|
on Game Theory |
| By: | Rumen Kostadinov |
| Abstract: | I study a general model of repeated interactions between long-run players who have no probabilistic beliefs about the environment in which future interactions will take place. I introduce a notion of equilibrium, where at each history players minimise their regret from forgoing an alternative strategy under the worst-case sequence of future games, taking as given the strategies of other players. I derive a recursive characterisation of equilibrium outcomes for fixed discounting, as well as a folk theorem. I demonstrate the tractability of the characterisation in applications to risk-sharing and partnership games. |
| Keywords: | dynamic games; repeated games; regret minimization |
| JEL: | C73 D81 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2022-08&r=gth |
| By: | Michele Crescenzi |
| Abstract: | We provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. For any finite game, we study how players coordinate their play on a signal by means of a public strategy whose instructions are expressed in some natural language. Language can be ambiguous in that different players may assign different truth values to the very same formula in the same state of the world. We model ambiguity using the player-dependent logic of Halpern and Kets (2015). We show that, absent any ambiguity, self-enforcing coordination always induces a correlated equilibrium of the underlying game. When language ambiguity is allowed, self-enforcing coordination strategies induce subjective correlated equilibria. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2211.03426&r=gth |
| By: | Larbi Alaoui; Katharina A. Janezic; Antonio Penta |
| Abstract: | How coordination can be achieved in isolated, one-shot interactions without communication and in the absence of focal points is a long-standing question in game theory. We show that a cost-benefit approach to reasoning in strategic settings delivers sharp theoretical predictions that address this central question. In particular, our model predicts that, for a large class of individual reasoning processes, coordination in some canonical games is more likely to arise when players perceive heterogeneity in their cognitive abilities, rather than homogeneity. In addition, and perhaps contrary to common perception, it is not necessarily the case that being of higher cognitive sophistication is beneficial to the agent: in some coordination games, the opposite is true. We show that subjects' behavior in a laboratory experiment is consistent with the predictions of this model, and reject alternative coordination mechanisms. Overall, the empirical results strongly support our model. |
| Keywords: | Coordination, cognitive cost, sophistication, strategic reasoning, value of reasoning |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D80 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1849&r=gth |
| By: | Thomas Byrne |
| Abstract: | Following the solution to the One-Round Voronoi Game in arXiv:2011.13275, we naturally may want to consider similar games based upon the competitive locating of points and subsequent dividing of territories. In order to appease the tears of White (the first player) after they have potentially been tricked into going first in a game of point-placement, an alternative game (or rather, an extension of the Voronoi game) is the Stackelberg game where all is not lost if Black (the second player) gains over half of the contested area. It turns out that plenty of results can be transferred from One-Round Voronoi Game and what remains to be explored for the Stackelberg game is how best White can mitigate the damage of Black's placements. Since significant weaknesses in certain arrangements were outlined in arXiv:2011.13275, we shall first consider arrangements that still satisfy these results (namely, White plays a certain grid arrangement) and then explore how Black can best exploit these positions. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2211.06472&r=gth |
| By: | Eric van Damme; Xu Lang |
| Abstract: | We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the players' disagreement payoffs are private information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that if the Pareto frontier is linear, or the utility functions are quasi-linear, the outcome of an ex post efficient mechanism must be independent of the players' disagreement values. Hence, in this case, a bargaining solution must be ordinal: the players' interim expected utilities cannot depend on the intensity of their preferences. For a non-linear frontier, the result continues to hold if disagreement payoffs are independent or if one of the players only has a few types. We discuss implications of these results for axiomatic bargaining theory and for full surplus extraction in mechanism design. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2211.06830&r=gth |
