|
on Business, Economic and Financial History |
| By: | Tetsuji OKAZAKI; Yutaka Arimoto; Tomoko Hashino; Masaki Nakabayashi; Yoshihiro Sakane |
| Abstract: | This paper surveys the changes in economic history research in Japan. In recent decades, the internationalization of research has progressed and the influence of economics and econometrics has increased, and related to these changes, more economic historians are working on new topics using new approaches. Japans economic history research was internationalized prior to World War II, but only in the sense that economic historians in Japan imported theoretical frameworks, concepts, and perspectives from the Western literature. In recent decades, the situation has changed. Economic historians in Japan, equipped with analytical tools from economics and econometrics, have generated new insights and exported them to the international academic community. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cnn:wpaper:24-012e |
| By: | Baubeau, Patrice; Teixeira, Mateo |
| Abstract: | This article addresses the growing gap in the literature between qualitative data on prices and money in France around World War II, and the available CPI. It gathers archival price data to calculate a new CPI for 1938-1949, incorporating both official and black-market prices. The study demonstrates the adequacy of available sources and the robustness of the new CPI, both in its construction and when compared to contemporary analyses. Three key findings are that France did not experience exponential price acceleration; that dictatorship (1940-1944) was no more effective at price control than democracy (1945-1949); and that the 1944-1945 wage increases had a minor impact on inflation, questioning the price-wage loop explanation of France’s post-war inflation. |
| Keywords: | Inflation; Prices; Black markets; Repression; Politics; Public statistics, History; Political economy; France, World War 2 |
| JEL: | E31 N0 N01 N1 N44 P4 P44 P48 |
| Date: | 2024–06–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121621 |
| By: | Petach, Luke |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effect of religion on the economic progress of Black Americans after Reconstruction. Southern religious institutions-particularly the Southern Baptist church-played a key role in the development of the Lost Cause mythology that helped legitimate the white supremacist political order which dominated the American South well into the twentieth century. Using county-level data on religious adherence from the 1860 Census and data on county economic characteristics from the full count Census for the years 1850 to 1910, I show that from 1870 onward Black incomes, Black literacy rates, the share of Black individuals with "high-skill" occupations, and the share of Black individuals with manufacturing occupations were lower in counties with a greater pre-Civil War Baptist membership share. This finding is robust to county-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, state-specific linear time trends, and controlling for the county slave population share prior to 1860. No such negative effect on Black economic outcomes exists for the Catholic church, which never formally recognized the Confederacy. I highlight the relationship between Baptist church membership and Lost Cause ideology by demonstrating a positive effect of Baptist membership on Confederate monument construction, lynching, and showings of D.W. Griffith's Birth of a Nation. |
| Keywords: | Economics of Religion, Stratification Economics, Economic History, Post- Reconstruction, Lost Cause |
| JEL: | Z12 Z13 J15 N31 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1480 |
| By: | Lukas Rosenberger; W. Walker Hanlon; Carl Hallmann |
| Abstract: | How did Britain sustain faster rates of economic growth than comparable European countries, such as France, during the Industrial Revolution? We argue that Britain possessed an important but underappreciated innovation advantage: British inventors worked in technologies that were more central within the innovation network. We offer a new approach for measuring the innovation network using patent data from Britain and France in the late-18th and early-19th century. We show that the network influenced innovation outcomes and demonstrate that British inventors worked in more central technologies within the innovation network than French inventors. Drawing on recently developed theoretical tools, and using a novel estimation strategy, we quantify the implications for technology growth rates in Britain compared to France. Our results indicate that the shape of the innovation network, and the location of British inventors within it, explains an important share of the more rapid technological change and industrial growth in Britain during the Industrial Revolution. |
| JEL: | N13 O30 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32875 |
| By: | Churchill, Sefa Awaworyi (RMIT University); Chang, Simon (University of Western Australia); Smyth, Russell (Monash University); Trinh, Trong-Anh (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | This paper extends prior theory linking present-day sex ratios to present-day propensity for entrepreneurship among men backward in time to explore the long-run gender origins of entrepreneurship. We argue that present-day propensity for entrepreneurship among men will be higher in neighbourhoods which had historically high sex ratios. We propose that high sex ratios generate attitudes and behaviours that imprint into cultural norms about gender roles and that vertical transmission within families create hysteresis in the evolution of these gender norms. To empirically test the theory, we employ the transport of convicts to the British colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a natural experiment to examine the long-run effect of gender norms on entrepreneurship in present-day Australia. We use a representative longitudinal dataset for the Australian population that provides information on the neighbourhood in which the participant lives, which we merge with data on the sex ratio in historical counties from the mid-nineteenth century. We find that men who live in neighbourhoods which had high historical sex ratios have a higher propensity for entrepreneurship. We present evidence consistent with the vertical transmission of gender norms within families being the likely mechanism. Arguments for policies to promote female entrepreneurship are typically couched in terms of gender norms representing a barrier to more women starting their own business. We present evidence consistent with gender norms contributing to gender differences in rates of entrepreneurship by being a spur for higher male entrepreneurship rather than a barrier to female entrepreneurship. |
