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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
By: | Khalil, Elias |
Abstract: | Let us define entrepreneurship as creativity and the evolution of novelty. Let us suppose, the main thesis of the chapter, that entrepreneurship is an action that does not differ from everyday action such as walking, driving, or chewing gum. If the definition and supposition are granted we can conclude that the theory of everyday action, such as walking or chewing gum, is one and the same as the theory of evolution. The conclusion is definitely strange if not extraordinary. It is based on a subtle but subversive thesis: There is no difference between everyday action and creativity or evolution. This conclusion is extraordinary only because it goes against the dominant dogmas in economics (i.e., neoclassical theory) and evolutionary biology (i.e., neo-Darwinian theory). Both dogmas draw a radical divide between action and evolution. For neo-Darwinian theory, action is phenotype ultimately determined by genotype—while the genotype evolves according to another mechanism. For neoclassical economics, action is determined by rational calculation of the efficient allocation of given resources—while resources evolve according to another mechanism. To undermine the radical divide between the theory of action and the theory of evolution, this chapter shows how everyday action—from walking, fetching water, to fishing—is entrepreneurial at first level of approximation—and hence should be the basis of the theory of evolution. |
Keywords: | Action; Evolution; neo-Darwinism; neoclassical theory; Austrian Economics; classical economics; Alfred Whitehead; John Dewey. |
JEL: | D29 D20 |
Date: | 2006–10–13 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:501&r=hpe |
By: | Stanton, Angela A. |
Abstract: | This paper reviews the literature of behavioral-, experimental-, and neuro-economics research with the ultimatum and the dictator games. “One may wonder whether Adam Smith, were he working today, would not be a neuroeconomi[st]” Aldo Rustichini 2005 |
Keywords: | Literature Review of behavioral-; experimental- and neuro-economics using ultimatum and dictator game |
JEL: | D01 A10 |
Date: | 2006–04–26 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:767&r=hpe |
By: | Lanteri, Alessandro; Yalcintas, Altug |
Abstract: | The professional life of economists takes place within the boundaries of the institution of academic economics. Belonging to the institution enable economists in many ways. It provides a context wherein their contribution is meaningful. But it constrains, too, what economists are allowed to do or say. Thus, institutions both enable and constrain individual action. Metaphors do the same and are therefore, in this respect, institutions. They are place-holders to communicate our beliefs, feelings, and thoughts. So far, there is nothing wrong. This may become a problem, however, as Richard Rorty has once said, when the “happenstance of our cultural development [is] that we got stuck so long with place-holders.” In the essay we focus on the enabling and disabling roles of metaphors as institutions in the rhetoric of economics. We argue, from the perspective of economics of rhetoric, that some of the metaphors can lead us to path dependent circumstances where the performance of the metaphors is not as desirable as it was when the metaphors were first introduced. Sometimes certain metaphors undergo exaptation, and are employed with new functions. Altogether, we believe, the tools of institutional economics can be fruitfully employed to study metaphors. |
Keywords: | Economics of rhetoric; metaphors as Institutions; path Dependence; exaptation. |
JEL: | B52 B25 B41 |
Date: | 2006–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:747&r=hpe |
By: | Zaman, Md Monowaruz |
Abstract: | This article constructs a new analytical and visible model of economics called “Cycle of Economics” by drawing a thread though neoclassical economics and its theoretical alternatives. By doing so it becomes clear that an economy is self-corrective and progressive by nature. However natural cycle of economics is overridden by profit motive instutions. The role of institutes is not to correct market but to create dynamic market. A market is not uniform or equal behaving for all segments of economic agents rather it is distributed on layers of energy states. If the market energy is weak for the outermost layer agents, they may fall in deep rooted poverty without having any choice but to straggle for subsistence. |
Keywords: | Bounded Rationality; Game Theory; Income Distribution; Information Pattern; Market Energy; Market Dynamics; Neoclassical Economics; Property Right; Transaction Cost; Rationality Pattern |
JEL: | B49 O10 |
Date: | 2006–09–30 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:614&r=hpe |
By: | Maria Mello de Malta |
Date: | 2006 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2006:40&r=hpe |
By: | Hugo E. A. da Gama Cerqueira |
Date: | 2006 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2006:39&r=hpe |
By: | José Rubens Damas Garlipp |
Date: | 2006 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2006:145&r=hpe |
By: | Mornati Fiorenzo (University of Turin) |
Date: | 2005–11–10 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:cesmep:200512&r=hpe |
By: | Mornati Fiorenzo (University of Turin) |
Date: | 2005–10–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:cesmep:200510&r=hpe |
By: | Becchio Giandomenica (University of Turin) |
Date: | 2005–05–19 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:cesmep:200507&r=hpe |
By: | Jaques Kerstenetzky |
Date: | 2006 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2006:78&r=hpe |
By: | Spada Anna |
