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on Business, Economic and Financial History |
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Issue of 2006‒10‒14
twenty-one papers chosen by |
| By: | Jeffrey G. Williamson |
| Abstract: | In the first global century before 1914, trade and especially migration had profound effects on both low-wage, labor abundant Europe and the high-wage, labor scarce New World. Those global forces contributed to a reduction in unskilled labor scarcity in the New World and to a rise in unskilled labor scarcity in Europe. Thus, it contributed to rising inequality in overseas countries, like the United States, and falling inequality in most of Europe. Falling unskilled labor scarcity and rising skill scarcity contributed to the high school revolution in the US. Rising unskilled scarcity also contributed to the primary schooling and literacy revolution in Europe. Under what conditions would we expect the same responses to globalization in today’s world? This paper argues that modern debates about inequality and schooling responses to globalization should pay more attention to history. |
| JEL: | D3 F1 I2 J6 N3 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12553&r=his |
| By: | Stephen Quinn; William Roberds |
| Abstract: | The Bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1609, was the first public bank to offer accounts not directly convertible to coin. As such, it can be described as the first true central bank. The debut of central bank money did not result from any conscious policy decision, however, but instead arose almost by accident, in response to the chaotic monetary conditions during the early years of the Dutch Republic. This paper examines the history of this momentous development from the perspective of modern monetary theory. |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedawp:2006-13&r=his |
| By: | Antonio Tena Junguito |
| Abstract: | This paper endeavors to study Spanish protectionism on the Italian mirror. On the assumption that literature present both European peripheral countries at a similar stage of development that reacted with a similar protectionist reply to late 19th century economic globalization. Nevertheless, competitiveness and specialization of the respective industrial structures were quite different, as the manufacture export performance in the two countries shows since the turn of the century. This paper will emphasize the existence of significant different protection policies in Spain and Italy between 1860-1930 as an influential variable. The analysis of the quantitative evidence characterize the Italian and Spanish protectionist as low and fiscal versus high and manufacture respectively. The paper develop a new test on the infant industry argument for Spain and Italy which aims at measuring the dynamic effects produced by protection on both economies. |
| Date: | 2006–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:whrepe:wp06-08&r=his |
| By: | J. David Hacker; Michael R. Haines |
| Abstract: | Under the urging of late nineteenth-century humanitarian reformers, U.S. policy toward American Indians shifted from removal and relocation efforts to state-sponsored attempts to "civilize" Indians through allotment of tribal lands, citizenship, and forced education. There is little consensus, however, whether and to what extent federal assimilation efforts played a role in the stabilization and recovery of the American Indian population in the twentieth century. In this paper, we rely on a new IPUMS sample of the 1900 census of American Indians and census-based estimation methods to investigate the impact of federal assimilation policies on childhood mortality. We use children ever born and children surviving data included in the censuses to estimate childhood mortality and [responses to] several questions unique to the Indian enumeration [including tribal affiliation, degree of "white blood", type of dwelling, ability to speak English, and whether a citizen by allotment] to construct multivariate models of child mortality. The results suggest that mortality among American Indians in the late nineteenth century was very high - approximately 62% [standardize as % or percent throughout] higher than that for the white population. The impact of assimilation policies was mixed. Increased ability to speak English was associated with lower child mortality, while allotment of land in severalty was associated with higher mortality. The combined effect was a very modest four percent [as above] decline in mortality. As of 1900, the government campaign to assimilate Indians had yet to result in a significant decline in Indian mortality while incurring substantial economic and cultural costs. |
| JEL: | J1 J15 N11 N3 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12572&r=his |
| By: | Subhayu Bandyopadhyay (Department of Economics, West Virginia University, and IZA, Bonn); Howard J. Wall (Federal Reserve Bank of St . Louis) |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates the responsiveness of aid to recipient countries’ economic and physical needs, civil/political rights, and government effectiveness. We look exclusively at the post-Cold War era and control for the political, strategic, and other considerations of donors with fixed effects. In general, we find that aid and per capita income were negatively related, while aid was positively related with infant mortality, rights, and government effectiveness. |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wvu:wpaper:06-14&r=his |