| Keywords: | gender norms, sex ratios, entrepreneurship, Australia |
| JEL: | I31 J21 J22 N37 O10 Z13 Z18 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17170 |
| By: | Guillem Verd Llabrés (Universidad de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain) |
| Abstract: | After the end of World War II, family allowances became central to Western European Welfare states as they influenced gender relations, demographic growth, child welfare and wage regulation. Yet, their implementation was shaped by several determinants —fertility rates, religion, Conservative dictatorships, or party competition— whose relative importance is still open to study. Spain provides a significant case study to understand such determinants. It was a firstcomer in developing family allowances, giving them a crucial role in the Francoist social policies, but their development was marked by significant religious cleavages, left-right political competition and regime changes during the interwar period. The paper shows that, despite gaining momentum among catholic campaigners and Parties, the apathy —if not opposition— from the left, employers and landowners prevented the scheme from being developed before the Spanish Civil War. After the conflict, despite becoming central to Francoist social programs targeting the family and the labour market, family allowances fell well behind campaigners’ expectations, and proved unable to reach a significant proportion of Spanish families. The Spanish low fiscal capacity and the inability to collect contributions —particularly in the countryside— were central to understanding such a difficult development. |
| Keywords: | Family Allowances, Spain, Religious Cleavage, Political Regime, Fiscal Capacity |
| JEL: | I38 J13 N34 N44 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ahe:dtaehe:2405 |
| By: | Cummins, Neil |
| Abstract: | Using surnames from the universe of death and wealth-at-death records in England and Wales, from 1858 to 2018, I document the emergence of a modern ethnic wealth gradient. Historically, Non-British ethnicities have average wealth 2-5 times that of the English. However, this premium has decreased over the 20th century. By 1980, non-British ethnicities have no advantage over the British. However, this masks considerable heterogeneity within the non-British ethnicity group. Europeans typically die significantly richer than the English whereas the Pakistani and Swedish die significantly poorer. Some groups always have lower wealth. The Irish, have wealth around 50% of the average English throughout. Surprisingly, the most egalitarian measure of wealth is representation within the top 1%. Most ethnicities have an equal, or greater, representation in the top 1% than the English, 1980-1992. Despite large differences in average wealth between ethnicities, the vast majority of variation, 97.5% is between individuals. |
| JEL: | N00 N33 N34 |
| Date: | 2024–08–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:wpaper:124681 |
| By: | Carla Sequeira (Faculty of Arts and Humanities of University of Porto) |
| Abstract: | Our presentation will focus on two recently founded Port wine producers: Noble & Murat, founded in 2012, and Porto dos Santos, founded in 2022. These two companies are examples of a new dynamic in the Port wine sector, marked by the re-emergence of companies and brands with a family tradition. Noble & Murat, founded in the first half of the 19th century as an exporter of Port wine, but also of other products, especially cod, marked the Port wine market and remained very active until the beginning of the 20th century. This historic brand was rehabilitated in the 21st century, when it was acquired by descendants of two families long associated with the Port wine sector, and now focuses exclusively on the production of high-quality Port wines. Porto dos Santos was originally founded in the first half of the 19th century, but disappeared at the beginning of the 20th century. Recently, the brand was re-registered as a Port wine producer by one of the descendants of the founding family of the original company. These two companies/brands demonstrate the emergence and affirmation of new productive agents in the Port wine sector, particularly the producer-bottler targeting niche markets. |
| Keywords: | Port Wine; Brands; Family tradition |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:14216120 |
| By: | Bellanca, Nicolo' |
| Abstract: | These writings examine Claudio Napoleoni's reflections on the themes of the Marxist theory of value. In particular, they focus on the concepts of economic exploitation and alienation, documenting their evolution and demonstrating how these explorations aim to delineate a horizon of human emancipation. Finally, the fourth essay argues that Napoleoni's Marxist contributions are not distinct from his more concrete analyses of the Italian economy. In the 1960s, his reassessment of the concepts of productive labour and rent allowed him to argue that the social and political hegemony of redistributive coalitions constitutes Italy's main structural weakness and the primary cause of inequality and lack of inclusion. |
| Keywords: | Marxist theory of value; Claudio Napoleoni; Hanna Arendt; Alienation; Economic exploitation; Productive labour; Political economy; Italian economy |
| JEL: | B24 D72 E11 |
| Date: | 2024–04–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121789 |
| By: | Maurin, Eric (Paris School of Economics); Oliveira, Florentine (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE) |
| Abstract: | In many countries, the Sixties marked a turning point in the history of women's emancipation. Using data with information on the birth order of large samples of individuals, we show that the first to be affected by this revolution were the first-born of the early 1960 s: they grew up much more often in "modern" families (two children max, working mother and significant likelihood of parental divorce) than children of higher birth orders born at the same time in other families. However, this change in family environment did not coincide with any decline in their educational or occupational achievement. |