| By: | Raouf Boucekkine (Rennes School of Business); Carmen Camacho (Paris School of Economics & CNRS); Weihua Ruan (Purdue University Northwest); Benteng Zou (Université du Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | We consider a group of players initially members of a coalition managing cooperatively a public bad, in this case, the stock of pollution. Countries are technologically heterogeneous but the pollution damage is uniform. We essentially attempt to characterize the conditions under which a country may eventually split and when it splits within an infinite horizon multi-stage differential game. In contrast to the existing literature, we do not assume that after splitting, the splitting player and the remaining coalition will adopt Markovian strategies. Instead, we assume that the latter will remain committed to the collective control of pollution and play open-loop, while the splitting player plays Markovian. Within a full linear-quadratic model, we characterize the optimal strategies. We later compare with the outcomes of the case where the splitting player and the \remaining" coalition play both Markovian. We highlight several interesting results in terms of the implications for long- term pollution levels and the duration of coalitions with heterogenous strategies. |
| Keywords: | Coalition splitting; environmental agreements; differential games; multistage optimal control, precommitment vs Markovian. |
| JEL: | C61 C73 D71 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:22-13&r=gth |
| By: | Ennio Bilancini (IMT School for Advanced Studies); Leonardo Boncinelli (University of Florence); Alessandro Tampieri (University of Florence) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the role of strategy assortativity for the evolution of parochial- ism. Individuals belonging to different groups are matched in pairs to play a prisoner dilemma, conditioning their choice on the identity of the partner. Strategy assortativ- ity implies that a player is more likely to be matched with someone playing the same strategy. We find that, if the degree of strategy assortativity is sufficiently high, then parochialism (i.e., cooperate with your own group and defect with others) spreads over a group, while egoism (i.e., defect with everyone) emerges otherwise. Notably, parochialism is more likely to emerge in a smaller group. |
| Keywords: | prisoner dilemma; cooperation; in-group favoritism; cultures; asymptotic stability. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 Z10 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:22-14&r=gth |
| By: | Sosung Baik; Sung-Ha Hwang |
| Abstract: | We study the revenue comparison problem of auctions when the seller has a maxmin expected utility preference. The seller holds a set of priors around some reference belief, interpreted as an approximating model of the true probability law or the focal point distribution. We develop a methodology for comparing the revenue performances of auctions: the seller prefers auction X to auction Y if their transfer functions satisfy a weak form of the single-crossing condition. Intuitively, this condition means that a bidder's payment is more negatively associated with the competitor's type in X than in Y. Applying this methodology, we show that when the reference belief is independent and identically distributed (IID) and the bidders are ambiguity neutral, (i) the first-price auction outperforms the second-price and all-pay auctions, and (ii) the second-price and all-pay auctions outperform the war of attrition. Our methodology yields results opposite to those of the Linkage Principle. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2211.12669&r=gth |
| By: | Christophe Bravard (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes); Jacques Durieu (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2, GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes); Sudipta Sarangi (DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Virginia Tech [Blacksburg]); Stéphan Sémirat (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes) |
| Abstract: | We study message credibility in social networks with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents prefer a specific outcome while unbiased agents prefer the true state of the world. Each agent who receives a message knows the identity (but not type) of the message creator and only the identity and types of their immediate neighbors. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game and demonstrate filtering by the network: the posterior beliefs of agents depend on the distance a message travels. Unbiased agents, who receive a message from a biased agent, are more likely to assign a higher credibility and transmit it further when they are further away from the source. For a given network, we compute the probability that it will always support the communication of messages by unbiased agents. Finally, we establish that under certain parameters, this probability increases when agents are uncertain about their network location. |
| Keywords: | Influential Players,Filter,Network |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03850289&r=gth |
| By: | Qi-Qing Song; Min Guo |
| Abstract: | This gives two existence results of alpha-core solutions by introducing P-open conditions and strong P-open conditions into games without ordered preferences. The existence of alpha-core solutions is obtained for games with infinite-players. Secondly, it provides a short proof of Kajii's (Journal of Economic Theory 56, 194-205, 1992) existence theorem for alpha-core solutions, further, the Kajii's theorem is equivalent to the Browder fixed point theorem. In addition, the obtained existence results can include many typical results for alpha-core solutions and some recent existence results as special cases. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2211.03112&r=gth |