| By: | James Feyrer; Bruce Sacerdote |
| Abstract: | Using a new database of islands throughout the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans we examine whether colonial origins affect modern economic outcomes. We argue that the nature of discovery and colonization of islands provides random variation in the length and type of colonial experience. We instrument for length of colonization using wind direction and wind speed. Wind patterns which mattered a great deal during the age of sail do not have a direct effect on GDP today, but do affect GDP via their historical impact on colonization. The number of years spent as a European colony is strongly positively related to the island's GDP per capita and negatively related to infant mortality. This basic relationship is also found to hold for a standard dataset of developing countries. We test whether this link is directly related to democratic institutions, trade, and the identity of the colonizing nation. While there is substantial variation in the history of democratic institutions across the islands, such variation does not predict income. Islands with significant export products during the colonial period are wealthier today, but this does not diminish the importance of colonial tenure. The timing of the colonial experience seems to matter. Time spent as a colony after 1700 is more beneficial to modern income than years before 1700, consistent with a change in the nature of colonial relationships over time. |
| JEL: | E21 O11 O4 O40 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12546&r=his |
| By: | Eva Fernandez |
| Abstract: | This This paper looks at the role of brands in the expansion of sherry exports into the UK during the 20th century. From 1920, the leading Spanish sherry firms (Domecq and González Byass) popularized their own brands through wide advertising campaigns and increased their commitment with the import market establishing distribution alliances and subsidiaries. The sale of their own brands allowed firms to overcome the reputation problems that had caused a decline of exports from 1870 onwards. During the second half of the 20th century the advertising budget of the firms increased even more, allowing exports to multiply by 7 between 1950 and 1980, and placing sherry as the second alcoholic beverage consumed in the UK after beer. The increasing competition placed by imitators and new entrants selling at lower prices to overtake the market power of leading brands, led Spanish leading firms to cut margins and compete on prices during the 1970s. The profitability of the sherry business declined in the UK, but the marketing knowledge acquired by the use of brands and the increasing integration into distribution allowed Spanish leading firms (especially Domecq) to grow internationally. |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:whrepe:wp06-09&r=his |
| By: | Alan M. Taylor; Janine L. F. Wilson |
| Abstract: | Do international trade and finance flow together? In theory, trade and finance can be substitutes or complements, so the matter must be resolved empirically. We study trade and financial flows from the United Kingdom from 1870 to 1913 and the United States in the interwar years. Trade and finance are robustly correlated, even after allowing for simultaneity. Evidence from the British Empire casts doubt on the idea that trade is a punishment device in the event of a default. |
| JEL: | F10 F30 F40 N10 N20 N70 |
| Date: | 2006–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12543&r=his |
| By: | Chiaki Moriguchi; Emmanuel Saez |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the evolution of income concentration in Japan from 1886 to 2002 by constructing long-run series of top income shares and top wage income shares, using income tax statistics. We find that (1) income concentration was extremely high throughout the pre-WWII period during which the nation underwent rapid industrialization; (2) a drastic de-concentration of income at the top took place in 1938-1945; (3) income concentration has remained low throughout the post-WWII period despite the high economic growth; and (4) top income composition in Japan has shifted dramatically from capital income to employment income over the course of the 20th century. We attribute the precipitous fall in income concentration during WWII primarily to the collapse of capital income due to wartime regulations and inflation. We argue that the change in the institutional structure under the occupational reforms made the one-time income de-concentration difficult to reverse. In contrast to the sharp increase in wage income inequality observed in the United States since 1970, the top wage income shares in Japan have remained remarkably stable over the recent decades. We show that the change in technology or tax policies alone cannot account for the comparative experience of Japan and the United States. Instead we suggest that institutional factors such as corporate governance and union structure are important determinants of wage income inequality. |