| Keywords: | Sixties, family size, maternal employment, education |
| JEL: | J11 J12 J13 I24 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17236 |
| By: | Heng-fu Zou (The World Bank) |
| Abstract: | Deirdre McCloskey's argument in favor of what she calls humanomics emphasizes the role of novel ideas about liberty and dignity for ordinary people as the driving force behind what she terms "The Great Enrichment." This period of unprecedented economic growth, beginning in the 18th century and continuing into the present, was not primarily driven by capital accumulation or institutional frameworks, but by the widespread social acceptance of bourgeois values that encouraged innovation and entrepreneurship among the masses. |
| Date: | 2024–08–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cuf:wpaper:659 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Brazil’s foreign and trade relations with Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) date back to the Portuguese slave trade. Of the 9.5 million people captured in Africa and brought to the New World between the 16th and 19th centuries, nearly 4 million landed in Rio de Janeiro, i.e. ten times more than all those sent to the United States. Still today, about 51 % of the population see themselves as black or mixed. Racial inequality remains deeply engrained in many respects, notably concerning persistent inequality. Nonetheless, oppression and marginalization of black Brazilians have been largely ignored in modern Brazilian-African relations. Instead, a pronounced nationalism suffused Brazil’s political life. It guided Brazil’s foreign and trade relations and defined how Brazilians interpreted the opportunities of African independence movements. Only Brazil’s President Lula da Silva acknowledged the common historical roots during his first time as president from 2003 to 2011. In fact, his election was driven by the overwhelming support of Afro-Brazilians. Trade relations in the first half of the 20th century were largely limited to South Africa, which accounted for 90 % of Brazil’s African trade. Brasilia’s foreign and trade policy since the 1960s focussed on Nigeria, an important oil supplier, and the five Portuguese-speaking former Portuguese African colonies (PALOP) and the Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP), founded in 1996. Up to date, Brazilian’s trade relations in West Africa, apart from Nigeria (34 % of Brazil’s African trade) remained fairly modest. Nevertheless, Ghana and Senegal played a decisive role in shaping Brazil-African relations in the early stages of African independence since the 1960s. Because Brazil has meanwhile considerable energy and commodity resources of its own, its approach concerning African trade is less commodity driven than the Chinese or European, but orientated at resource diversification, sustainable development and cooperation to develop these resources, e.g. bioethanol plants in Ghana and other African countries. Therefore, African governments see a greater sense of mutual partnership and reciprocity in their relationship with Brazil. However, corrupt political African elites themselves urged the Brazilian government and companies often into informal political and business norms, with controversial and corrupt investment in commodity extraction, infrastructure and land-grabbing. Apart from that, Brazil tried to create a niche for Brazilian management services, knowledge and technology transfer, suited supposedly exceptionally well for tropical markets. |
| Abstract: | Die Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen Brasiliens zu Subsahara-Afrika (SSA) gehen bis auf den portugiesischen Sklavenhandel zurück. Von den 9, 5 Millionen Menschen, die zwischen dem 16. und 19. Jahrhundert in Afrika gefangen genommen und in die Neue Welt gebracht wurden, landeten fast 4 Millionen in Rio de Janeiro, d.h. zehnmal mehr als alle Sklaven, die in die Vereinigten Staaten geschickt wurden. Noch heute sehen sich etwa 51 % der Bevölkerung Brasiliens als schwarz oder gemischt. Rassenungleichheit ist in vielerlei Hinsicht nach wie vor tief verwurzelt, insbesondere in Bezug auf die anhaltende Ungleichheit. Dennoch wurden Unterdrückung und Marginalisierung schwarzer Brasilianer in den modernen brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen weitgehend ausgeblendet. Stattdessen durchdrang ein ausgeprägter Nationalismus das politische Leben Brasiliens. Es bestimmte auch seine Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen und definierte, wie die Brasilianer die Chancen afrikanischer Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen nutzten. Erst Brasiliens Präsident Lula da Silva bekannte sich während seiner ersten Amtszeit als Präsident von 2003 bis 2011 zu den gemeinsamen historischen Wurzeln. Tatsächlich verdankte er seine Wahl der überwältigenden Unterstützung der Afrobrasilianer. Die Handelsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts beschränkten sich weitgehend auf Südafrika, auf das 90 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens entfielen. Brasilias Außen- und Handelspolitik konzentrierte sich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren auf Nigeria, einen wichtigen Öllieferanten, sowie die fünf ehemaligen portugiesischen afrikanischen Kolonien (PALOP) und das 1996 gegründete Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP). Der Handel mit Westafrika blieb, mit Ausnahme von Nigeria (34 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens), recht bescheiden. Dennoch spielten Ghana und Senegal in den frühen Stadien der afrikanischen Unabhängigkeit eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Gestaltung der brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen. Da Brasilien mittlerweile über beträchtliche eigene Energie- und Rohstoffressourcen verfügt, ist sein Ansatz im afrikanischen Handel weniger rohstoffgetrieben als der chinesischer oder europäischer Investoren, sondern orientiert sich an Ressourcendiversifizierung, nachhaltiger Entwicklung und Kooperation zur Erschließung dieser Ressourcen, z.B. Bioethanolanlagen in Ghana. Daher sehen afrikanische Regierungen ihre Beziehungen zu Brasilien eher auf gegenseitiger Partnerschaft gegründet. Korrupte politische afrikanische Eliten selbst drängten jedoch die brasilianische Regierung und Unternehmen oft zu informellen politischen und geschäftlichen Praktiken, mit umstrittenen und korrupten Investitionen in Rohstoffgewinnung, Infrastruktur und Landraub. Abgesehen davon versuchte Brasilien, eine Nische für brasilianische Managementdienstleistungen, Wissens- und Technologietransfer zu schaffen, der angeblich hervorragend für tropische Märkte geeignet war. |
