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on Health Economics |
| By: | Johansson, Per (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation); Skedinger, Per (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)) |
| Abstract: | The issue considered in this study is whether objective, official reports on disability status are reliable. While there is a rather large literature on the reliability of self-reported disability, evidence regarding objective data is scant. It seems to be a widely held view among researchers that, since individuals out of work are inclined to respond towards poor health, it would be best to have official data provided by the relevant administrative bodies. But we argue that such administrative data should be regarded with some suspicion, since the administrators also may have incentives to misreport. The empirical evidence, based on a large sample of Swedish jobseekers, suggests systematic misreporting by the Public Employment Service of objective, official disability measures due to incentives to exaggerate disability. |
| Keywords: | Work disability; classification error; public employment service |
| JEL: | I12 J28 J68 |
| Date: | 2005–05–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2005_014&r=hea |
| By: | Junmin Wan (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | The hypotheses of non-addiction, myopia and rational addiction are tested using annual, quarterly and monthly data. Changes in the prices of Japanese cigarettes can be viewed as natural experiments from the point of view of consumer behavior, because the Japanese government controls cigarette prices. The empirical results of this paper support the addiction hypothesis. The short-run and long-run price elasticities range from - 0.338to -0.421, and from -0.679 to -0.686, respectively; thus, increases in tax revenues in the long-run are likely to be smaller than those in the short-run. As a result, tax increases would be an effective means of curbing smoking and reducing its social cost. Furthermore, the debt compensation programs for the Japan Railway and the National Forestry will not go according to plan, unless revenues are increased in the future. |
| Keywords: | smoking, rational addiction, tax revenues |
| JEL: | D12 E21 H29 |
| Date: | 2002–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:04-11&r=hea |
| By: | Junmin Wan (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a new way to examine the effects of mandatory information disclosure on inter-brand cigarette demands and the behavior of a monopolistic firm in Japan. I estimated inter-brand demands by including nicotine, tar content, and policy event information in the model and by using cigarette brand sales data. I found that the mandatory disclosure of nicotine and tar content information decreased the intake of nicotine and tar per capita and per smoker; thus mandatory disclosure is likely to increase consumersf welfare, if we suppose that they always choose their favorite cigarette. Furthermore, I found that the monopolistic firm supplied more, new, and better quality products, discontinued the production of poorer quality goods, and conducted more R & D, in response to disclosure mandates. |
| Keywords: | Rational addiction; Smoking; Health information; Tobacco control |
| JEL: | I18 D11 D12 |
| Date: | 2002–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:04-12&r=hea |
| By: | Junmin Wan (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a new way to examine the effects of mandatory information disclosure on inter-brand cigarette demands and the behavior of a monopolistic firm in Japan. I estimated inter-brand demands by including nicotine, tar content, and policy event information in the model and by using cigarette brand sales data. I found that the mandatory disclosure of nicotine and tar content information decreased the intake of nicotine and tar per capita and per smoker; thus mandatory disclosure is likely to increase consumersf welfare, if we suppose that they always choose their favorite cigarette. Furthermore, I found that the monopolistic firm supplied more, new, and better quality products, discontinued the production of poorer quality goods, and conducted more R & D, in response to disclosure mandates. |
| Keywords: | inter-brand cigarette, nicotine, tar, mandatory disclosure |
| JEL: | I18 D12 D82 |
| Date: | 2004–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:04-13&r=hea |