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on Business, Economic and Financial History |
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Issue of 2007‒12‒19
nine papers chosen by |
| By: | Gordon H. Hanson; Craig McIntosh |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we examine net emigration from Mexico over the period 1960 to 2000. The data are consistent with labor-supply shocks having made a substantial contribution to Mexican emigration, accounting for one third of Mexican labor flows to the U.S. over the last 25 years of the 20th century. Net emigration rates by Mexican state birth-year cohort display a strong positive correlation with the initial size of the Mexican cohort, relative to the corresponding U.S. cohort. Labor-demand shocks also contribute to emigration, but the state-specific component of these is muted relative to labor supply. In states with long histories of emigration, the effects of cohort size on emigration are relatively strong, consistent with the existence pre-existing networks. In states without a history of emigration, the effects of cohort size on emigration accelerate as a cohort ages, consistent with the creation of new networks. |
| JEL: | F2 J61 |
| Date: | 2007–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13675&r=his |
| By: | Alacevich, Michele |
| Abstract: | Development economics in its early years created the image of a fierce fight between advocates of contrasting theories or approaches- " balanced growth " vs. " unbalanced growth " or " program loans " vs. " project loans. " This view has the merit to highlight such conflicts in great detail; yet it fails to take into account the reality of development economics as it was practiced in the field. This paper reassesses these old conflicts by complementing the traditional focus on theoretical debates with an emphasis on the practice of development economics.A particularly interesting example is the debate between Albert Hirschman, one of the fathers of the " unbalanced growth " approach, and Lauchlin Currie, among the advocates of " balanced growth " on how to foster iron production in Colombia in the 1950s. An analysis of the positions held by these two economists shows that they were in fact much less antithetical than is usually held and, indeed, were in some fundamental aspects surprisingly similar. Debates among development economists during the 1950s thus must be explained-at least partially-as the natural dynamics of an emerging discipline that took shape when different groups tried to achieve supremacy-or at least legitimacy-through the creation of mutually delegitimizing systemic theories. |
| Keywords: | Economic Theory & Research,Banks & Banking Reform,Access to Finance,,Labor Policies |
| Date: | 2007–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4441&r=his |
| By: | Carlos Escudé |
| Abstract: | Entre 1975 y 2003 la Argentina protagonizó la mayor involución de la historia económica mundial. Entre estos años, la masa de pobres creció de aproximadamente el 5% hasta el 50%. Como consecuencia, nacieron las organizaciones de la nueva pobreza. En diciembre de 2001, éstas derrocaron a dos presidentes constitucionales. A partir de esa crisis, las organizaciones populares adquirieron una suerte de poder de veto extra-constitucional sobre la gestión de gobierno. Es por eso que el presidente Duhalde adelantó las elecciones cuando murieron dos piqueteros, cuyos actos ilegales estaban siendo reprimidos según manda la ley. Frente a esos límites en su capacidad de maniobra interna, el presidente Kirchner cooptó dirigentes piqueteros. Auspició la elección de algunos como legisladores e incorporó a otros en funciones de gobierno. Esta táctica, acompañada del fuerte crecimiento económico de la Argentina durante sus años de gestión, desactivó la protesta callejera. Sin embargo, ninguna de las propuestas programáticas radicalizadas que algunos de estos dirigentes auspiciaban se convirtieron en política del gobierno. Cuando los dirigentes piqueteros reaccionaron, ya era tarde. El crecimiento del empleo y la disminución de la pobreza habían disminuido el poder de sus organizaciones. English: Between 1975 and 2003, Argentina underwent the most acute regression in world economic history. Between these years, the number of people below the poverty line grew from approximately 5% to 50% of total population. As a consequence, protest organizations emerged with ever increasing power. In December 2001 they overthrew two constitutional presidents. From that crisis onward, they attained a para-constitutional veto power over governments. This is the reason why President Duhalde called for anticipated elections when two picketers were killed as a consequence of the lawful repression of their unlawful actions. Vis-à-vis these limits to his domestic power, President Kirchner decided to incorporate picketing leaders in the state itself. He encouraged the election of some as legislators and co-opted others as government officials. This tactic, which was accompanied by the strong economic growth rates of Argentina during his years in office, deactivated street protests. Notwithstanding, none of the radical government programs promoted by the picketing leaders which had been co-opted in the state were implemented by the government. When the picketing leaders reacted, it was too late. The growth of employment and the decrease of poverty had deprived their organizations of part of their power. |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cem:doctra:359&r=his |
