, such as, for instance, the critical theories (Sraffian and Post-keynesian) coming from the Cambridge (Uk) tradition, have, almost completely, got out from the hunt territory crossed by the young Italian economists; because, perhaps, they are inclined to believe that an academic carrier as economist cannot be developed smoothly if based on research themes outside the nowadays mainstream.
    Keywords: Italian research model in economics; evolution; pluralism; monism
    JEL: B40 B00 A10 A14
    Date: 2010–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27219&r=hpe
  7. By: J. Maynard Smith
    Date: 2010–12–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:448&r=hpe
  8. By: B. Skyrms
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:400&r=hpe
  9. By: James Forder
    Abstract: Samuelson and Solow published a widely read paper in the May issue of the American Economic Review of 1960. It discussed the causes of inflation, the Phillips curve, and related matters. Discussion of their paper frequently says that it presented the Phillips curve as a stable, exploitable relation, and hence played an important role in the development of inflationary policy. This is hardly so. Sometimes authors notice this, but they nevertheless say it was misread as advocating inflationary policy and hence played the same role in policy development. Close attention to what was said about it in the relevant period – the 1960s – reveals that it was not then seen as advocating inflationary policy at all. This raises a strange puzzle as to why it was that, rather suddenly, it came to be incorrectly said that Samuelson and Solow had been interpreted as being inflationist when they neither were that, nor had been interpreted in that way.
    JEL: B22 B23
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:516&r=hpe
  10. By: Dilip Abreu; David Pearce; Ennio Stacchetti
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:199&r=hpe
  11. By: Dan Friedman
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:393&r=hpe
  12. By: John Nachbar
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:599&r=hpe
  13. By: Jan-Emmanuel De Neve; Nicholas A. Christakis; James H. Fowler; Bruno S. Frey
    Abstract: Research on happiness has produced valuable insights into the sources of subjective well-being that are of importance to economics. A major nding from this literature is that people exhibit a "baseline" level of happiness that shows persistent strength over time. Here we explore the extent to which baseline happiness is in uenced by genetic variation. Using data from Add Health, we employ a twin study design to show that ge- netic variation explains about 33% of the variation in happiness, and that the in uence of genes varies by gender (women 26%, men 39%) and tends to rise with age. We also present evidence that variation in a specific gene predicts happiness. Individuals with a transcriptionally more eficient version of the serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4) are significantly more likely to report higher levels of life satisfaction|having one or two alleles of the more eficient type raises the average likelihood of being very satised with one's life by 8.5% and 17.3%, respectively. Finally, using data from an indepen- dent source (the Framingham Heart Study) we show that a linked single nucleotide polymorphism (rs2020933) in the SLC6A4 gene also predicts life satisfaction. These results are the rst to identify a specific gene that may be associated with baseline levels of happiness.
    Keywords: academia; Happiness; Subjective Well-Being; Genetics
    JEL: A12 Z00
    Date: 2010–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2010-24&r=hpe
  14. By: L. W. McKenzie
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:1388&r=hpe
  15. By: Morales Meoqui, Jorge
    Abstract: The so-called Ricardian model of contemporary economic textbooks differs significantly from the famous numerical example included in chapter seven of the Principles. The difference is not merely with respect to the definition of the four numbers, but also in terms of underlying proposition, logical construction, assumptions and theoretical implications. Therefore, the textbook model should no longer be considered as part of Ricardo’s international trade theory, nor taken as basis for understanding Ricardo’s superior demonstration of comparative advantage in the Principles.
    Keywords: comparative advantage; Ricardian model; CULC model; international trade theory; free trade
    JEL: B12 F11
    Date: 2010–03–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27104&r=hpe
  16. By: Morales Meoqui, Jorge
    Abstract: Ricardo essentially adhered to the logic of trade that Smith formulated in the Wealth of Nations. The contrary notion that they had opposing logics of trade is the result of an inaccurate interpretation of Ricardo’s numerical demonstration of the comparative-advantage proposition in chapter seven of the Principles. A deeper understanding of this numerical demonstration also leads to a partial refutation of the familiar contraposition between the comparative-advantage proposition and the absolute cost advantage theory of trade.