| By: | Caserta, Maurizio; Distefano, Rosaria; Ferrante, Livio |
| Abstract: | In everyday life, individuals interact with relatives, friends and colleagues, share ideas and passions and cooperate with others to pursue common goals. Within each social domain, individuals recognize themselves as a group member with rights and duties to observe. Understanding the importance of social norms and encouraging mutually beneficial cooperation is crucial for societal and economic development. This paper presents an experimental study of an educational program for early adolescents of 11 years old from South Italy. The program introduces participants to institutions, civic engagement, sense of duty, and decision-making. Among other didactic activities, it includes guided tours and a role-taking game. Our results suggest that the program attendance positively affects cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma and altruistic behavior in a Dictator Game. Our findings contribute to the nature-nurture debate, showing that promoting prosocial behavior can be effective in pursing the common good. |
| Keywords: | Experimental game theory,Group Decision Making,Cooperation,Prisoner’s Dilemma,Dictator Game |
| JEL: | C72 C93 I20 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:266393&r=gth |
| By: | Ayan Bhattacharya |
| Abstract: | This paper builds a model of interactive belief hierarchies to derive the conditions under which judging an arbitrage opportunity requires Bayesian market participants to exercise their higher-order beliefs. As a Bayesian, an agent must carry a complete recursion of priors over the uncertainty about future asset payouts, the strategies employed by other market participants that are aggregated in the price, other market participants' beliefs about the agent's strategy, other market participants beliefs about what the agent believes their strategies to be, and so on ad infinitum. Defining this infinite recursion of priors -- the belief hierarchy so to speak -- along with how they update gives the Bayesian decision problem equivalent to the standard asset pricing formulation of the question. The main results of the paper show that an arbitrage trade arises only when an agent updates his recursion of priors about the strategies and beliefs employed by other market participants. The paper thus connects the foundations of finance to the foundations of game theory by identifying a bridge from market arbitrage to market participant belief hierarchies. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2211.03244&r=gth |
| By: | William Brock; Anastasios Xepapadeas |
| Abstract: | Scientific evidence suggests that anthropogenic impacts on the environment such as land use changes and climate change promote the emergence of infectious diseases in humans. We develop a two-region epidemic-economic model which unifies short-run disease containment policies with long-run policies which could control the drivers and the severity of infectious diseases. We structure our paper by linking a susceptible-infected-susceptible model with an economic model which includes land use choices for agriculture and climate change and accumulation of knowledge that supports land augmenting technical change. The contact number depends on short-run containment policies (e.g., lockdown, vaccination), and long-run policies affecting land use, the natural world and climate change. Climate change and land use changes have an additional cost in terms of infectious disease since they might increase the contact number in the long run. We derive optimal short-run containment controls for a Nash equilibrium between regions, and long-run controls for climate policy, land use and knowledge at an open loop Nash equilibrium and the social optimum and unify the short- and long-run controls. We explore the impact of ambiguity aversion and model misspeciffication in the unified model and provide simulations which support the theoretical model. |
| Keywords: | infectious diseases, SIS model, natural world, climate change, land use, containment, Nash equilibrium, OLNE, social optimum, land augmenting technical change |
| JEL: | I18 Q54 D81 |
| Date: | 2022–12–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aue:wpaper:2232&r=gth |
| By: | Pablo Brañas-Garza (Loyola Behavioral Lab); Antonio Cabrales (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Maria Paz Espinosa (University of the Basque Country); Diego Jorrat (Loyola Behavioral Lab) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study a game in which success requires a sufficient total contribution by members of a group. There are significant uncertainties surrounding the chance and the total effort required for success. A theoretical model with max-min preferences towards ambiguity predicts higher contributions under ambiguity than under risk. However, in a large representative sample of the Spanish population (1,500 participants) we find that the ATE of ambiguity on contributions is zero. The main significant interaction with the personal characteristics of the participants is with risk attitudes, and it increases contributions. This suggests that policymakers concernedwith ambiguous problems (like climate change) do not need to worry excessively about ambiguity. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:196&r=gth |