| Keywords: | Brazil, South Atlantic, Sub-Saharan Africa, West Africa, international trade, migration, slavery, post-colonialism |
| JEL: | E26 F22 F54 I31 J46 L31 N17 O17 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300930 |
| By: | McLaughlin, Eoin; Pecchenino, Rowena A. |
| Abstract: | In the decade before the Great Famine, Ireland experienced a boom in microfinance institutions (MFIs). Taking a social enterprise perspective, this paper analyses the institutional context for this boom. It finds evidence linking the boom in MFIs to the development, via the introduction of the poor law in 1838, of a nascent welfare state at the end of a very turbulent period in Irish history. Many contemporary writers saw microfinance as a legal means that could lessen the burden on rate payers by helping the poor help themselves. Econometric analysis at the level of the Poor Law Union confirms the link between MFIs, an Irish solution, and the poor law, a British solution, to Ireland's chronic poverty. The goal of the Irish solution was to address what was perceived to be the cause of poverty, a want of capital, while the British solution addressed the symptoms of poverty but not its root cause. |
| Keywords: | social enterprise, microfinance, inequality, development, Ireland, social enterprise, microfinance, inequality, development, Ireland |
| JEL: | G21 H75 I38 N23 N33 N83 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hwuaef:301872 |
| By: | Kohnert. Dirk |
| Abstract: | As early as 1991, Ali Mazrui argued that the Red Sea was not suitable for separating Africa from Arabia. For the two were inextricably intertwined through languages, religions (particularly Islam) and identities in both the Sahara and the Red Sea in a historical fusion of Arabism and African identity. Their separation was closely linked to a broader trend in which the white world closed ranks and created a system of global apartheid. The historical origins of the Africa-Middle East divide, i.e. the views of the Red Sea and the Sahara as racial and civilizational boundaries created by European Enlightenment ideology and early colonial expansionism were reinforced by postcolonial authoritarian regimes and Cold War rivalries, as well as by nationalist currents in Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increasingly viewed the Horn of Africa as their 'Western security flank'. They were united in their desire to prevent the growing influence of Turkey, Iran and Qatar in this part of the world. These Gulf rivalries formed the basis for growing economic cooperation with SSA as well as military support and security alliances, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which together have become the largest Gulf investors in Africa, compete with each other, particularly with Qatar, which has established embassies in most SSA countries. In addition, state and non-state actors from the Middle East and North Africa were closely involved in the destabilization of the Sahel in the 2010s by providing military, intelligence and ideological support to SSA states and terrorist groups. On the other hand, the Gulf States became increasingly dependent on migrant labour and the steady increase in migration from SSA to these countries, reinforced by the massive influx from African migrant-sending countries given the restrictions on African migration to Europe. As early as the seventh century AD, Arabia had relied heavily on the slave trade and the supply of labour from SSA, founded on the philosophy that it was legitimate to enslave black people because they were no better than animals. During this time, Black Africa became the largest slave depot in the Islamic world. To this day, there are significant African migrant and diaspora communities in the Middle East. Their presence has at times helped to perpetuate long-standing derogatory views and attitudes towards Africa and its peoples. These attitudes, based on an Arab-centric social hierarchy and expressing contempt for African cultures, remain prevalent today and shape social relationships between employers and African migrants in the emirates of the Arabian Peninsula. |
| Abstract: | Bereits 1991 vertrat Ali Mazrui die These, dass das Rote Meer nicht dazu geeignet sei, Afrika von Arabien zu trennen. Denn beide waren durch Sprachen, Religionen (insbesondere den Islam) und Identitäten sowohl in der Sahara als auch im Roten Meer in einer historischen Verschmelzung von Arabismus und afrikanischer Identität untrennbar miteinander verwoben. Deren Trennung sei eng verbunden mit einem allgemeineren Trend, gemäß dem die weiße Welt ihre Reihen schloss und ein System der globalen Apartheid schuf. Die historischen Ursprünge der Kluft zwischen Afrika und dem Nahen Osten, d. h. die durch die Ideologie der europäischen Aufklärung und den frühen kolonialen Expansionismus geschaffene Sicht auf das Rote Meer und die Sahara als Rassen- und Zivilisationsgrenzen, wurden durch postkoloniale autoritäre Regime und Rivalitäten im Kalten Krieg sowie durch nationalistische Strömungen in Afrika, dem Nahen Osten und Nordafrika verstärkt. Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate betrachteten das Horn von Afrika zunehmend als ihre "westliche Sicherheitsflanke". Sie waren sich einig in dem Wunsch, den wachsenden Einfluss der Türkei, Irans und Katars in diesem Teil der Welt zu verhindern. Diese Rivalitäten am Golf bildeten die Grundlage für die wachsende wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit SSA sowie für militärische Unterstützungs- und Sicherheitsallianzen, insbesondere am Horn von Afrika. Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate, die zusammen zu den größten Golfinvestoren in Afrika geworden sind, konkurrieren miteinander, insbesondere mit Katar, das in den meisten SSA-Ländern Botschaften eingerichtet hat. Zudem waren staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure aus dem Nahen Osten und Nordafrika in den 2010er Jahren eng an der Destabilisierung der Sahelzone beteiligt, unter anderem durch die Bereitstellung militärischer, geheimdienstlicher und ideologischer Unterstützung für SSA-Staaten und Terrorgruppen. Andererseits wurden die Golfstaaten zunehmend abhängig von Wanderarbeitskräften und der stetigen Zunahme der Migration aus SSA in diese Länder, verstärkt durch den massiven Zustrom aus afrikanischen Migranten-Entsendeländern angesichts der Einschränkungen afrikanischer Migration nach Europa. Bereits ab dem siebten Jahrhundert n. Chr. stützte sich Arabien stark auf den Sklavenhandel und die Bereitstellung von Arbeitskräften aus SSA, begründet mit der Philosophie, dass es legitim sei, schwarze Menschen zu versklaven, weil sie nicht besser als Tiere seien. In dieser Zeit wurde Schwarzafrika zum größten Sklavendepot der islamischen Welt. Bis heute gibt es im Nahen Osten bedeutende afrikanische Migranten- und Diasporagemeinschaften. Ihre Anwesenheit hat zeitweise dazu beigetragen, seit langem bestehende abwertende Ansichten und Einstellungen gegenüber Afrika und seinen Völkern aufrechtzuerhalten. Diese Einstellungen, die auf einer arabisch-zentrierten sozialen Hierarchie basieren und eine Verachtung gegenüber afrikanischen Kulturen zum Ausdruck bringen, sind bis heute vorherrschend und prägen die sozialen Beziehungen zwischen Arbeitgebern und afrikanischen Migranten in den Emiraten der Arabischen Halbinsel. |
| Keywords: | GCC, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Sub-Saharan Africa, Red Sea, Horn of Africa, Islamic terrorism |
| JEL: | D74 E26 F55 H56 N47 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300911 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | In the 1960s, sub-Saharan Africa experienced a major diplomatic offensive by Israel. Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana was the first country to establish diplomatic and economic relations. Others soon followed, so that by the mid-1960s some forty African countries were receiving agricultural and military aid from Israel and benefiting from scholarships for their students. Israel's involvement was facilitated by the CIA's activities in Africa at the time, which were conceived and funded by the United States and other Western powers as their "third force" in Africa. Since then, the situation has evolved due to Africans' growing solidarity with the Palestinians and their rejection of Israel's "apartheid" system of systematic discrimination against non-Israeli populations. Israel lost the support of most SSA countries in the early 1970s because of its collaboration with apartheid South Africa. As Nelson Mandela said, "South Africa will never be free until Palestine is free". At its 12th Ordinary Session in Kampala in 1975, the OAU for the first time identified Israel's founding ideology, Zionism, as a form of racism. Nevertheless, several African countries continued to maintain low-level contacts through thirteen foreign embassies, for example in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, while educational and commercial exchanges continued, albeit on a much reduced scale and away from the public eye. But the scourge of Islamist terrorism necessitated a revival of relations. Military and security cooperation, including cyber security, is particularly intensive with Ethiopia, Zaire, Uganda, Ghana, Togo and South Africa, for example. It has also often served to prop up despotic African regimes. Today, sub-Saharan Africa is a lucrative market for the Israeli defence industry. |
| Abstract: | In den 1960er Jahren erlebte Afrika südlich der Sahara eine umfassende diplomatische Offensive Israels. Das Ghana Kwame Nkrumahs war das erste Land, das diplomatische und wirtschaftliche Beziehungen aufbaute. Andere Länder folgten bald, so dass Mitte der 1960er Jahre etwa vierzig afrikanische Länder Agrar- und Militärhilfe von Israel erhielten und von Stipendien für ihre Studenten profitierten. Das Engagement Israels wurde durch die damaligen Aktivitäten der CIA in Afrika gefördert, die von den Vereinigten Staaten und anderen westlichen Mächten als ihrer "dritten Kraft" in Afrika gestaltet und finanziert wurden. Seitdem hat sich die Situation aufgrund der wachsenden Solidarität der Afrikaner mit den Palästinensern und ihrer Ablehnung des israelischen "Apartheid"-Systems, d.h. der systematischen Diskriminierung nicht-israelischer Bevölkerungsgruppen, weiterentwickelt. Israel verlor Anfang der 1970er Jahre aufgrund seiner Zusammenarbeit mit dem Apartheid-Südafrika die Unterstützung der meisten SSA-Länder. Wie Nelson Mandela sagte: "Südafrika wird niemals frei sein, bis Palästina frei ist." Auf ihrer 12. ordentlichen Tagung in Kampala im Jahr 1975 bezeichnete die OAU erstmals Israels Gründungsideologie, den Zionismus, als eine Form des Rassismus. Dennoch unterhielten mehrere afrikanische Länder weiterhin Kontakte auf niedriger Ebene über dreizehn ausländische Botschaften, beispielsweise in Äthiopien, Tansania, Uganda und Zaire, während der Bildungs- und Handelsaustausch fortgesetzt wurde, wenn auch auf deutlich reduziertem Niveau und abseits der Öffentlichkeit. Doch die Geißel des islamistischen Terrorismus machte eine Wiederbelebung der Beziehungen erforderlich. Die militärische und sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit, einschließlich der Cybersicherheit, ist beispielsweise mit Äthiopien, Zaire, Uganda, Ghana, Togo und Südafrika besonders intensiv. Sie diente häufig auch der Unterstützung despotischer afrikanischer Regime. Heute ist Afrika südlich der Sahara ein lukrativer Markt für die israelische Rüstungsindustrie. Kamerun, Tschad, Äquatorialguinea, Lesotho, Nigeria, Ruanda, die Seychellen, Südafrika und Uganda erhielten zwischen 2006 und 2010 Waffen aus Israel. Im Jahr 2014 gingen 40 % der israelischen Waffenexporte in afrikanische Länder. Nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und dem Beginn des israelisch-arabischen Friedensprozesses nahmen die meisten afrikanischen Staaten die Beziehungen zu Israel wieder auf, nachdem Netanyahu 2009 Premierminister wurde unter dem Motto: "Israel kommt nach Afrika zurück, Afrika kommt nach Israel zurück". Israel unterhält mittlerweile Beziehungen zu 40 Staaten südlich der Sahara, von denen einige eine pro-israelischere Haltung einnehmen als zuvor. Die Stabilisierung des Horns von Afrika wurde als entscheidend angesehen, da sie in direktem Zusammenhang mit dem Einwanderungsdruck stand, dem Israel seit Mitte des letzten Jahrzehnts ausgesetzt war. Auf israelischem Boden leben schätzungsweise 40.000 afrikanische Flüchtlinge, die meisten aus dem Sudan und Eritrea. Israels internationales Ansehen wurde durch seine entschlossene Politik beeinträchtigt, die Zahl der Migranten durch den Bau einer Mauer an der Grenze zu Ägypten zu begrenzen. Seit 2013 hat die Regierung im Rahmen eines Programms der "freiwilligen Ausreise" zwischen 2014 und 2017 versucht, rund 4.000 Migranten nach Ruanda und Uganda abzuschieben. Fast alle flohen wieder aus Rwanda und machten sich auf die gefährliche Reise nach Europa. |
