|
on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Antonio Serra |
| Abstract: | In his monumental History of Economic Analysis, Joseph A. Schumpeter calls Serra “the first to compose a scientific treatise … on economic principles and policy.” This working paper, available only hardcopy and upon request, brings the first ever English translation of Antonio Serra’s Breve Trattato. However, the translation is designed to be used in a workshop to take place in Venice in 2007, sponsored by The Other Canon Foundation, which will produce a final English translation of the text for publication. |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tth:wpaper:09&r=hpe |
| By: | Franco DONZELLI |
| Abstract: | Rise and decline of the notion of "own rate of interest" ; in Sraffa. The notion of “commodity rate of interest”, introd uced by Sraffa in a short review-article published in1932, is tak en up by Keynes a few years later under the label of “own rate of interest”. The latter expression soon spreads in the literature, eventually replacing Sraffa’s original name. At its birth Sraffa ’s notion, developed within the framework of a stationary equilib rium model of Wicksellian derivation, appears to be a very promis ing tool of analysis. Sraffa focuses his attention on the phenome non of the possible multiplicity of the “own rates of interest” a ssociated with the various commodities produced and traded in a m onetary economy, suggesting that such phenomenon ought to be inte rpreted as a disequilibrium occurrence, originated by the exogeno us perturbations to which the economy is continuously subjected. By assuming that the agents correctly expect, and the “forward” c ommodity markets perfectly anticipate, the underlying stationary equilibrium prices, Sraffa is able to show that the divergence am ong the “own rates of interest” associated with the various commo dities can be interpreted as an effective market signal, analogou s to the one supposedly provided by the divergence between market and natural prices in classical price theory: such a signal, in fact, would affect producers’ decisions, fostering the appropriat e changes in the production levels of the various “industries” an d thereby promoting the convergence of the economy towards the gi ven stationary equilibrium. At first sight, Sraffa’s analysis se ems to foreshadow interesting theoretical developments in the are a of expectations formation, equilibration processes, the working of “forward” and “futures” commodity markets, and related topics . But such hopes are bound to be disappointed, for Sraffa drops t he notion of “own rate of interest” shortly after its introductio n in 1932, subsequently abstaining from any discussion of both th at notion and any other related concept in all his later writings . In this paper, after dispelling a certain ambiguity surroundin g Sraffa’s original definition of the concept of “own rate of int erest”, we shall explain why Sraffa does not proceed along the ro ad deceptively opened by his 1932 article. In particular, we shal l single out three different reasons explaining why Sraffa almost immediately gives up any kind of research in that area: first, i n the 1932 paper Sraffa’s analysis of expectations formation and the functioning of “forward” markets is not pursued for its own s ake, but only with the purpose of making the adjustment process t owards the stationary equilibrium of the economy more plausible a nd robust; secondly, the constant costs (or constant returns) ass umption, that Sraffa is forced to make in order to analyse the di sequilibrium adjustment process, is an assumption that he will co me to disown in his later work; finally, in the 1932 paper the an alytical treatment of the notion of “own rate of interest” is ser iously incomplete, for Sraffa is unable (or unwilling) to contriv e that sort of “futures” contract, essentially different from the “forward” contract actually envisaged therein, that alone would make the notion of “own rate of interest” applicable to a real (t hat is, a moneyless) economy, as Sraffa pretends to be able to do . Now, since the required sort of “futures” contract, which Sraf fa neglects, is instead systematically employed in modern general equilibrium theory, of both the Arrow-Debreu and the Incomplete Markets type, the paper also examines the peculiar fate of the no tion of “own rate of interest” in such contemporary theoretical m odels. |
| Keywords: | rate of interest, forward transactions, commodity futures, stationary equilibrium, disequilibrium, expectations |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2004-32&r=hpe |
| By: | Sophus A. Reinert |