| JEL: | H24 N15 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12558&r=his |
| By: | Edward Nelson |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the Great Inflation of the 1970s in Japan and Germany. From 1975 onward these countries had low inflation relative to other large economies. Traditionally, this success is attributed to a stronger discipline on the part of Japan and Germany*s monetary authorities*for example, more willingness to accept temporary unemployment, or stronger determination not to monetize government deficits. I instead attribute the success of these countries from the mid-1970s to their governments* and monetary authorities* acceptance that inflation is a monetary phenomenon. Symmetrically, their higher inflation in the first half of the 1970s is attributable to the fact that their policymakers over this period embraced nonmonetary theories of inflation. |
| Keywords: | Inflation (Finance) ; Economic conditions - Japan ; Economic conditions - Germany |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2006-052&r=his |
| By: | Michael D. Bordo; Owen F. Humpage; Anna J. Schwartz |
| Abstract: | The deterioration in the U.S. balance of payments after 1957 and an accelerating loss of gold reserves prompted U.S. monetary authorities to undertake foreign-exchange-market interventions beginning in 1961. We discuss the events leading up to these interventions, the institutional arrangements developed for that purpose, and the controversies that ensued. Although these interventions forestalled a loss of U.S. gold reserves, in the end, they only delayed more fundamental adjustments and, in that respect, were a failure. |
| Keywords: | Foreign exchange administration ; Bretton Woods Agreements Act |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0609&r=his |
| By: | Samuel Mercier (Université de Bourgogne) |
| Abstract: | (VF)Cet article vise à démontrer l’ancienneté des débats académiques portant sur le rôle de l’entreprise en société. Les premières réflexions organisées autour du concept de Stakeholder semblent commencer avec la publication de l’ouvrage majeur de Freeman (1984). Pourtant, ce dernier reconnaît lui-même qu’il n’est pas l’inventeur d’une notion apparue bien avant. Ainsi, la théorie des parties prenantes apparaît, de manière explicite, au début des années 1960 et est ancrée en management stratégique.Ces considérations ne sont pourtant pas apparues ex-nihilo. Elles s’encastrent dans un contexte économique et juridique préexistant, propice à faire apparaître des controverses fondamentales sur la propriété et les objectifs de l’entreprise. Nous explorons les origines implicites de la théorie des parties prenantes et montrons qu’elles se recoupent très largement avec celles de la RSE. |
| Keywords: | Stakeholder Theory;Stakeholders;Parties prenantes;Théorie des parties prenantes;Responsabilité sociale; Gouvernance;Nature de l’entreprise. |
| JEL: | M14 D23 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1061004&r=his |
| By: | Michael D. Bordo; David C. Wheelock |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the macroeconomic conditions and policy environments under which stock market booms occurred among ten developed countries during the 20th Century. We find that booms tended to occur during periods of above-average growth of real output, and below-average and falling inflation. We also find that booms often ended within a few months of an increase in inflation and monetary policy tightening. The evidence suggests that booms reflect both real macroeconomic phenomena and monetary policy, as well as the extant regulatory environment. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy ; Stock exchanges |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2006-051&r=his |
| By: | Dunnewijk, Theo (UNU-MERIT); Hultén, Staffan (Stockholm School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Since the introduction of mobile telephony in the early fifties in Europe, US and Japan the demand for this service exploded. It seems that the latent demand for mobile telecommunication services for decade's continued to be very strong. Since the introduction of cellular technology the capacity of the services increasingly became able to meet the massive demand. Next and future generations of mobile telecommunication technologies bring increased transmission speed and more versatile services. This forces network operators to organise multi- sourced information flows supplied by service providers to increase the network effect of the system instead of providing the network infrastructure and leave the content to the users as in pure voice telephony. The drivers and inhibitors behind the emergence and recent developments of mobile telecommunications systems in Europe are highlighted in this paper. Liberalisation of the telecom markets in Europe drove new entrants to the market and curbed excessive pricing. However, in recent years the lack of challenging service is the main cause for the wavering development of newer generations of mobile telecommunication services. |
