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on Game Theory |
| By: | Rajiv Vohra (Brown University); Debraj Ray (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We revisit Nash’s axiomatic bargaining solution when coalitions employ threats that must be consistent with their solutions. As in Nash, our solution maximizes a (possibly weighted) product of payoffs for each coalition, but subcoalitional threats appear as conventional constraints that are not netted out when maximizing the Nash product. We study different aspects of this coalitional solution, including its connections to a notion of “pragmatic egalitarianism”. We then embed the solution into a setting with externalities, and define viable coalitional structures, under which every coalition follows its coalitional solution but interacts noncooperatively with other coalitions. We discuss applications to public goods, R&D coalitions, oligopoly cartels, and hospital networks. |
| Keywords: | Nash bargaining, coalitional threats, strategic externalities JEL codes: C70, D60, D63 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1633 |
| By: | Germ\'an Gieczewski; Maria Titova |
| Abstract: | We study generalized verifiable disclosure by an informed sender with type-independent preferences. We first characterize all perfect Bayesian equilibria as individually rational partitions of the sender's types into coalitions ordered by payoff. An equilibrium survives our coalition-proofness criterion if no group of types can profitably coordinate an announcement that the receiver will interpret as coming precisely from the types willing to join it. Coalition-proof equilibria are partitions that are greedy: at each step, a coalition of the remaining types attains the highest payoff consistent with equilibrium. Given the generality of our setting, coalition-proof equilibria may fail to exist. We establish existence under restrictions on preferences and evidence: quasiconcavity with message completeness, betweenness, cheap talk with message completeness, and payoff degradation. For a rich disclosure game with stochastic evidence, we show that the sender's ex-ante payoff in a coalition-proof equilibrium is a piecewise linear tent over the belief simplex, analogous to the concave closure in Bayesian persuasion and the quasiconcave closure in cheap talk. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.15087 |
| By: | Liping Tang; Michiko Ogaku |
| Abstract: | We study consensus formation and information acquisition in conferences where DeGroot-type opinion updating is constrained by an acceptance rule based on Kullback-Leibler divergence. Players choose private information experiments before deliberation, and these choices determine both their posterior distributions and acceptance tolerances. We establish sufficient conditions for global consensus under specified conference structures, including repeated bilateral conferences organized by a fully receptive mediator. Under full reimbursement of the mediator's conference costs, the information-acquisition game has a weighted potential and admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We develop a numerical procedure using verified payoff bounds over the continuous posterior domain to certify approximate equilibria and assess partial reimbursement policies that preserve a given equilibrium profile. The binary state, three-player examples illustrate how conference order interacts with state variance. At larger variances in the tested range, placing the demanding nonmediator last is associated with lower conference costs and lower certified sufficient planner reimbursement, but greater information acquisition expenditure by the mediator. These findings reveal a trade-off between the planner's fiscal expenditure and the mediator's private burden, and show that the conference structure matters economically. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.33555 |
| By: | Junkee Jeon |
| Abstract: | Households compare their living standard with others' and dislike changing it. We study consumption and investment when felicity depends on consumption relative to a benchmark, the population's geometric average consumption, and cuts in felicity weigh more than increases. Asset returns are exogenous. For finitely many types and arbitrary initial wealth and inherited standards, a mean field equilibrium exists under a weak interaction condition, and for fixed budget multipliers the benchmark is the fixed point of a contraction. In a complete market with common risk, a mean field equilibrium at empirical type frequencies is an exact Nash equilibrium of the finite game, for any preferences over relative consumption. We bound the gain from deviating when plans computed at another composition are used. We compute equilibria in which groups with different wealth, inherited standards, and loss aversion revise spending at different dates. With identical households and common risk, the unique symmetric equilibrium is the policy of a single loss averse household with modified curvature. In a baseline example, ignoring the inherited standard costs up to 17% of wealth, while small errors about the composition of the reference group cost less than 0.5%. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.16019 |