| Keywords: | Israel, AU, Palestinians, African immigration to Israel, trafficking, racism |
| JEL: | D31 D62 D74 E26 F22 F55 H56 N47 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300913 |
| By: | Ó Gráda, Cormac |
| Abstract: | World War 1 exacerbated the cost of the influenza epidemic of 1918-19 in two ways. First, it facilitated the spread the flu virus through the movement of clusters of infected soldiers and sailors. Second, it constrained public health measures that would have reduced mortality (as during the Covid-19 epidemic). While there is no obvious way of estimating any resulting mortality, attributing even a modest share of the deaths caused by the flu to the war would significantly increase the civilian death toll. |
| Keywords: | pandemic, influenza, World War I |
| JEL: | I1 I18 N0 |
| Date: | 2024–06–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121698 |
| By: | Heng-fu Zou (The World Bank) |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cuf:wpaper:658 |
| By: | Knake, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | In his article, Sebastian Knake challenges the general assumption that traditional savings accounts in the US disappeared naturally as a result of the combination of interest rate regulation and extraordinarily high market interest rates during the stagflation period. By comparing the US experience with simultaneous developments in West Germany, he finds that the opportunity costs of owning a regular passbook were comparable in both countries. In contrast to the US case, however, the passbook remained a cornerstone of household saving in Germany. Drawing upon research in several bank archives in the US and Germany, Knake explains these divergent developments in terms of fundamental differences in how banks and their customers communicated over prices. In the US, a peculiar combination of regulative rules forced banks, and especially savings institutions, to aggressively promote new types of bank accounts that were introduced by federal regulation authorities, thereby increasing nominal interest rate expectations. In Germany, by contrast, banks confined information about advantageous investment opportunities to the smallest possible share of the customer base. These divergent communication strategies reflect a difference in the balance of power in the bank-customer relationship. German customers depended on their primary-and in most cases only-bank relationship to acquire information on alternative investments, while US customers could draw on several relationships with banks and savings institutions to obtain the relevant information. Thus, the fate of the passbook was sealed by the ability or inability of banks to keep their customers in the dark about the real opportunity costs of passbook saving. |
| Keywords: | Savings, Deposits, Interest Expectations, Portfolio Choice, Financial History, Passbook, Comparative History |
| JEL: | G14 G21 N20 N22 N24 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:pp1859:301873 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Since the 1960s, both the regime of Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) and, subsequently starting from 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran, have intervened in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). While the Shah's policies were motivated by a virulent anti-communist stance, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) pursued a 'radical' policy of changing the political status of the Western world, including the Western Arab allies, who were hostile to the survival of the mullah regime. While the Shah focused on geopolitical interests, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the vital sea route to the Red Sea, and in South Africa, and ignored the interests of African Muslims, the IRI exploited increasingly radicalized Islamists to expand Iranian influence on the continent. For example, the IRI has spent billions of dollars in the region to provide Muslim schools and free social services through hospitals and orphanages supported by the Iranian Red Crescent. The IRI's strategy aimed to build grassroots support among Muslim communities rather than focusing exclusively on African governments. Tehran's expansionist policies included arms sales to state and non-state actors and the destabilization of regimes. The goal was to build partnerships that would help evade international sanctions while opening new terrain for its axis of resistance against its global and regional adversaries, particularly its arch-enemy Israel. Tehran's version of political Islam involved building up proxies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels, most recently in Yemen, who have wreaked havoc on international shipping lanes in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Tehran expanded its influence in the Sahel region, taking advantage of self-serving French Africa policy and the policies of other Western powers in West Africa to establish contacts with the anti-Western ASE military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Russia, China and Turkey paved the way for this new alignment. The rivalry between Iran and Israel has intensified in recent decades, with several confrontations between the two countries in the Red Sea and East Africa since the 2010s. Iran has continuously expanded its engagement throughout the region, leading to a ‘balance of deterrence’ between the two countries. |
| Keywords: | Iran; Israel; State of Palestine; Sub-Saharan Africa; political Islam; jihadism; Houthi rebels; Hezbollah; Horn of Africa; Yemen; Red Sea; Sahel; South Africa; Nigeria, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia; France; Turkey; Russia; China; |
| JEL: | E26 F13 F22 F35 F51 F54 F63 H56 N17 N47 O55 P45 Z12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024–08–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121656 |
| By: | Howard Bodenhorn |