| Keywords: | Telecommunications, Market Structure, Production, Pricing, Technological Change, Economic History, Europe |
| JEL: | L96 L11 O31 N70 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2006034&r=his |
| By: | Stefan Szymanski (Tanaka Business School, Imperial College) |
| Abstract: | The Coase Theorem is both one of the simplest and most profound ideas in economics. Coase’s insight was first expressed in print as a theorem by George Stigler, following the publication of the famous article “The Problem of Social Cost” by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase (1960). Stigler stated it thus: “with zero transactions costs, private and social costs will be equal”. In this paper the Coase Theorem is approached through the medium of a sports league. While Coase’s article dates from 1960, a colleague at Chicago University published a discussion of the market for baseball players in 1956 which almost completely anticipates the more famous paper (Rottenberg (1956)). |
| Keywords: | Coase |
| JEL: | L83 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spe:wpaper:0617&r=his |
| By: | Evelyne Poincelot (Université de Bourgogne); Grégory Wegmann (Université de Bourgogne) |
| Abstract: | In this article, we present the evolution of management accounting and the strategic management accounting (SMA) concept. The balanced scorecard (BSC), a SMA tool, is quite famous in European countries. Its principle objective is to articulate planning decisions with control ones thanks to non-financial indicators. Contractual theories constitute the foundations of this tool. But in Northern Europe, some specific BSC are designed in the framework of knowledge-based theories.We describe here the results of an inquiry conducted in France. Its aims are mainly to test the usefulness of non-financial indicators in driving a firm’s objectives and the link between the use of non-financial indicators and the performance. We demonstrate that the French managers associate non-financial indicators with strategic objectives. But we also conclude that they believe that there is no direct link between the use of non-financial metrics and the performance. |
| Keywords: | Management accounting;Strategic management accounting;Balanced Scorecard;Non-financial indicators;Contractual and knowledge-based theories;Survey questionnaire. |
| JEL: | M10 M40 |
| Date: | 2006–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1060905&r=his |
| By: | Fernandez, Pablo (IESE Business School); Carabias, Jose M. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | En este documento se cuantifica la creación de valor para los accionistas del Banco Santander (BSCH) entre diciembre de 1991 y diciembre de 2005. En ese período, el aumento de la capitalización de BSCH fue de 67.070 millones de euros, el aumento del valor para los accionistas fue de 32.114 millones de euros, y la creación de valor para los accionistas fue de 4.158 millones de euros (expresado en euros de 2005). La rentabilidad media anual de BSCH fue del 17,9%, sensiblemente superior a la del IBEX 35 (14,0%): cada euro invertido en acciones de BS en diciembre de 1991 se convirtió en 10,06 euros en diciembre de 2005, mientras que 1 euro invertido en el IBEX 35 se convirtió en 6,26 euros. La inflación media fue del 3,4%, y la rentabilidad media de todas las empresas del IBEX, exceptuando BSCH, fue del 13,6%. La capitalización de BSCH durante estos años osciló entre el 5,2% y el 17,4% de la capitalización del IBEX 35. En diciembre de 1991, BS fue la séptima empresa por capitalización (tras Telefónica, Endesa, Repsol, BBV, Iberdrola y Banco Central). En diciembre de 2005, BSCH fue la empresa con mayor capitalización del IBEX 35. BSCH pasó de ser la 35ª empresa del EuroStoxx50 por capitalización en 1996 a ser la 4ª en 2005. |
| Keywords: | creación valor para accionistas; aumento valor para accionistas; rentabilidad para accionistas; |
| JEL: | G12 G31 M21 |
| Date: | 2006–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0637&r=his |
| By: | Fernandez, Pablo (IESE Business School); Carabias, Jose M. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | En este documento se cuantifica la creación de valor para los accionistas de BBVA entre diciembre de 1991 y diciembre de 2005. En ese período, el aumento de la capitalización de BBVA fue de 47.386 millones de euros, el aumento del valor para los accionistas fue de 35.001 millones de euros, y la creación de valor para los accionistas fue de 15.617 millones de euros (expresado en euros de 2005). La rentabilidad media anual de BBVA fue del 19,8%, sensiblemente superior a la del IBEX 35 (14,0%). La rentabilidad de BBVA en estos catorce años fue del 1.151,1% (cada euro invertido en acciones de BBV en diciembre de 1991 se convirtió en 12,51 euros en diciembre de 2005), mientras que la rentabilidad del IBEX 35 en estos catorce años fue del 526,3%. La inflación acumulada fue del 58,8%. La rentabilidad media de todas las empresas del IBEX, exceptuando BBVA, fue del 13,5%. La capitalización de BBVA durante estos años osciló entre el 5,6% y el 16,5% sobre el total de la capitalización del IBEX 35. En diciembre de 1993, BBV fue la séptima empresa por capitalización (tras Telefónica, Endesa, Repsol, Iberdrola, Argentaria y Banco Santander). En diciembre de 2005, BBVA fue latercera. |
