nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2008‒08‒06
three papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Chicago

  1. History and the Development of Central Banking in Australia 1920-1970 By Selwyn Cornish
  2. Learning from Experts By Irene Valsecchi
  3. Coalitional Matchings By Dinko Dimitrov; Emiliya Lazarova

  1. By: Selwyn Cornish
    Keywords: central banking, Reserve Bank of Australia, banking history and policy, Coombs, Theodore, Chifley.
    JEL: G21 G28 N27
    Date: 2008–06
  2. By: Irene Valsecchi (University of Milano-Bicocca)
    Abstract: The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent, and the non-expert, who is either a decision-maker or an evaluator of the expert’s performance. According to the Bayesian decision-theoretic approach the expert is the agent who announces his probabilistic opinion, and the non-expert has to incorporate that opinion into his beliefs in a consistent way, despite his poor understanding of the expert’s substantive knowledge. The two approaches ground the relationships between experts and non-experts on such different premises that their results are very poorly connected.
    Keywords: Expert, Information Transmission, Learning
    JEL: D81 L21
    Date: 2008–04
  3. By: Dinko Dimitrov (University of Bayreuth); Emiliya Lazarova (School of Management and Economics, Queen’s University Belfast)
    Abstract: A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in and over the student groups he would like to teach to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over the groups of students he wants to study with and over the teams of researchers he would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents’ preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings.
    Keywords: Coalitions, Common Rankings, Core, Stability, Totally Balanced Games, Two-Sided Matchings
    JEL: C78 J41 D71
    Date: 2008–05

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