| By: | Francesco Squintani (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Political networks are often factional: like-minded politicians form groups around a small core of leaders, and few links cross ideological collections. I develop a model in which information transmission is a main reason such networks form. Politicians are partitioned into ideologically cohesive collections, transmission is sufficiently reliable but imperfect, and link costs are neither too high nor too low. Every expert–decision maker pair is equally likely and every politician assigns the same weight to every decision. I show that every efficient network is star-factional. In each ideological collection, politicians are connected to a unique leader, and only leaders communicate across collections. Star-factional networks arise as Nash equilibria of the bilateral network formation game and are the only equilibria immune to joint deviations. When politicians differ, efficient leadership favors those with greater expertise, authority, or relevance. If these characteristics are divided, multiple leaders may be efficient. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1631 |
| By: | Lisa Bruttel (University of Potsdam, Berlin School of Economics, CEPA) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a simple incentivized measure of individual attitudes towards strategic uncertainty. This measure is based on the idea that the size of the difference between the expected profit from playing a game and the value that an individual places on playing that game provides information about how much they like or dislike the strategic uncertainty involved. This measure explains trusting decisions in the trust game, where standard risk aversion measures have no explanatory power. Furthermore, it correlates across different games and predicts behavior associated with strategic uncertainty outside the laboratory. |
| Keywords: | strategic uncertainty, risk, trust, elicitation method, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D81 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pot:cepadp:107 |
| By: | Ciamac C. Moallemi; Mallesh M. Pai; Dan Robinson; Christoph Schlegel |
| Abstract: | The resilience and censorship resistance of a blockchain depend on where the validators and proposers of that blockchain physically operate. We study the economic incentives behind this location choice, both with a single proposer and with multiple concurrent proposers. Formally, we study a game where proposers first choose locations and then compete in a first-price auction for an opportunity whose common value is driven by information from geographically dispersed sources. A single proposer minimizes variance-weighted delay, locating at a weighted median of the sources and co-locating with any dominant one. By contrast, with two proposers, information both observe equally early earns no rent, and each proposer's expected profit is proportional to the standard deviation of the information it receives before its rival. We show that the location game admits the jointly unobserved variance as an ordinal potential, so global solutions of a weighted two-median problem are equilibria. With two sources, one proposer locates at each, however weak one is. With more proposers and at least as many sources, equilibrium locations are distinct under regular bidding. Multiple concurrent proposers thus do more than limit any single proposer's control over inclusion: by rewarding exclusive rather than shared information, they create an economic force toward geographic decentralization. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.18812 |
| By: | Srikanth B. Pai (Assistant Professor at Madras School of Economics, Chennai.) |
| Abstract: | Alienation-based abstention makes participation endogenous because the platforms chosen by parties determine who votes. We study how voter tolerance affects the existence, location, and persistence of pure-strategy equilibria in two versions of a two-party spatialmodel. In the first, office-seeking parties maximize voter plurality; in the second, they care about the policy implemented. We characterize all office-seeking equilibria through a condition called window dominance, which gives a distributional characterisation of profitable deviations both near to and far from a party’s platform. For general continuous voter distributions, pure strategy equilibrium in the office seeking game may fail to exist, may be non-unique, and may appear and disappear as tolerance increases. To resolve this, we identify a centripetal structure in the set of positions that can not lose to each rival. When this structure holds, a single anchor defeats every other platform and determines the unique office-seeking equilibrium. The classical Downs and Llavador results are special cases. We show that this structure persists at all larger tolerance radii once it holds at a radius of at least half the policy space and at least twice the median’s distance from the center. The centripetal structure emerges before full participation for all voter distributions. Finally, the same structure yields a complete classification of equilibrium when parties care about the policy implemented rather than electoral victory alone. |
| Keywords: | spatial electoral competition; alienation-based abstention; party convergence; centripetal incentives; median voter theorem; pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Classification-JEL: : C72; D71; D72. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mad:wpaper:2026-312 |
| By: | Srikanth B. Pai (Assistant Professor at Madras School of Economics, Chennai.) |
| Abstract: | An opposite-order platform profile occurs when parties choose platforms in the opposite order from their ideal points. Such an outcome undermines the usual ideological interpretation of party competition: the party identified as left chooses the right-hand platform, while the party identified as right chooses the left-hand platform. We study a two-party ordinal spatial voting model in which voter and party preferences are single-peaked. Under full turnout, we show that single-peakedness alone rules out opposite-order equilibria. With endogenous abstention, we identify an additional ordinal condition: parties agree on how to rank deviations on either side of their ideal points. We call this cross-side agreement. Cardinal utilities that are commonly used in the literature, like symmetric single-peaked utilities and common translated utility shapes, satisfy this condition. Under single-peakedness and cross-side agreement, opposite-order equilibria are impossible even with abstention. The assumption is tight: we construct an example admitting a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with opposite order in which cross-side agreement fails.Length: 17pages |