| Abstract: | Studies of modern misdemeanor adjudication find that courts set bail higher than is required to reasonably assure that nonviolent defendants who pose no immediate threat to the community will appear for trial. Some defendants languish in jail for extended periods during which time they lose income, employment, and the ability to provide an effective defense for themselves. This paper considers the downstream consequences of bail setting in an urban, southern police court in the 1910s. I find that defendants unwilling or unable to post cash bail were not more likely to be convicted or to be incarcerated than defendants who posted bail. Conditional on conviction, however, defendants who posted bail and returned for their hearings were about half as likely to serve time. Among those who served time, defendants who posted bail served just 6 percent as much time as defendants who did not post bail. The ability to post bail was correlated with unobserved income or wealth and I find evidence that defendants who did not post bail and served on the chain gang were employed in low-income jobs and likely faced a binding cash-in-advance constraint. |
| JEL: | K14 N0 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32887 |
| By: | Yokoyama, Kazuki |
| Abstract: | Without a sufficiently informative dataset, it would be difficult to explore strategic interdependencies among firms, such as demand estimation. This paper investigates strategic interdependence through a unique historical case of duopoly in the Japanese maritime industry during the 1880s. Yubin Kisen Mitsubishi, led by Iwasaki Yataro, was a monopoly. A new entrant, Kyodo Un'yu, led by Shibusawa Eiichi, offered superior services and implemented a strategy of one-sided fare reductions. Yubin Kisen Mitsubishi delayed in taking countermeasures. This paper regards this delay as a quasi-experiment, and reveals the process by which Kyodo Un'yu gained market share. A simple elasticity calculation shows that a 1% price cut by Kyodo Un'yu resulted in a 10.065% increase in cargo transport demand. |
| Keywords: | Strategic Interdependence, Duopoly, Price Reduction, Elasticity, Maritime Industry, Shibusawa Eiichi, Iwasaki Yataro |
| JEL: | D43 N75 N85 R41 |
| Date: | 2024–08–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121730 |
| By: | Alvaredo, Facundo (Paris School of Economics); Bourguignon, Francois (Paris School of Economics); Ferreira, Francisco H. G. (London School of Economics); Lustig, Nora (Tulane University) |
| Abstract: | Drawing on a comprehensive compilation of quantile shares and inequality measures for 34 countries, including over 5, 600 estimated Gini coefficients, we review the measurement of income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last seven decades. We find that there is quite a bit of uncertainty regarding inequality levels for the same country/year combinations. Differences in inequality levels estimated from household surveys alone are present but they derive from differences in the construction of the welfare indicator, the unit of analysis, or the treatment of the data. With harmonized household surveys, the discrepancies are quite small. The range, however, expands significantly when –to correct for undercoverage and underreporting especially at the top of the distribution– inequality estimates come from some combination of surveys and administrative tax data. The range increases even further when survey-based income aggregates are scaled to achieve consistency not only with tax registries but with National Accounts. Since no single method to correct for underreporting at the top is fully convincing at present, we are left with (often wide) ranges, or bands, of inequality as our best summaries of inequality levels. Reassuringly, however, the dynamic patterns are generally robust across the bands. Although the evidence roughly until the 1970s is too fragmentary and difficult to compare, clearer patterns emerge for the last fifty years. The main feature is a broad inverted U curve, with inequality rising in most countries prior to and often during the 1990s, and falling during the early 21st century, at least until around 2015, when trends appear to diverge across countries. This pattern is broadly robust but features considerable variation in timing and magnitude depending on the country. |
| Keywords: | income inequality, measurement, Latin America and the Caribbean |
| JEL: | D31 D63 O54 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17201 |
| By: | Roberto Asmat (Vienna University of Economics and Business); Karol J. Borowiecki (University of Southern Denmark); Marc T. Law (University of Vermont) |
| Abstract: | Are women helped or harmed by being evaluated by other women? The evidence remains inconclusive and varies by time and place. We address this debate from a global and historical perspective by analyzing confidential data on the universe of international piano competitions held between 1890 and 2023 across approximately 100 countries. Using multiple identification strategies that leverage the repeated nature of these events, we find robust evidence that female competitors are less successful when judged by juries with a higher proportion of women. We estimate that replacing an all-male jury with an all-female jury reduces the likelihood that a female pianist reaches the finals by over 20 percent, reaches the podium by over 30 percent, or wins by over 40 percent. Analysis of individual juror scoring records from a major competition reveals that female jurors are stricter than their male counterparts in their relative assessments of female versus male competitors. We also find that the bias against female competitors is driven by prime-age female jurors who were previous winners in less prestigious competitions. This suggests that the gender bias of female jurors may be related to the threat that emerging female talent poses in a segmented labor market. |
| Keywords: | gender bias, female jurors, competition outcomes, classical music |
| JEL: | J16 J71 Z11 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cue:wpaper:awp-03-2024 |
| By: | Mouré, Christopher |
