nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2006‒06‒24
six papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Chicago

  1. Caryle, Malthus and Sismondi: The Origins of Carlyle’s Dismal View of Political Economy By Robert Dixon
  2. Raúl Prebisch: power, principle and the ethics of develompment. Essays in honour of David H. Pollock marking the centennial celebrations of the birth of Raúl Prebisch. By Edgar J. Dosman
  3. A true competitive advantage? Reflections on different epistemological approaches to strategy research By Durand, Rodolphe; Vaara, Eero
  4. The´Efficiency`of Equity By Stephan Klasen
  5. (When) Would I Lie To You? Comment on “Deception: The Role of Consequences†By Sjaak Hurkens; Navin Kartik  
  6. Ten Do It Better, Do They? An Empirical Analysis of an Old Football Myth By Marco Caliendo; Dubravko Radic

  1. By: Robert Dixon
    Abstract: While it is correct to say that Carlyle first applied the exact phrase “dismal science” to political economy in his 1849 article on plantation labour in the West Indies, I argue that Carlyle came to the view that political economy was “dismal” well before that time. Indeed, his negative attitude can be seen quite clearly in his earlier published reactions to the writings of Malthus (and Sismondi, amongst others) on population growth and its consequences and also to the perceived ‘materialistic’ nature of the subject matter of political economy.
    Date: 2006
  2. By: Edgar J. Dosman
    Abstract: "Es difícil describir o interpretar la historia económica de América Latina sin hacer referencia a la enorme contribución de Raúl Prebisch. Su figura se proyecta a través de la región como la de un gigante en pensamiento y acción. Las huellas de su legado continuan siendo indudablemente relevantes en las actuales discusiones sobre América Latina en relación a los futuros redireccionamientos de su desarrollo económico y gobierno internacional". Enrique V. Iglesias
    Keywords: Economic Policy, Regional Integration, Common Markets, Latin America
    JEL: B1 F13 F15
    Date: 2006–04
  3. By: Durand, Rodolphe; Vaara, Eero
    Abstract: In this paper, the authors focus on the theory of truth underlying specific traditions in strategy research. They distinguish positivism, constructionism, scientific realism, and pragmatism as viable, but fundamentally different epistemological approaches. The authors argue that each of these approaches is based on a specific theory of truth.
    Keywords: truth; strategy; competitive advantage
    JEL: L10
    Date: 2006–01–01
  4. By: Stephan Klasen
    Abstract: In standard neo-classical economics, efficiency and equity issues are largely treated as separate and separable issues. In this paper, I will discuss findings from four strands of literature that challenge this separability and in fact suggest that greater equity will promote greater efficiency in the sense of maximizing well-being in a society. There four strands refer to findings from the experimental literature on the importance of equity or fairness, the subjective well-being literature on the importance of relative incomes and inequality on subjective well-being, the distribution-adjusted well-being literature that combines measures of mean incomes with measures of income inequality to derive at welfare judgements across space and time, and the literature on the relationship between income and gender inequality on economic growth. Some implications for research and policy are explored.
    Keywords: Efficiency, equity, experimental economics, subjective well-being
    JEL: I31 D5 C9
    Date: 2006–06–09
  5. By: Sjaak Hurkens; Navin Kartik  
    Abstract: This paper reconsiders the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (2005,American Economic Review). We argue that Gneezy’s data cannot reject the hipótesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person’s decisión of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. We find that our data cannot reject this hypothesis either, but we also discover substantial differences in behavior between our sub jects and Gneezy’s sub jects.
    Keywords: experimental economics, lying, deception, social preferences
    JEL: C91
    Date: 2006–06–02
  6. By: Marco Caliendo (DIW Berlin, IAB Nuremberg and IZA Bonn); Dubravko Radic (University of Wuppertal)
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate how the expulsion of a player influences the outcome of a football match. Common sense implies a negative impact for the affected team. However, an old football myth suggests that such an expulsion might also be beneficial since it increases the team spirit as well as the efforts of the affected team. We make use of a unique dataset containing all games played in a World Cup Championship between 1930 and 2002 and follow a twofold econometric strategy: We start with a conditional maximum likelihood estimator which is independent of the relative strength of the teams before we extend this estimator to take the relative strength of the teams and the minute of the expulsion into account. Our results indicate that the scoring intensities of both teams do not differ after the expulsion. Conducting scenario analysis reveals that the impact of a red card depends on the minute of the expulsion and does not have an impact at all if given at the end of the first half or later.
    Keywords: Poisson process, (un)conditional likelihood, football, red card effect
    JEL: C40 Z00
    Date: 2006–06

This nep-hpe issue is ©2006 by Erik Thomson. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.