| Keywords: | spatial voting, electoral competition, abstention, single-peaked preferences, opposite order Classification-JEL: : D72, D71, C72 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mad:wpaper:2026-313 |
| By: | Jason R. Blevins; Youngjae Jeong |
| Abstract: | We consider multiplicity and uniqueness of equilibria in continuous-time dynamic discrete games where players move sequentially according to independent Poisson processes. With multiple equilibria, the structural model is incomplete: the reduced form and counterfactual predictions depend on how equilibria are selected. We provide closed-form sufficient conditions for uniqueness of Markov perfect equilibrium in this class of games. The conditions are semiparametric and can be verified from model primitives. To measure the coverage of the conditions and characterize multiplicity more broadly, we carry out a large-scale numerical search for equilibria of a dynamic duopoly model of entry and exit. Although uniqueness is the norm in our broad search, we find that multiplicity concentrates in economically relevant regions: where the market cannot profitably sustain both firms, where firms are very patient, and at intermediate decision frequencies that balance strategic interaction and commitment. When multiplicity is present, we typically find two stable asymmetric equilibria and one unstable symmetric equilibrium. Monte Carlo and counterfactual simulations show this structure matters for empirical work. A full-solution estimator that assumes uniqueness can converge to the unstable equilibrium, even when the data were generated by a stable one, while a two-step estimator recovers the correct equilibrium. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.33660 |
| By: | Seiya Hirano; Yuta Kittaka |
| Abstract: | Cooperation between competing platforms is commonly observed. While the impact of such coopetition on platform competition has been studied, the contractual terms governing such cooperation are typically taken as given, leaving the formation of such cooperation largely unexplored. This paper analyzes a cross-channel strategy in which consumers can access one platform’s content through its rival’s superior distribution channel, and examines whether the strategy emerges through bargaining over the associated revenue-sharing rate. We show that the cross-channel plan is introduced only when the content-providing platform receives about half or more of the revenue generated by the plan. We further show that the welfare effects depend on how the contractual terms are determined. Under a revenue-sharing arrangement determined through Nash bargaining, introducing the cross-channel plan increases industry profit, consumer surplus, and total surplus. By contrast, under an arrangement that combines revenue sharing with a lump-sum transfer, industry profit increases, but consumer surplus and total surplus may decrease. |
| Date: | 2026–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1324 |
| By: | Liu, Ernest; Redding, Stephen J.; Smith-Worthington, Bennett; Yang, David Y. |
| Abstract: | We develop a tractable framework for analyzing geopolitics as a network of coordination and strategic influence. Countries choose geopolitical actions that trade off domestic interests against incentives to align with connected countries. They can exert costly bilateral influence to affect one another's actions. We characterize equilibrium actions and bilateral influence in closed form. Crosscountry differences in domestic interests decompose into latent geopolitical cleavages, each of which the network transmits into geopolitical actions independently of the others. The crosscountry covariance matrices of domestic interests and of geopolitical actions identify the cleavages and their importance, from which we recover the network. We implement the framework using data on United Nations voting and democratic orientation. The inferred network is well approximated by a few dimensions, aligns with external measures of geopolitical ties, and recovers well-known historical cleavages. We undertake counterfactuals for domestic interests and network connections and quantify three notions of geopolitical power. |
| Keywords: | networks;coordination;strategic influence;network games |
| JEL: | F15 F52 D85 C72 |
| Date: | 2026–10–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:141793 |
| By: | Stefan Steinerberger |
| Abstract: | We consider the classic bargaining problem: two players have to agree on a `fair' division $(x, y) \in \Omega \subset \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^2$ which results in Player 1 receiving $x$ and Player 2 receiving $y$. The usual approach to this problem has been to impose a number of desirable axioms that a fair division should have and then conclude that the solution is uniquely defined by the axioms. We take an orthogonal view, avoid the discussion of axioms, and ask whether different and contradicting axioms may give rise to similar solutions. To this end, we define a natural metric on the space of solutions to the bargaining problem. The metric shows a strong internal consistency between the three celebrated solutions due to Nash (1950), Raiffa (1953) and Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975). It identifies problematic cases for the Utilitarian solution and the Perles-Maschler solution (1981). The area monotonic solution of Anbarci-Bigelow (1988) is shown to be nearly perfectly located on a shortest path from Nash to Kalai-Smorodinsky. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.32877 |