| Abstract: | Much of the economic analysis of banking crises focuses on the interplay between concentration and stability. A common theory is that concentration is associated with greater stability, whereas competition is associated with instability. In this view, there is a trade-off between, on the one hand, the higher prices and higher profits associated with a banking cartel, and on the other, frequent banking crises and lower prices caused by a fragmented sector. However, this theory is not entirely convincing. Principally, it tends to treat competition and concentration as independent variables, whereas in reality, causality works both ways: banks actively work to transform the structure of the system and transcend apparent constraints – whether through coordinating interest rates, influencing policy, or by transforming the business landscape through corporate amalgamation. In addition, the last two major banking crises in the US occurred in dramatically different conditions of concentration from one other, complicating any obvious empirical connection between concentration and stability. In this paper, I try to move beyond this hypothesis by investigating the relationship between corporate concentration and banking stability through the lens of organized power. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, I make two claims. First, since the 1980s, the differential profitability of large banks has been driven by corporate amalgamation. Second, crises tend to be followed by an increase in the pace of amalgamation. As a result, since the 1980s, banking crises have preceded a dramatic redistribution of resources and control to a handful of large banks. While it is not clear that concentration makes a banking crisis less likely, the evidence suggests that crisis makes concentration more likely. Though the research presented here is only tentative and exploratory, it indicates that since the 1980s, large banks have remade the business and regulatory landscape in ways that defy the logic of a simple binary relationship between concentration and stability, and that this needs to be taken into account when analysing the dynamics of banking crises. |
| Keywords: | banks, capital as power, concentration, crisis, mergers & acquisitions, United States |
| JEL: | G G2 G3 G01 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:capwps:301397 |
| By: | Bulla Casas, Lina Juliana (Universidad Nacional de Colombia) |
| Abstract: | El trabajo reproductivo es un concepto económico y social que ha tomado importancia en el estudio de la ciencia económica desde múltiples puntos de vista. Por lo tanto, en el presente trabajo se genera un debate con uno de los principales referentes de la economía, Karl Marx. Con el fin de percibir cómo desde pensamientos considerados clásicos, desde la teoría del valor-trabajo, se le ha concebido al trabajo reproductivo una valoración y posición diferenciada del considerado trabajo productivo. Lo anterior, para concluir que mediante estas distinciones se ha subordinado al trabajo reproductivo aún hoy en día cuando se puede discernir de esta posición desde los argumentos presentados. |
| Keywords: | trabajo reproductivo; Marx; pensamiento económico; trabajo productivo; economía del cuidado; valor-trabajo. |
| JEL: | B14 B24 B54 |
| Date: | 2022–08–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000538:000044 |
| By: | Fabien Clive Ntonga Efoua (FSEG, UYII-Soa - Faculté de Sciences Économiques et de Gestion - Yaoundé II, CEDIMES - CEDIMES - Centre d'Etudes sur le Développement International et les Mouvements Economiques et Sociaux) |
| Abstract: | Based on the observation that there is chaos in the crypto-world and the need to regulate this ecosystem, this paper proposes: (i) to revisit the genesis and draw up a state of the art concerning the different forms of cryptocurrencies, (ii) suggest a typology in order to (iii) review the directions that could be taken by their development. From an academic view, in addition to Economics, this could be of interest to many other disciplinary fields, particularly Computer science, Law and History. Methodologically, this paper is based on a historical and dialectical approach. That allows us to distinguish two main types of cryptocurrencies: those which are "decentralised" and those which are "sovereign". This common categorisation can be refined according to some specific criteria, in particular: the nature of the digital flow, the consensus algorithm, the issuer and the core technology. Thus, we can differentiate seven sub-categories of cryptocurrencies: the "primitive" digital currencies, the Bitcoin, the Altcoins, the Stablecoins and what we call the Iotcoins, on the one hand; then the Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) and what we call the National Digital Currencies (NDC) on the other. From our view, given the volatility of the decentralised cryptocurrencies, the security aspects and their propensity to finance the shadow economy, their coexistence with the sovereign cryptocurrencies will undoubtedly arise. Concerning particularly the (future) Govcoins, the CBDC seem to have more support than the NDC, given the everlasting issue of temporal inconsistency. |
| Abstract: | Partant du constat d'un chaos généralisé dans la cryptosphère et de la nécessité d'une régulation de cet écosystème, cet article propose : (i) de revisiter la genèse et dresser un état de l'art relatif aux différentes formes de cryptomonnaies, (ii) d'en proposer une typologie et (iii) de conjecturer sur quelques tendances qui devraient marquer leur processus évolutif ; se situant de fait à un carrefour entre l'Economie, l'Informatique, le Droit et l'Histoire. La méthodologie s'appuie sur une approche dialectique. Cette dernière permet de distinguer deux principaux types de cryptomonnaies : celles dites « décentralisées » et celles dites « souveraines ». Cette catégorisation peut être affinée selon des critères plus spécifiques, notamment : la nature du flux digital, l'algorithme de consensus, l'émetteur et la technologie de base (avec ou sans blockchain). Nous parvenons ainsi à différencier sept sous-catégories de cryptomonnaies : les monnaies numériques « primitives », le Bitcoin, les Altcoins, les Stablecoins, et ce que nous appelons les Iotcoins d'une part ; puis les Monnaies Numériques de Banque Centrale (MNBC) et ce que nous appelons les Monnaies Numériques Nationales (MNN) d'autre part. Selon notre analyse, compte tenu de la volatilité des cryptomonnaies décentralisées, des risques de sécurité qu'elles posent et de leur propension à participer au financement de l'économie souterraine, la question de leur cohabitation avec les cryptomonnaies souveraines se posera inévitablement. Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne les Govcoins, les MNBC semblent susciter davantage d'adhésion que les MNN, eu égard à la sempiternelle question de l'incohérence temporelle. |
| Keywords: | Digital currencies, Bitcoin, Altcoins, Stablecoins, Govcoins, Monnaies numériques, Débats et Tendances Monnaies numériques, Monnaies Numériques de Banque Centrale |
| Date: | 2024–07–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04660619 |