| Abstract: | A long tradition of thought in Western political philosophy compares the body of man to the political body. This traditional cosmological frame of reference was, with the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, overcome by the emergence of evolutionary social systems. Albert Schäffle [1831-1903] can fruitfully be considered the last major representative of the old trajectory of thought, and Thorstein Veblen [1853-1929] the first of the new. By comparing and contrasting their uses of biological metaphors and the places these occupied in their larger visions of society and the economy, the author explores some of the tensions generated in late nineteenth century political philosophy by the dramatic change in biological paradigm—in other words by Darwin’s first encounter with the body politic. |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tth:wpaper:08&r=hpe |
| By: | Herta Andiel; Carmen Cayuelas Franco |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwsre:sre-disc-2006_04&r=hpe |
| By: | Maurice Salles (CREM-CNRS) |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:200617&r=hpe |
| By: | Erik S. Reinert |
| Abstract: | The author argues that in order to create a qualitative understanding of the factors polarizing the world in growing wealth and growing poverty there is a need to create economics by inclusion, a system where all relevant factors, some of which have been part of the economic discourse for centuries, but also elements (like the different effects of process and product innovations) that are part of evolutionary economics itself, are considered simultaneously. According to the author, this historical/institutional approach to economics would benefit especially the Third World. Moreover, the economics by inclusion should also open the way for policies of inclusion, a system that will put the accent on the wellbeing of the majority and not on the growth of the export sector. |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tth:wpaper:01&r=hpe |
| By: | Richard R. Nelson |
| Abstract: | The purpose of the article is to discuss the differences between the evolutionary economic theory and the neoclassical theory from the appreciative viewpoint that aims to capture the basics of what actually is going on, leaving aside formal mathematical modeling in the two theories. As the result, evolutionary theory sees the economy as always in the process of change that involves economic actors taking actions that break from previous behavior, and an environment in continuing flux because of the innovation. While neoclassical theory sees the economy as at rest, or undergoing well anticipated change it has nothing to say about these kinds of conditions. Therefore the author believes the processes of economic catch-up have to proceed under the implicit or explicit guidance of an evolutionary economic theory. |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tth:wpaper:02&r=hpe |
| By: | S. STEENHAUT; P. VAN KENHOVE |
| Abstract: | The current research scrutinizes the discrete emotion of guilt in situations in which the consumer benefits at the expense of the seller. A first objective was to endorse previous made assumptions of guilt being an important emotion in ethically questionable consumer situations. Therefore, in a first study the experience of guilt (versus shame) is explored across four different questionable consumer behaviors relying on two key ingredients of the guilt emotion, i.e. perceived control and omission/commission. A second objective was to examine what causes guilt to occur in these questionable situations (study 2a/b). Two distinct conceptualizations of the guilt emotion are investigated, i.e. the intrapsychic and interpersonal perspective. Results support both notions of the guilt emotion separately in the context of consumer ethics. When investigating the consequent ethical intentions, it was found to be sufficient for consumers’ behavioral decisions to alter if one of the two perspectives is made salient, that is, when guilt is aroused. Implications are discussed for both consumer ethics literature and consumer behavior research in general. |
| Date: | 2006–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:06/381&r=hpe |
| By: | Isabelle Brocas; Juan D. Carillo |
| Abstract: | We model the brain as a multi-agent organization. Based on recent neuroscience evidence, we assume that different systems of the brain have different time-horizons and different access to information. Introducing asymmetric information as a restriction on optimal choices generates endogenous constraints in decision-making. In this game played between brain systems, we show the optimality of a self-disciplining rule of the type “work more today if you want to consume more today” and discuss its behavioral implications for the distribution of consumption over the life-cycle. We also argue that our dual-system theory provides “micro-microfoundations” for discounting and offer testable implications that depart from traditional models with no conflict and exogenous discounting. Last, we analyze a variant in which the agent has salient incentives or biased motivations. The previous rule is then replaced by a simple, non-intrusive precept of the type “consume what you want, just don’t abuse”. |
| Date: | 2006–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:scp:wpaper:06-48&r=hpe |