| By: | Haohui Wang |
| Abstract: | A long-lived sender repeatedly advises a myopic receiver who observes only the recommendation record. Nonbinding, observable self-restraint, such as a rolling quota on favorable recommendations, makes each favorable recommendation use capacity that could serve future opportunities, inducing selective advice. With two actions, when obedience requires a strictly positive cost of self-restraint, the sender's normalized equilibrium payoff is subject to a ceiling equal to the payoff from the best credible partitional signal minus the expected cost of self-restraint. This bound holds at every discount factor; under an upper-tail condition, rolling quotas approach it as the sender becomes patient. A sufficiently valuable opportunity can also induce an informative violation that ends communication. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.33390 |
| By: | David Gill; Yaroslav Rosokha |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we identify level-$k$ reasoning in repeated games that operates at the level of a supergame strategy. First, we develop a model of level-$k$ reasoning that incorporates choices over strategies as well as beliefs about the strategies chosen by others. Then, jointly using elicited strategies and beliefs about strategies from the indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and applying a new notion of balance-optimal error tolerance, we classify a substantial fraction of subjects as level-1 or level-2. Moreover, we show that when level-$k$ reasoning operates at the level of a repeated-game strategy, cognitive ability and experience predict higher level reasoning. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.33098 |
| By: | Raouf Boucekkine; Weihua Ruan; Ullrika Sahlin |
| Abstract: | Invasive alien species (IAS) generate substantial ecological and economic damages that often transcend political boundaries, creating strong incentives for coordinated management. We develop a two-region ecological-economic model of IAS control that integrates prevention and eradication measures with population dynamics characterized by logistic growth and an Allee effect. We derive analytical results on the interaction between ecological thresholds and strategic behaviour and compare outcomes under cooperation (central planner) and non-cooperation (open loop Nash equilibrium and Markovian Nash equilibrium). We show that, under realistic control costs, neither prevention nor eradication can eliminate invasive populations in finite time, and complete prevention of cross-border spread is generally not optimal. In the absence of an Allee effect, the zero-population equilibrium is unstable, implying long-run persistence of the invasive species. By contrast, the presence of an Allee effect fundamentally alters system dynamics by making extinction locally stable and creating a basin of attraction within which eradication becomes feasible. This finding highlights the economic significance of ecological thresholds and demonstrates how delays in management can shift populations beyond critical levels, after which eradication is unlikely regardless of subsequent control efforts. Numerical simulations further show that cooperative management expands the set of initial conditions leading to eradication and consistently reduces aggregate social costs relative to decentralized management. The results provide a formal rationale for rapid intervention, precautionary regulation, and stronger multilateral cooperation in IAS management, particularly in jurisdictions such as the European Union where listing and control actions may be delayed pending evidence of harm. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.14916 |
| By: | Luciana Yeung; Antonio Bruno de Carvalho Morales |
| Abstract: | Employers in Brazilian labor courts are ordered to pay something in roughly nine of every ten adjudicated claims, and a composition is available at any time at a fraction of what a judgment costs them. Yet large employers decline to compose, claim after claim, for years. We show that this is the equilibrium of a repeated game in which a long-lived defendant faces a continuing flow of short-lived claimants who differ in the personal cost of carrying a claim. The defendant is not buying a cheaper resolution of the present claim; it is buying a public record of refusing to compose, which lengthens the expected duration of any claim brought against it and thins the flow of claims it will face in future. The mechanism requires neither divergent beliefs about the merits nor private information. Three results carry the argument. A reputation for toughness deters entry if and only if the ratio of the two values at stake is smaller than the ratio of the two delays, each measured as a discounted annuity, a condition that is automatic when compositions price at the claimant’s reservation value. Because claimants differ, deterrence is always partial and the filing rate is bounded away from zero at every reputation the defendant can attain, so the stationary outcome is persistent litigation rather than its disappearance. And permanent toughness requires the defendant’s patience to exceed a threshold that falls with the responsiveness of entry and with the speed at which the market’s record forms. We take the model to approximately 130, 000 decisions of Brazil’s largest regional labor court (TRT-2, São Paulo) for 2001–2017, obtained by text mining. The corpus establishes the institutional configuration the model assumes: court-fee waivers granted essentially automatically and held by 84.7% of claimants, no exposure of the losing claimant to the employer’s attorney fees, and contingent representation, which together produce a lottery with no losing ticket and guarantee participation at any degree of risk aversion. It also establishes the constraint that forces our definition of reputation, since an employer that disputes everything still loses most of what it disputes and cannot build a record of victories. We do not report a calibration: composition rates are not observable in a corpus of decisions, and we set out what would be needed to measure the model’s remaining objects. |