Abstract: | L'influenza esercitata da Marshall sul pensiero di Keynes è stata per un lungo periodo oggetto di scarsa attenzione. In generale, gli studi su Keynes riconoscono come fonti del suo pensiero filosofico e metodologico, Russell (in una prima fase), Moore e Wittgenstein, tralasciando del tutto il ruolo di Marshall. Nell 'ultimo decennio tuttavia l'influenza marshalliana sul pensiero filosofico e metodologico di Keynes è stata affrontata da più parti. I contatti biografici e gli scambi intellettuali tra Marshall e Keynes si susseguirono dal periodo della formazione di Keynes nel laboratorio marshalliano (1905) alla ripresa da parte di Keynes del pensiero di Marshall dopo la sua morte (1924) in occasione della stesura dello scritto commemorativo e della pubblicazione postuma degli "Official Papers" (1926), curata da Keynes. Il confronto delle reazioni di Keynes in questi due momenti di vicinanza al pensiero di Marshall mostra come egli passi nel corso degli anni da un 'iniziale resistenza ad una successiva completa acquisizione delle idee marshalliane sulla natura, gli scopi e il metodo dell 'economia. In più mostra come il ruolo di Marshall nella formazione del pensiero di Keynes non sia stato affatto marginale anzi abbia avuto un 'importanza cruciale, e possa collocarsi alla base della revisione di Keynes per l'entusiasmo nei confronti di logica e matematica. Il ruolo di Marshall è stato importante anche per la maturazione dell 'idea che la teoria debba adattarsi alla pratica e non viceversa, che caratterizzerà l'esito delle riflessioni di Keynes rispetto a quello dei filosofi di Cambridge, con il pensiero dei quali si era a lungo confrontato. La prospettiva dell'influenza esercitata dai filosofi di Cambridge su Keynes, e soprattutto della interpretazione originale che egli ne hafornito, è utile per chiarire il ruolo svolto da Marshall nella formazione del pensiero filosofico, metodo logico ed economico di Keynes e, più in generale, per comprendere l'origine e le caratteristiche delle affinità tra le idee di Marshall e quella di Keynes sulla natura, gli scopi e il metodo dell'economia. |
Date: | 2005–11–24 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:cesmep:200513&r=hpe |
By: | Antonio Carlos Macedo e Silva |
Date: | 2006 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2006:114&r=hpe |
By: | Fiori Stefano (University of Turin) |
Abstract: | Hayek opposes the expIanation of the emergence of institutions as "spontaneous (unintentional) order", which he considers correct, against "constructivism" (viewed as erroneous). This dichotomy exhibits some inconsistencies, far, on Hayek's account, constructivist ideologies seem able both to prevent the evolutionary emergence of norms and to generate institutions coherent with deliberate, intentional, purposes. If this is so, afe there then two views on the emergence of institutions in Hayek's theory? The parer consequent1y discusses whether constructivism and evolution of norms afe two alternative kinds of expIanation, and in particular whether the former can be interpreted in evolutionary terms. |
Date: | 2005–04–21 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:cesmep:200504&r=hpe |
By: | Becchio Giandomenica (University of Turin) |
Date: | 2005–10–20 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:cesmep:200511&r=hpe |
By: | Fiori Stefano (University of Turin) |
Abstract: | The paper aims to show how Simon's notion of bounded rationality should be interpreted in the light of its connection with artificial intelligence. This connection points out that bounded rationality is a highly structured concept, and sheds light on several implications of Simon's general views on rationality. Finally, offering three paradigmatic examples, the artic1e presents the view that recent approaches, which refer to Simon's heterodox theory, only partially accept the teachings of their inspirer, splitting bounded rationality from the context of artificl al intelligence. |
Date: | 2005–07–20 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:cesmep:200509&r=hpe |
By: | Yalcintas, Altug |
Abstract: | Abstract: History books are full of success stories. Intellectuals are interested in such stories because they are important in human history – they are important especially for those who are willing to know more about how we have reached the peak points of human civilization. History books, however, do not always credit issues of human failure and error. The social element – that is, the set of undesirable consequences of the imperfect character of human doings – are thus left out as irrelevant. Oddities and wrongheadedness, for instance, are not at the forefronts of human notice. They are seen only as peculiarities to be corrected sooner or later. Human failure and error are important as they are often left uncorrected in time. That is to say, we keep repeating the same errors through time. Uncorrected errors of the past sometimes generate undesirability, dissatisfaction, and disappointment in the future, because such errors prevent us from producing pragmatic solutions to practical problems in the economy and society. They prevent us from reaching “the general equilibrium.” They prevent us from getting at “the fundamental truth.” The world is, therefore, not the best of all possible worlds. The world, unlike the portrayals of neo-classical economics in general and Paul Samuelson in particular, is a world of transaction costs, as Ronald Coase argued, in the form of human failure and error. Consequences of such errors, which do not disappear easily and without causing further trouble, make the idea impossible – the idea that perfection in the world of humans is achievable. I illustrate in the paper that there are such errors in human history that cause path dependence in the economy and society. Many errors in the past, I argue, are not corrected – they linger. History is therefore not only a bunch of success stories in the form of efficiencies and optimizations. History is also the stories of error – stories of path dependence. And such errors, too, should matter for historical economists. |
Keywords: | Path dependence; Paul David; Efficiency and Optimality |
JEL: | B52 B25 B41 |
Date: | 2006–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:749&r=hpe |
By: | Fubini Lia (University of Turin) |
Abstract: | An important contribution by Malinvaud presents a theory of unemploment not sufficiently considered by modern macroeconomics. This paper employs his theory to explain some features of contemporary unemployment with special reference to Italy. Empirical evidence appears to be in line with the theory. |
Date: | 2005–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:dipeco:200501&r=hpe |
By: | Jennifer Hermann |
Date: | 2006 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2006:152&r=hpe |
By: | Danilo Araújo Fernandes; Paulo Gala; José Márcio Rego |
Date: | 2006 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2006:2&r=hpe |