| By: | Andrei Markevich (Department of Economics, University of Warwick, and the Center for Economic and Financial Research, New Economic School, Moscow) |
| Abstract: | In hierarchies, agents’ hidden actions increase principals' transactions costs and give rise to a demand for monitoring and enforcement. The fact that the latter are costly raises questions about their scope, organisation, and type. How much control is enough? The paper uses historical records to examine Stalin’s answers to this question. We find that Stalin's behaviour was consistent with his aiming to maximise the efficiency of the Soviet system of control subject to the loyalty of his inspectors and the risk of a “chaos of orders” arising from parallel centres of power. |
| Keywords: | Casymmetric information, principal-agent problem, transaction costs, hierarchy, USSR |
| JEL: | H83 D73 P21 N44 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0110&r=his |
| By: | Juanita Villaveces Niño |
| Abstract: | El presente documento es una revisión detallada de la formación y cambios de la deuda pública colombiana desde la Constitución de Cúcuta hasta 1821, cuando se reconvierte toda la deuda pública externa bajo la ley de 21 de mayo de 1873. Este documento busca señalar los componentes de la deuda a lo largo del periodo señalando cambios importantes por causas externas (guerras) o causas internas (insolvencia y necesidad de recomponer la deuda y sus pagos). Este documento está principalmente basado en la codifi cación nacional de todas las leyes de Colombia a partir del año 1821 y la revisión de otras fuentes secundarias. ************************************************************************************************************* Th e paper presents an extensive review of the formation and changes of Colombian public debt since the Constitution of Cucuta in 1821 to 1873 when the public debt was completely transformed throughout the Law of May 21th. Th e paper underlines public debt components presenting signifi cant changes due to internal or external causes (insolvency, war, etc.). To do so, we focused on legislation and secondary sources. |
| Date: | 2007–01–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000091:004354&r=his |
| By: | Trujillo, Lourdes; Juan, Ellis; Estache, Antonio |
| Abstract: | This paper summarizes the evidence on the evolution of transport PPPs over the last 15 years or so. In the process, it provides a primer on the associated policy issues, including of the central role of project finance in the implementation of PPP policies and the debates on risk allocation in the design of PPPs. The paper also offers a discussion of the increasingly well recognized residual roles for the public sector in transport, with an emphasis on the regulatory debates surrounding the adoption of PPPs. |
| Keywords: | Transport Economics Policy & Planning,Debt Markets,Banks & Banking Reform,Access to Finance, |
| Date: | 2007–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4436&r=his |
| By: | Swantje Renfordt |
| Abstract: | By comparing European and US newspaper debates on the 2003 Iraq War, this working paper empirically tests whether a European public sphere exists regarding the contested issue of war and peace. This component of foreign and security policy represents a hard case for the evolution of European communication and looking for it empirically leads into nearly uncharted territory, as most studies have not yet addressed this particular policy field. The data set includes more than 400 articles from six respected newspapers in Germany, Great Britain, and the US, which serve in this case as a non-European control group. One interesting finding of the frame analysis is the fact that one can identify a European community of communication that relates to the legal dimension of the Iraq-debate and to discourses in two European countries. Opinions related to the question whether or not the use of military force complies with international law vary widely in all three countries. However, in contrast to the discourse prevalent in the US, both the German and the British discourses show a strong preference for upholding the rule of international law. |
| Keywords: | European identity; institutions; media |
| Date: | 2007–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0017&r=his |
| By: | Samuel de Abreu Pessôa; Claudio Monteiro Considera; Mário Ramos Ribeiro |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2007:073&r=his |
| By: | Samuel Berlinski; Torun Dewan; Keith Dowding |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of individual and collective ministerial performance on the length oftime a minister serves in British government from 1945-97, using the number ofresignation calls for a minister as an individual performance indicator and the cumulativenumber of such calls as an indicator of government performance. Our analysis lendssupport to a 'two-strike rule': ministers facing a second call for their resignation have asignificantly higher hazard than those facing their first, irrespective of the performance ofthe government. A minister's hazard rate is decreasing in the cumulative number ofresignation calls; but conditional on receiving a first resignation call, the hazard rateincreases with the number of calls that all government ministers have faced in the past.Our message is that collective ministerial performance is a key determinant of whether aminister survives his first resignation call. |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stipep:25&r=his |