| Keywords: | Litigation, Ligation, litigation, settlement, labor courts, repeated games, reputation, risk aversion, text mining |
| JEL: | K41 C72 C73 J52 K31 |
| Date: | 2026–08–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:1242026 |
| By: | Jozwik, Jan (School of Economics, University of Nottingham Ningbo China); Lane, Tom (Newcastle University Business School); Song, Lina (Nottingham University Business School); Zhang, Fan (Independent researcher) |
| Abstract: | Building on evidence that group cohesion drives economic efficiency, we hypothesise income inequality influences efficiency by altering cohesion, with the direction depending on inequality type. Using a novel experimental design with extensive group interactions and a state-of-the-art group cohesion measure, we confirm stronger cohesion is associated with more efficient interactions. Group cohesion is strengthened by inequality between groups, a mechanism previously overlooked. Furthermore, unexpectedly, inequalities within groups do not hinder cohesion. These results suggest interpersonal relationships display resilience to economic disparities, challenging the prevailing argument that inequality must harm cohesion, and undermining a pathway through which it could reduce efficiency. |
| Keywords: | economic inequality, group cohesion, social identity, cooperation, coordination, public goods, weak-link game, economic experiment |
| JEL: | C99 D31 D64 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwc:wpaper:2026-02 |
| By: | Hattori, Keisuke; Yoshikawa, Takeshi |
| Abstract: | Manufacturers rely on retailers both to sell their products and to create demand. Investment in demand creation can reverse the usual profit effects of retail entry on manufacturers and incumbent retailers. As the network grows, the manufacturer invests more and each retailer invests less. Entry can reduce the manufacturer's profit despite a higher wholesale price and greater sales, or increase incumbents' profits through savings on investment costs. When investment is sufficiently effective, the manufacturer prefers a finite network even when adding retailers is costless. Cheaper manufacturer investment expands its preferred network, whereas cheaper retailer investment contracts it and can reduce sales and consumer surplus. With identical investment technologies and finite optimal networks, the manufacturer's network is no larger than the socially optimal network; with different technologies, this ordering can reverse. The welfare consequences of distribution limits therefore depend on which firms create demand and bear its cost. |
| Keywords: | Demand creation, Distribution networks, Investment spillovers, Vertical restraints, Profit-increasing entry |
| JEL: | L13 L14 L42 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:344260 |
| By: | Maria Bernadette Donato (University of Messina); Vincenzo Platino (University of Naples Federico II and CSEF); Antonio Villanacci (University of Florence) |
| Abstract: | We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite number of commodities and households, in which preferences are affected by the welfare of others—measured in terms of wealth—and households are allowed to transfer resources to one another. Our goal is to establish the existence of equilibria under more general and realistic assumptions than those adopted in the literature. Specifically, we substitute an ad hoc limit on individual transfers for a bound that is dual-purpose: it satisfies the mathematical criteria necessary for our proof and adheres to the legal frameworks typically prevalent across various countries. This approach allows us to prove existence under standard assumptions of continuity and quasi-concavity, rather than the stronger assumptions of Lipschitz continuity and concavity imposed in the literature. |
| Keywords: | Exchange economy, interdependent preferences, transfers, competitive equilibrium, generalized game approach. |
| JEL: | C62 D50 D51 D62 |
| Date: | 2026–10–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:798 |
| By: | In-Uck Park; Sunoo Park |
| Abstract: | "Security by obscurity, " or the idea that hiding how a system works helps protect it from adversaries, has long been poorly regarded in the security community. Yet its intuitive appeal persists, and it has resurfaced repeatedly in industry practices and public debates over the years. The logic, on the one hand, is that open scrutiny of systems is the best way to find and respond to problems; and on the other hand, that too much openness can increase risk by giving adversaries a roadmap for attack. This isn't purely a technical question, but a human one: it's about how attackers and good-faith security researchers respond to openness in the real world. As such, security experts base their stance on decades of community experience; however, the field lacks empirical or theoretical foundations to back up these long-standing beliefs. We provide the first rigorous modeling of "security by obscurity, " aiming to capture how rational actors will respond to openness or obscurity in fallible systems. We prove that in equilibrium under realistic model conditions, "obscured" systems are more likely to suffer successful attacks than "open" systems --- establishing theoretical support for the longstanding received wisdom. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.12858 |