| By: | Andrea Civilini; Vito Latora |
| Abstract: | We propose a dynamical model of price formation on a spatial market where sellers and buyers are placed on the nodes of a graph, and the distribution of the buyers depends on the positions and prices of the sellers. We find that, depending on the positions of the sellers and on the level of information available, the price dynamics of our model can either converge to fixed prices, or produce cycles of different amplitudes and periods. We show how to measure the strength of competition in a spatial network by extracting the exponent of the scaling of the prices with the size of the system. As an application, we characterize the different level of competition in street networks of real cities across the globe. Finally, using the model dynamics we can define a novel measure of node centrality, which quantifies the relevance of a node in a competitive market. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2211.07412&r=gth |
| By: | Stéphane Airiau (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Haris Aziz (UNSW - University of New South Wales [Sydney], CSIRO - Data61 [Canberra] - ANU - Australian National University - CSIRO - Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation [Canberra]); Ioannis Caragiannis (Aarhus University [Aarhus]); Justin Kruger (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jérôme Lang (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Dominik Peters (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | A divisible public resource is to be divided among projects. We study rules that decide on a distribution of the budget when voters have ordinal preference rankings over projects. Examples of such portioning problems are participatory budgeting, time shares, and parliament elections. We introduce a family of rules for portioning, inspired by positional scoring rules. Rules in this family are given by a scoring vector (such as plurality or Borda) associating a positive value with each rank in a vote, and an aggregation function such as leximin or the Nash product. Our family contains wellstudied rules, but most are new. We discuss computational and normative properties of our rules. We focus on fairness, and introduce the SD-core, a group fairness notion. Our Nash rules are in the SD-core, and the leximin rules satisfy individual fairness properties. Both are Pareto-efficient. |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03843084&r=gth |
| By: | Krämer, Jan; Shekhar, Shiva; Hofmann, Janina |
| Abstract: | Algorithmic learning gives rise to a data-driven network effects, which allow a dominant platform to reinforce its dominant market position. Data-driven network effects can also spill over to related markets and thereby allow to leverage a dominant position. This has led policymakers to propose data siloing and mandated data sharing remedies for dominant data-driven platforms in order to keep digital markets open and contestable. While data siloing seeks to prevent the spillover of data-driven network effects generated by algorithmic learning to other markets, data sharing seeks to share this externality with rival firms. Using a game-theoretic model, we investigate the impacts of both types of regulation. Our results bear important policy implications, as we demonstrate that data siloing and data sharing are potentially harmful remedies, which can reduce the innovation incentives of the regulated platform, and can lead overall lower consumer surplus and total welfare. |
| Keywords: | Data-driven network effects,algorithmic learning,regulation,data sharing,data siloing |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse22:265645&r=gth |
| By: | Kurt R. Brekke (Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), Department of Economics); Dag Morten Dalen (BI Norwegian Business School); Odd Rune Straume (Department of Economics/NIPE, University of Minho) |
| Abstract: | We study the incentives of drug producers to develop predictive biomarkers, taking into account strategic interaction between drug producers and health plans. For this purpose we develop a two-dimensional spatial framework that allows us to capture the informational role of biomarkers and their effects on price competition and treatment choices. Although biomarkers increase the information available to prescribers, we identify an anticompetitive effect on the prices set by producers of therapeutically substitutable drugs. We also find that better information about each patient´s most therapeutically appropriate drug does not necessarily lead to more efficient treatment outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Pharmaceutical markets; Precision medicine; Therapeutic competition; Predictive biomarkers. |
| JEL: | I11 I18 L13 L65 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nip:nipewp:3/2022&r=gth |
| By: | Hanspach, Philip |