    Keywords: comparative advantage; absolute cost advantage; Ricardian model; international trade theory; free trade
    JEL: B12
    Date: 2010–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27143&r=hpe
  17. By: D. Foster; P. Young
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:493&r=hpe
  18. By: S. Siegel; D. A. Goldstein
    Date: 2010–12–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:559&r=hpe
  19. By: E. Akin; V. Losert
    Date: 2010–12–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:424&r=hpe
  20. By: M. Kandori; R. Rob
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:502&r=hpe
  21. By: Harris, D.; Herrmann, B.; Kontoleon, A.
    Abstract: In-group favouritism behaviour is observed everywhere around the world and previous research has shown that this behaviour is also easily triggered in a laboratory in various contexts. However, little is known about why different magnitudes of in-group favouritism are observed across societies. In this paper, we use a new allocation experiment to examine the nature of social norms within the context of in-group favouritism behaviour. In this experiment, a decision-maker has to decide only once how to allocate a fixed amount of resource between each of the three members of her own group and each of the three members of the out-group, whilst the decision- maker's own payo is not aected by her decision. Three treatments are implemented: in the first treatment, only the members of the in-group can punish the decision-maker. In the second treatment, only the members of the out-group can punish the decision-maker. Finally, in the third treatment, only an independent third-party observer can punish the decision-maker. The aim of these treatments is to test whether there is a prevailing social norm which dominates the behavioural standard within the context of in-group favouritism and whether this mechanism varies across dierent subject pools, namely Thailand and the UK.<br><br> Compared to a baseline treatment with no punishment opportunity, we observed that among the Thai subjects in-group favouritism significantly increased once the in-group members were given the opportunity to punish the decision-maker. The threat of punishment from a third-party punisher also increased in-group favouritism in Thailand. However, when only the out-group members had the opportunity to punish, no change in in-group favouritism behaviour was observed. On the contrary, within the British subject pool, when the out-group members had the opportunity to punish the decision-maker, we observed a decline in in-group favouritism as well as a marked shift towards an equitable outcome. The threats of punishments from the in-group members and the third-party, on the other hand, did not have any impact on in-group favouritism behaviour in the UK. The results suggest that within the Thai subject pool, there appears to be a prevailing `in-group bias norm' which is strongly enforced within and outside the group. Within the UK subject pool, however, it is less clear what the prevailing norm is. Whilst the threat of punishment from the out-group members who directly lose out from favouritism behaviour appeared to significantly reduce this behaviour, an uninvolved third-party was not willing to incur a cost to punish this behaviour. This interesting result indicates two possible explanations: first, in-group favouritism, in contrast to selfish or opportunistic behaviour, may not considered as a strong enough violation of a social norm; and second, the norm of egalitarianism within the context of favouritism may still be `evolving'.
    Keywords: Social Norms, In-group Favouritism, Group Behaviour, In-group Punishment, Out-group Punishment, Third-party Punishment, Experimental Design
    JEL: D73 C92
    Date: 2010–12–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1062&r=hpe
  22. By: Glen Ellison
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:631&r=hpe
  23. By: R. Boylan; E. El-Gamal
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:403&r=hpe
  24. By: K. K. Lancaster
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:1385&r=hpe
  25. By: D. Fudenberg; D. M. Kreps
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:382&r=hpe
  26. By: S. Hurkens
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:474&r=hpe
  27. By: Y. Kim
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:503&r=hpe
  28. By: David Kreps; Paul Milgrom; John Roberts; Bob Wilson
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:239&r=hpe
  29. By: Michalis Drouvelis
    Abstract: Experimental evidence from public good games with punishment suggests that punishment works when subjects assign it fairly by sanctioning non-cooperators. This paper reports an experiment in which punishment is assigned unfairly in the sense that it is not linked to individual behaviour and is melted out to all group members (irrespective of their prior behaviour). We test whether unfair punishment generates different contribution and punishment behaviour relative to the standard punishment game. Our findings suggest different dynamics of average contributions in the presence of unfair punishment relative to the standard punishment game. Contribution levels are significantly different only when subjects have obtained experience from both games. We also find that, although the assignment of punishment is unaffected after the experience of an environment with unfair punishment, a history of unfair punishment makes a difference regarding reactions to alleviation, reward and punishment received.
