|
on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Geoffrey M. Hodgson |
| Abstract: | There has been a remarkable growth in evolutionary economics since the 1980s. But despite this outward success there has been inner disagreement on fundamental issues including the building blocks of evolutionary theory and the very meaning of ‘evolution’ itself. This essay provides a philosophical perspective on both the defining agreements and ongoing disputes within evolutionary economics. Its primary emphasis is on ontology. It shows that some major disputes derive not from incompatible propositions but the choice of different levels of analysis. A route toward reconciliation of different viewpoints is thus exposed. |
| Keywords: | Length 20 pages |
| Date: | 2010–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2010-01&r=hpe |
| By: | Luis Roberto Martínez; Christian Jaramillo; Nicolas De Roux; Juan-Camilo Cárdenas |
| Abstract: | The house-money effect –people’s tendency to be more daring with easily-gotten money– is a behavioral pattern that poses questions about the external validity of experiments in economics: to what extent do people behave in experiments like they would have in a real-life situation, given that they play with easily-gotten house money? We ran an economic experiment with 66 students to measure the house-money effect on their risk preferences. They received an amount of money with which they made risky decisions involving losses and gains; a treatment group got the money 21 days in advance and a control group got it the day of the experiment. We find that, when facing possible losses, people in the treatment group showed a lower tolerance to risk than people in the control group. If the players are assumed to have a CRRA utility function and to behave according to expected-utility theory, the risk-attitude adjustment corresponds to an average increase of 1 in their risk aversion coefficient. While the exact pattern of this house-money adjustment differs by gender, it is not possible to determine the sign of this gender effect unambiguously. In any case, it is advisable to include credible controls for the house-money effect in experimental work in economics. |
| Date: | 2010–01–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:006712&r=hpe |
| By: | Parpandel, Denisa Elena; Belu, Nicoleta; Voiculet, Alina; Rizea, Ionela Carmen |
| Abstract: | „In the concept of a new economy that should integrate all stakeholders such as man, society, environment and organization, knowing natural, human and social life is becoming a greater and more comprehensive concern”. - D.J.Hickson Humankind is undergoing a historic process of passage to a new society, a new economic system that is modernized by IT. The new society is characterized by major changes as there is an upturn of values where knowledge has become the most important manufacturing factor in modern economy, meaning the bases of power exertion, generating productivity increase and ensuring business competitiveness. One can be certain that the future world ensuing from the current reshaping of values, beliefs, economic and social structures, of political concepts and systems, in brief of world conception shall be different from what anybody could imagine. |
| Keywords: | new economy; organization; management; knowledge; business competitiveness. |
| JEL: | D8 D83 |
| Date: | 2010–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:20859&r=hpe |
| By: | Denis Cogneau (Paris School of Economics, DIAL, IRD, Paris) |
| Abstract: | European Enlightenment thinkers were right in stressing the political dimension of inequality, rather than referring to "natural differences" as some others did after them in the 19th or 20th centuries. Drawing from recent theoretical and empirical contributions in social sciences and in particular in economics, I try to sketch the lines of a research program dedicated to the politics of inequality on the one hand, to political inequalities on the other hand. _________________________________ Les penseurs européens des Lumières avaient raison de mettre en avant la dimension politique de l’inégalité, plutôt que de la renvoyer à l’expression de différences naturelles, comme d’autres l’ont fait après eux aux XIXè et XXè siècle. En m’appuyant sur des contributions théoriques et empiriques récentes en sciences sociales et particulièrement en économie, j’essaie d’esquisser les lignes d’un programme de recherche consacré à la politique des inégalités d’une part, et aux inégalités politiques d’autre part. |
| Keywords: | Inequality, Development, Political economy, Long-term history, Inégalité, Développement, Economie Politique, Histoire longue. |
| JEL: | B2 N3 O1 |
| Date: | 2009–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt200910&r=hpe |
| By: | Kleppe, J. (Tilburg University) |
| Abstract: | This Ph. D. thesis deals with various topics within the field of game theory. The first chapters of the thesis focus on cooperative game theory, which mainly studies fair allocations of joint benefits by means of cooperation. In particular the per capita prenucleolus, public congestion network situations and cooperative situations are considered. Non-cooperative game theory studies situations in which players are unable to make binding agreements. Therefore, the focus is on individual incentives. The chapter on transfer equilibria and contract games forms a bridge between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory as we allow certain aspects of commitment and cooperation within the framework of non-cooperative games in strategic form. The final chapter of this thesis extensively studies fall back equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which is the most fundamental solution concept in non-cooperative game theory. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3763576&r=hpe |
| By: | Azar, Ofer H.; Bar-Eli, Michael |
| Abstract: | Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is a commonly-used solution concept in game-theoretic models in various fields in economics, management, and other disciplines, but the experimental results whether the MSNE predicts well actual play in games is mixed. Consequently, evidence for naturally-occurring games in which the MSNE predicts the outcome well is of great importance, as it can justify the vast use of MSNE in models. The game between the kicker and goalkeeper in soccer penalty kicks is a real-world game that can be used to examine the application of the MSNE concept or its accuracy because payoffs are a common knowledge, the players have huge incentives to play correctly, the game is simple enough to analyze, its Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies, and players' actions can be observed. We collected and analyzed data on the direction of kicks and jumps in penalty kicks in various top leagues and tournaments. Our analysis suggests that the MSNE predictions are the closest to the actual sample data, even though some other prediction methods use information on the marginal distribution of kicks or jumps whereas the MSNE does not. |
| Keywords: | Soccer; Football; MSNE; Mixed-strategies; Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; Sports; Penalty kicks |
| JEL: | L83 C70 D00 C93 C72 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:20964&r=hpe |