nep-hme New Economics Papers
on Heterodox Microeconomics
Issue of 2014‒01‒24
eight papers chosen by
Frederic S. Lee
University of Missouri-Kansas City

  1. Innovation Markets, Future Markets, or Potential Competition: How Should Competition Authorities Account for Innovation Competition in Merger Reviews? By Benjamin Kern
  2. Equality under Threat by the Talented: Evidence from Worker-Managed Firms By Burdín, Gabriel
  3. Women on French Corporate Board of Directors- How Do They Differ from their Male Counterparts? By Rey Dang; Anne-Françoise Bender; Marie-José Scotto
  4. Persistence in corporate networks By Milaković, Mishael; Raddant, Matthias; Birg, Laura
  5. Pride and Patronage - The effect of identity on pay-what-you-want prices at a charitable bookstore By Christina Gravert
  6. The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets By Martin Gaynor; Kate Ho; Robert Town
  7. Universalism vs. particularism: a round trip from sociology to economics By Guido de Blasio; Diego Scalise; Paolo Sestito
  8. Price Regulation and Parallel Imports of Pharmaceuticals By Kurt R. Brekke; Tor Helge Holmås; Odd Rune Straume

  1. By: Benjamin Kern (University of Marburg)
    Abstract: The relevant competitors in regard to innovation might, but not necessarily do, correspond to the identified competitors on actual product markets. Hence, the conventional analysis of product markets, in order to assess the potential anticompetitive effects of mergers, is insufficient to capture innovation competition in its full extent. As a consequence, the aim of this article is to introduce and compare the existing alternative approaches which can, in principle, be used for the assessment of anticompetitive innovation effects in merger review. By focusing on the applied U.S. Antitrust, it turns out that none of the existing approaches seems to be appropriate to fully account for innovation competition. However, the ‘Innovation Market Analysis’, the first framework especially designed for the assessment of innovation aspects, might still serve as a good starting point for the development of a revised assessment framework.
    JEL: B52 K21 L12 L41 O31
    Date: 2014
  2. By: Burdín, Gabriel (IECON, Universidad de la República)
    Abstract: Are high-ability individuals more likely to quit egalitarian regimes? Does the threat of exit by talented individuals restrict the redistributive capacity of democratic organizations? This paper revisits that long-standing debate by analyzing the interplay between compensation structure and quit behavior in the distinct yet underexplored institutional setting of worker-managed firms. The study exploits two novel administrative data sources: a panel of Uruguayan workers employed in both worker-managed and conventional firms; and a linked employer–employee panel data set covering the population of Uruguayan worker-managed firms and their workers from January 1997 to April 2010. A key advantage of the data is that it enables one to exploit within-firm variation on wages to construct an ordinal measure of the worker ability type. The paper's four main findings are that (1) worker-managed firms redistribute in favor of low-wage workers; (2) in worker-managed firms, high-ability members are more likely than other members to exit; (3) the hazard ratio of high-ability members is lower for founding members and for those employed by worker-managed firms in which there is less pay compression; and (4) high-ability members are less likely to quit when labor market conditions in the capitalist sector are less attractive. This paper contributes to the study of the interplay between equality and incentives that permeates many debates in public finance, comparative economic systems, personnel and organizational economics.
    Keywords: labor managed firms, redistribution, compensation structure, job mobility
    JEL: H00 J54 J62 M52 P0
    Date: 2013–12
  3. By: Rey Dang; Anne-Françoise Bender; Marie-José Scotto
    Abstract: Our research aims at exploring individual’s characteristics of women on Boards in the French context. In the first part of our paper, we discuss the different theoretical frameworks which supported the business case of gender diversity on Boards of Directors and expose our hypothesis regarding differences in women and men characteristics. The second part presents our methods, measurements and data. Then, we focus on our empirical study. Our sample consists of the French Index SBF 120 companies. We studied the profile of 1,250 directors collecting information from the firms’ annual reports of year 2010, using various scales defined by previous research on that field in the Anglo–Saxon literature. Our findings confirm that integrating women on boards has an impact on the Human and Social Capital of Boards but not as much as might have been expected. It is worth noting that men and women board members seem to build their human and social capital through the same educational process in France. Nonetheless, our work shows significant differences between men and women regarding professional experience and board member status.