    Keywords: Recriprocity, Unfair punishment, Public good experiments
    JEL: C92 H41
    Date: 2010–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:10-34&r=hpe
  30. By: E. J. Bienenstock; P. Bonacich
    Date: 2010–12–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:2031&r=hpe
  31. By: E. Dekel; S. Scotchmer
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:434&r=hpe
  32. By: John Geanakoplos; David Pearce; Ennio Stacchetti
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:587&r=hpe
  33. By: R. Myerson
    Date: 2010–12–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:537&r=hpe
  34. By: J. Swinkels
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:456&r=hpe
  35. By: Drew Fudenberg; David M. Kreps
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:218&r=hpe
  36. By: Becchetti, Leonardo (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit); Pelloni , Alessandra (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit)
    Abstract: The recent availability of cross-sectional and longitudinal survey data on life satisfaction in a large number of countries gives us the opportunity to verify empirically (and not just to assume) what matters for individuals and what economists and policymakers should take into account when trying to promote personal and societal wellbeing. The wide array of econometric findings available in this booming literature display evidence, generally robust to different cultural backgrounds, on the effects of some important happiness drivers (income,unemployment, marital status) which can be considered “quasi stylized facts” of happiness. If economic policies, for many obvious reasons, cannot maximize self declared life satisfaction as such, we are nonetheless learning a lot from these contributions. In particular, results on the relevance and the risk of crowding out of relational goods, on the revisited inflation/unemployment trade off and, more in general, on the measurement of the shadow value of non market goods obtained with life satisfaction estimates, are conveying relevant information about individual preferences and what is behind utility functions. Such findings suggest us to move beyond anthropological reductionism toward behavioral complexity and to refocus target indicators of economic policies in order to minimize the distance between economic development and human wellbeing.
    Keywords: life satisfaction; shadow value of non market goods; unemployment/inflation trade-off
    Date: 2010–07–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:aiccon:2010_076&r=hpe
  37. By: V. Crawford
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:404&r=hpe
  38. By: D. Fudenberg; E. Maskin
    Date: 2010–12–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:546&r=hpe
  39. By: D. Stahl
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:401&r=hpe
  40. By: E. Kalai; E. Lehrer
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:529&r=hpe
  41. By: Glen Ellison
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:413&r=hpe
  42. By: A. Banos
    Date: 2010–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:463&r=hpe
  43. By: Nicolau, Mihaela
    Abstract: During the last decades many financial analysts, either theorists or practitioners, have dedicated their studies to the interactions between different financial sectors. The results of these researches confirm that commodities, bonds and stock markets are closely related, therefore a thorough analysis of one should includes considerations of the other two. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that, even if from the theoretical point of view financial markets present typical and strong correlations between them, under economic turmoil the correlations change their signs. Both elementary rules of economic theory and examples with real time series are used in the demonstration. The results of our research emphasize that a simple theoretical analysis of financial markets’ behaviour through inflation and interest rates cannot define the real interactions of the markets and more robust research approaches are required.
    Keywords: financial markets; correlation coefficient; inflation; interest rates; commodities; bonds; stocks; oil price.
    JEL: G12 E39 E44 G10
    Date: 2010–11–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27322&r=hpe
  44. By: Brian Roberson (Krannert School of Management, Economics Department, Purdue University); Dmitriy Kvasov (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)
    Abstract: The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes his fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players' resources are ''use it or lose it'' in the sense that any resources which are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. This article examines a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game which relaxes this use it or lose it feature. We find that if the level of asymmetry between the players' budgets is below a threshold, then there exists a one-to-one mapping from the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions in the constant-sum game to those in the non-constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players' budgets exceeds the threshold this relationship breaks down and we construct a new equilibrium.
    Keywords: Colonel Blotto Game; all-pay auction; contests; mixed strategies
    JEL: C72 D7
    Date: 2010–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2010-31&r=hpe
  45. By: Paul Milgrom; John Roberts
    Date: 2010–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:418&r=hpe
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