nep-hea New Economics Papers
on Health Economics
Issue of 2010‒11‒06
five papers chosen by
Yong Yin
SUNY at Buffalo, USA

  1. Why Junior Doctors Don’t Want to Become General Practitioners: A Discrete Choice Experiment from the MABEL Longitudinal Study of Doctors By Paul H. Jensen; Elizabeth Webster
  2. Static and Dynamic Efficiency of Irreversible Health Care Investments under Alternative Payment Rules By Rosella Levaggi; University of Brescia; Paolo Pertile
  3. Quantitative Analysis of Health Insurance Reform: Separating Community Rating from Income Redistribution By Pashchenko, Svetlana; Porapakkarm, Ponpoje
  4. Endogenous fertility, endogenous lifetime and economic growth: the role of child policies By Fanti, Luciano; Gori, Luca
  5. Age of Pension Eligibility, Gains in Life Expectancy, and Social Policy By Frank T. Denton; Byron G. Spencer

  1. By: Paul H. Jensen (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Elizabeth Webster (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne)
    Abstract: We use data from 3000 academic scientists to estimate the effects of other parties' patents on the academics' research. Nearly half of all scientists report that their choice of research projects has been affected by the presence of other parties' patents. We find that transaction costs and the culture of the workplace have the largest influence over whether or not patents affect the direction of research but that scientists’ understanding of patent law; their recent experience seeking permission to use patented material; and the source of research funds are also significant.
    Keywords: public science, innovation, R&D, invention, public research, patent
    JEL: O31 O34
    Date: 2010–10
  2. By: Rosella Levaggi; University of Brescia (University of Padova and FEEM); Paolo Pertile (University of Verona)
    Abstract: The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured both in the timing of adoption (dynamic) and the intensity of use of the technology (static). If the second instrument is unavailable, a trade-off may emerge between static and dynamic efficiency. In this context, we also discuss how the regulator could use the control of the level of uncertainty faced by the provider as an instrument to mitigate the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Finally, the model is calibrated to study a specific technology.
    Keywords: Health Care, Investments
    JEL: I18 D92
    Date: 2010–10
  3. By: Pashchenko, Svetlana; Porapakkarm, Ponpoje
    Abstract: Two key components of the upcoming health reform are a reorganization of the individual health insurance market and an increase in income redistribution in the economy. Which component contributes more to the welfare outcome of the reform? We address this question by constructing a general equilibrium life cycle model that incorporates both medical expenses and labor income risks. We replicate the key features of the current health insurance system in the U.S. and calibrate the model using the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey dataset. We find that the reform decreases the number of uninsured more than four times. It also brings significant welfare gains equivalent to almost one percent of the annual consumption. However, these welfare gains mostly come from the redistributive measures embedded in the reform. If the reform only reorganizes the individual market, introduces individual mandates but does not include any income-based transfers, the welfare gains are much smaller. This result is mostly driven by the fact that most uninsured people have low income. High burdens of health insurance premiums for this group are relieved disproportionately more by income-based measures than by the new rules in the individual market.
    Keywords: health insurance; health reform; risk sharing; general equilibrium
    JEL: E65 D91 D52 E21 I10
    Date: 2010–10–23
  4. By: Fanti, Luciano; Gori, Luca
    Abstract: We examine the effects of child policies on both the transitional dynamics and long-run demo-economic outcomes in the conventional overlapping generations model of neoclassical growth extended with endogenous longevity and endogenous fertility. The government invests in public health (Chakraborty, 2004) and the individual survival probability at the end of youth depends on health expenditure through an S-shaped longevity function. This may give rise to four steady states and, hence, development traps are possible. However, poverty or prosperity may not depend on initial conditions, while being the result of a child policy design. In particular, a child tax can be used to effectively allow those economies that were entrapped into poverty to prosper irrespective of where they start from.
    Keywords: Child policy; Endogenous fertility; Health; Life expectancy; OLG model
    JEL: J13 O40 I10
    Date: 2010–10–23
  5. By: Frank T. Denton; Byron G. Spencer
    Abstract: Canadians are living longer and retiring younger. When combined with the aging of the baby boom generation, that means that the “inactive” portion of the population is increasing and there are concerns about possibly large increases in the burden of support on those who are younger. We model the impact of continued future gains in life expectancy on the size of the population that receives public pension benefits. We pay special attention to possible increases in the age of eligibility and the pension contribution rate that would maintain the publicly financed component of the retirement income security system.
    Date: 2010–10

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