| Abstract: | Large digital platform companies increasingly integrate vertically by building Internet infrastructure, such as edge computing facilities, content delivery networks, or submarine cables. These investments enable new services while changing their bargaining power towards the upstream supplier. I model competing investment incentives in Internet infrastructure for an upstream player (e.g., an Internet Service Provider) and a large downstream platform and its effects on competition with smaller downstream platforms without proprietary infrastructure. Investment incentives increase discontinuously both upstream and downstream when the downstream platform has the larger network. With symmetric investment costs, the downstream platform will invest more than a pure upstream player. I discuss the model implications for net neutrality, network access regulation, and efficient side payments between platform and upstream industry. |
| Keywords: | platforms,multi-sided markets,competition policy,net neutrality,Internet,telecommunications infrastructure |
| JEL: | L13 L42 L51 L63 L86 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse22:265633&r=gth |
| By: | Guo, Qi; Huang, Shao'an; Wang, Gaowang |
| Abstract: | We develop a model of government intervention with information disclosure in which the government with two private signals trades against other market participants to stabilize the financial markets. The government trades optimally based more on the price target than the noisy signal about the fundamentals. Information disclosure harms financial stability by deteriorating the information advantages of the government. Releasing the price target diminishes noises in financial markets and decreases market liquidity, while releasing the fundamental signal reduces private information in financial markets and improves market liquidity; and the tradeoffs of releasing both signals depend on its policy weights. Releasing the fundamental signal raises price efficiency effectively, while releasing the price target has subtle effects on price efficiency. Under different scenarios of information disclosure, there exist tradeoffs between financial stability and price efficiency. |
| Keywords: | government intervention; information disclosure; financial stability; price efficiency; market liquidity |
| JEL: | G14 G18 |
| Date: | 2022–11–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:115470&r=gth |
| By: | Jeanjean, Francois |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effects of infrastructure sharing agreements on telecommunications markets. Using a model with an investment stage where firms compete" 'a la Cournot", I find that, infrastructure sharing agreements increase investment at industry level. Indeed, the sharing of infrastructures reduces costs of investment for involved operators and encourage them to invest more. This holds except if involved operators are much less efficient than their competitors (i.e., they have much higher marginal costs before investment). Furthermore, infrastructure sharing agreements generally increase both investments and consumer surplus, except if involved operators are much less efficient than their competitors or if they have very different level of efficiency. The infrastructure sharing agreement is even more effective when the most efficient operators are involved. |
| Keywords: | Mobile telecommunications,network sharing,competition,consumer welfare |
| JEL: | L40 L96 L11 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse22:265636&r=gth |
| By: | Matias Iaryczower; Santiago Oliveros; Parth Parihar |
| Abstract: | We study the ability of multi-group teams to undertake binary projects in a decentralized environment. The equilibrium outcomes of our model display familiar features in collaborative settings, including inefficient gradualism, inaction, and contribution cycles, wherein groups alternate taking responsibility for moving the project forward. Expected delay grows more than proportionally with project size, and some welfare-enhancing projects are not completed, even as agents become arbitrarily patient. A team composed of two equally large groups can complete larger projects than a fully homogenous team, even as the difference in preferences for completion among the two groups is arbitrarily small. Moreover, if the project is sufficiently large, the two-group team always completes the project strictly faster. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30656&r=gth |
| By: | Victor Hiller (Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas); Nouhoum Touré |
| Abstract: | A large body of evidence suggests that women's empowerment, both within the household and in politics, benefits to children and has the potential to promote economic development. Nevertheless, the existing interactions between these two facets of empowerment have not been considered thus far. The aim of the present paper is to fill this gap by proposing a theoretical framework in which women's bargaining power within both the private sphere and the public sphere is endogenous. We show that the mutual interplay between the evolution of women's voice in the family and in society may lead to the emergence of multiple equilibria and pathdependency phenomena. We also discuss policy interventions that are the most suitable to promote women's empowerment when its multidimensional nature is taken into account. |
| Keywords: | Female Empowerment,Intrahousehold Bargaining Power,Institutional Bargaining Power,Gender Inequality,Economic Development |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03843890&r=gth |