| By: |
Frédéric Gavrel (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1);
Thérèse Rebière (IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: |
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking
to go ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than
the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an
equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross)
incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to
climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an
equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, an utilitarian social
planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition
theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality. |
| Keywords: |
Going ahead of the Smiths,Social interactions,Well-being,Inequalities,Efficiency |
| Date: |
2015–12 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01242504&r=hap |