    Keywords: Corporate Governance, Boards of Directors, Diversity, Gender, Board Composition
    Date: 2014–01–06
  4. By: Milaković, Mishael; Raddant, Matthias; Birg, Laura
    Abstract: We examine the bipartite graphs of German corporate boards in 1993, 1999 and 2005, and identify cores of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. The novel feature of this paper is the focus on the dynamics of these networks. Germany's corporate governance has experienced significant changes during this time, and there is substantial turnover in the identity of core members, yet we observe the persistent presence of a network core, which is even robust to changes in the tail distribution of multiple board memberships. Anecdotal evidence suggests that core persistence originates from the board appointment decisions of largely capitalized corporations. --
    Date: 2014
  5. By: Christina Gravert (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark)
    Abstract: I conduct a field experiment at a charitable bookstore to provide evidence for the role of identity under "pay-what-you-want pricing". When subtly reminded of their participation in the store's membership program members paid significantly more per book then without a reminder, while this nudge had no effect on non-members. Making an individual aware of its close social connection to the seller can thus, in a charitable setting, increase voluntarily paid prices.
    Keywords: Field experiment, Pay-What-You-Want, Charitable contributions, Identity
    JEL: C93 D03 D4 D64
    Date: 2014–01–14
  6. By: Martin Gaynor; Kate Ho; Robert Town
    Abstract: The US health care sector is large and growing – health care spending in 2011 amounted to $2.7 trillion and 18% of GDP. Approximately half of health care output is allocated via markets. In this paper, we analyze the industrial organization literature on health care markets focusing on the impact of competition on price, quality and treatment decisions for health care providers and health insurers. We conclude with a discussion of research opportunities for industrial organization economists, including opportunities created by the US Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
    JEL: I11 L1 L10
    Date: 2014–01
  7. By: Guido de Blasio (Banca d'Italia); Diego Scalise (Banca d'Italia); Paolo Sestito (Banca d'Italia)
    Abstract: Social scientists, in particular sociologists, claim that the distinction between universalistic and particularistic values is relevant to explaining the social behaviour of individuals (and societies). This paper provides preliminary empirical evidence that supports the claim. It first defines a number of proxies for the degree of particularism embedded into long-celebrated dimensions of social behaviour (trust, political awareness, and associational activities). Then, it shows that the particularistic measures are positively correlated to each other and negatively correlated to some established generalist measures for all dimensions of social behaviour considered, both across and within countries and regions. Moreover, the paper relates that the various proxies for particularism share the same set of covariates (such as low education and income), which are neatly distinguishable from the determinants of the generalist measures.
    Keywords: particularism, social capital
    JEL: A13 Z13
    Date: 2014–01
  8. By: Kurt R. Brekke (Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics); Tor Helge Holmås (Uni Rokkan Centre); Odd Rune Straume (Universidade do Minho - NIPE)
    Abstract: This paper studies the effects of price regulation and parallel imports in the onpatent pharmaceutical market. First, we develop a theory model in which a pharmacy negotiates producer prices with a brand-name firm and then sets retail prices. We show that the effects of price regulation crucially depend on whether the producer faces competition from parallel imports. While parallel imports improve the bargaining position of the pharmacy, price regulation counteracts this effect and may even be profitable for the producer. Second, we use a unique dataset with information on sales and prices at both producer and retail level for 165 substances over four years (2004-7). Exploiting exogenous variation in the regulated price caps, we show that stricter price regulation reduces competition from parallel imports. While the effect is clearly negative on producer profits for substances without parallel imports, the effect is not significant for substances with parallel imports. Finally, we show that stricterprice regulation reduces total expenditures, but the effect is much stronger for substances with parallel import. Thus, our results suggest that price regulation may promote both static and dynamic efficiency in the presence of parallel imports.
    Keywords: Pharmaceutical market; Price regulation; Parallel imports
    JEL: I11 I18 L13 L51 L65
    Date: 2014

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