| Keywords: | creación valor para accionistas; aumento valor para accionistas; rentabilidad para accionistas; |
| JEL: | G12 G31 M21 |
| Date: | 2006–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0638&r=his |
| By: | Fernandez, Pablo (IESE Business School); Carabias, Jose M. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | En este documento se cuantifica la creación de valor para los accionistas de Iberdrola entre diciembre de 1991 y diciembre de 2005. En ese período, el aumento de la capitalización de Iberdrola fue de 17.279 millones de euros; el aumento del valor para los accionistas fue de 22.535 millones de euros, y la creación de valor para los accionistas fue de 14.424 millones de euros (expresado en euros de 2005). La rentabilidad media anual para los accionistas de Iberdrola fue del 17,3%, sensiblemente superior a la del IBEX 35 (14,0%): cada euro invertido en acciones de Iberdrola en diciembre de 1991 se convirtió en 9,31 euros en diciembre de 2005, mientras que 1 euro invertido en el IBEX 35 se convirtió en 6,26 euros. La inflación media fue del 3,4%, y la rentabilidad media de todas las empresas del IBEX, exceptuando Iberdrola, fue del 13,8%. La rentabilidad para los accionistas de Iberdrola fue positiva todos los años, excepto en 1994, 1999 y 2002. La capitalización de Iberdrola durante estos años osciló entre el 3,9% y el 8,5% de la capitalización del IBEX 35. En diciembre de 1991, Iberdrola fue la quinta empresa por capitalización (tras Telefónica, Endesa, Repsol y BBV). En junio de 2006, Iberdrola fue la sexta empresa por capitalización del IBEX 35 (tras BSCH, Telefónica, BBVA, Endesa y Repsol). |
| Keywords: | creación valor para accionistas; aumento valor para accionistas; rentabilidad para accionistas; |
| JEL: | G12 G31 M21 |
| Date: | 2006–07–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0640&r=his |
| By: | Fernandez, Pablo (IESE Business School); Carabias, Jose M. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | En este documento se cuantifica la creación de valor para los accionistas de Repsol entre diciembre de 1991 y diciembre de 2005. En ese período, el aumento de la capitalización de Repsol fue de 25.611 millones de euros; el aumento del valor para los accionistas fue de 22.790 millones de euros, y la creación de valor para los accionistas fue de 6.736 millones de euros (expresado en euros de 2005). La rentabilidad media anual para los accionistas de Repsol fue del 14,5%, sensiblemente superior a la del IBEX 35 (14,0%): cada euro invertido en acciones de Repsol en diciembre de 1991 se convirtió en 6,69 euros en diciembre de 2005, mientras que 1 euro invertido en el IBEX 35 se convirtió en 6,26 euros. La inflación media fue del 3,4%. La rentabilidad para los accionistas de Repsol fue positiva todos los años, excepto en 1994 y en 2000-2002. La capitalización de Repsol durante estos años osciló entre el 6% y el 10,8% de la capitalización del IBEX 35. En diciembre de 1991, Repsol fue la tercera empresa por capitalización (tras Telefónica y Endesa). En junio de 2006, Repsol fue la quinta empresa por capitalización del IBEX 35 (tras BSCH, Telefónica, BBVA y Endesa). |
| Keywords: | creación valor para accionistas; aumento valor para accionistas; rentabilidad para accionistas; |
| JEL: | G12 G31 M21 |
| Date: | 2006–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0643&r=his |
| By: | Fernandez, Pablo (IESE Business School); Carabias, Jose M. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | En este documento se cuantifica la creación de valor para los accionistas de Unión Fenosa entre diciembre de 1991 y diciembre de 2005. En ese período, el aumento de la capitalización de Unión Fenosa fue de 8.600 millones de euros; el aumento del valor para los accionistas fue de 9.972 millones de euros, y la creación de valor para los accionistas fue de 7.678 millones de euros (expresado en euros de 2005). La rentabilidad media anual para los accionistas de Unión Fenosa fue del 21,6%, sensiblemente superior a la del IBEX 35 (14,0%): cada euro invertido en acciones de Unión Fenosa en diciembre de 1991 se convirtió en 15,37 euros en diciembre de 2005, mientras que 1 euro invertido en el IBEX 35 se convirtió en 6,26 euros. La inflación media fue del 3,4%, y la rentabilidad media de todas las empresas del IBEX, exceptuando Unión Fenosa, fue del 13,9%. La rentabilidad para los accionistas de Unión Fenosa fue positiva todos los años, excepto en 1992, 1994 y 2001-2002. La capitalización de Unión Fenosa durante estos años osciló entre el 1,3% y el 2,4% de la capitalización del IBEX 35. En diciembre de 1991, Unión Fenosa fue la decimocuarta empresa por capitalización (tras Telefónica, Endesa, Repsol, BBV, Iberdrola, Banco Central, Banco Santander, Popular, Banesto, Hispano, Cepsa, Tabacalera y Acesa). En junio de 2006, Unión Fenosa fue la duodécima empresa por capitalización del IBEX 35 (tras BSCH, Telefónica, BBVA, Endesa, Repsol, Iberdrola, Popular, Arcelor, Inditex, ACS y Altadis). |
| Keywords: | creación valor para accionistas; aumento valor para accionistas; rentabilidad para accionistas; |
| JEL: | G12 G31 M21 |
| Date: | 2006–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0642&r=his |