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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
By: | David Dequech |
Date: | 2007 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2007:043&r=hpe |
By: | K. Vela Velupillai |
Abstract: | In this paper I try to substantiate the thesis that Jevons may have been too harsh on the vices of induction and generously optimistic about the virtues of deduction, as discussed, primarily, in his magnum opus, The Principles of Science [6]. With this aim in mind the paper attempts to suggest (modern), recursion theoretic, theoretical technologies that could reduce and, under conditions that I claim would be acceptable to Jevons, even eliminate the inductive indeterminacies that he had emphasised. |
Keywords: | Jevons, Inductiion, Inductive Inference, Bayes's Rule |
JEL: | B16 B31 C11 C63 |
Date: | 2007 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpde:0729&r=hpe |
By: | Colson, Aurélien (ESSEC Business School) |
Abstract: | The aim of this research paper is to analyse to what extent secrecy emerged as the uncontested norm for international negotiations after the Renaissance. The first section (1) introduces six key negotiation practitioners in 17th century Europe, including some of the earliest writers on negotiation: Hotman, Mazarini, Wicquefort, Rousseau de Chamoy, Callières, and Pecquet. Through an analysis of their original writings – most of which are no longer available in print – the following sections demonstrate that if an ambassador had to appear in the bright light of royal Court (2), his constant preoccupation was secrecy (3). How to protect his own secrets from third-parties (4) and uncover others’ secrets (5) were central focal points, establishing secrecy as the paradigm for modern international negotiation. |
Keywords: | Ambassador; Callières; Hotman; International Relations; Mazarini; Negotiation (history of); Pecquet; Rousseau de Chamoy; Secrecy; Wicquefort |
JEL: | F51 |
Date: | 2007–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-07023&r=hpe |
By: | Glavan, Bogdan |
Abstract: | Development policy has been energized in the last decades by a number of contributions emphasizing a new positive role the state can and should play in fostering economic growth. The central pillar of this literature is Michael Porter and his theory of clusters. A number of economists have attempted to anchor the appetite for clustering initiatives in a solid theoretical bedrock. They have pointed out an interesting market failure that may prevent the emergence of profitable clusters and thus jeopardize overall economic development: the failure of individuals to coordinate changes in their actions in order to reap the benefits of a better situation. This paper intends to provide a refutation of the idea that coordination failures as manifested in the inability of clusters to emerge can serve as a ground for government intervention. It uses mainly Porter, Rodrik and Rodriguez-Clare thesis as an example of this approach and criticizes the claim that coordination externalities prevent the market process to allocate resources optimally. |
Keywords: | Coordination; Market failure; Economic development |
JEL: | L5 O1 H0 |
Date: | 2007–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:6275&r=hpe |
By: | Mauro Boianovsky |
Date: | 2007 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2007:024&r=hpe |