|
on Game Theory |
| By: | André Casajus (HHL - Handelshochschule Leipzig - Graduate School of Management); Rodrigue Tido Takeng (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We introduce the concepts of the components' second-order productivities in cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) with a coalition structure (CS games) and of the components' second-order payoffs for one-point solutions for CS games as generalizations of the players' second-order productivities in TU games and of the players' second-order payoffs for one-point solutions for TU games (Casajus in Discrete Appl Math 304:212-219, 2021). The players' second-order productivities are conceptualized as second-order marginal contributions, that is, how one player affects another player's marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them by entering these coalitions. The players' second-order payoffs are conceptualized as the effect of one player leaving the game on the payoff of another player. Analogously, the components' second-order productivities are conceptualized as their second-order productivities in the game between components; the components' second-order payoffs are conceptualized as their second-order payoffs in the game between components. We show that the Owen value is the unique efficient one-point solution for CS games that reflects the players' and the components' second-order productivities in terms of their second-order payoffs. |
| Keywords: | TU game,Shapley value,Owen value,Second-order marginal contributions,Second-order payoffs |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03798448&r=gth |
| By: | Nima Haghpanah; Ron Siegel |
| Abstract: | We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which segmentations may result from the interaction among consumers and the seller. Instead of studying the interaction as a non-cooperative game, we take a reduced-form approach and introduce a notion of stability that any resulting segmentation must satisfy. A stable segmentation is one that, for any alternative segmentation, contains a segment of consumers that prefers the original segmentation to the alternative one. Our main result characterizes stable segmentations as efficient and saturated. A segmentation is saturated if no consumers can be shifted from a segment with a high price to a segment with a low price without the seller optimally increasing the low price. We use this characterization to constructively show that stable segmentations always exist. Even though stable segmentations are efficient, they need not maximize average consumer surplus, and segmentations that maximize average consumer surplus need not be stable. Finally, we relate our notion of stability to solution concepts from cooperative game theory and show that stable segmentations satisfy many of them. |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2210.13194&r=gth |
| By: | Andrea Attar (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, TSM - Toulouse School of Management Research - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TSM - Toulouse School of Management - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées); Eloisa Campioni; Gwenaël Piaser |
| Abstract: | We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We reconsider the issue of non-existence of an equilibrium as first raised by Myerson (1982). In the context of his example, we establish the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We clarify that Myerson (1982)'s non-existence result is an implication of the additional requirement he imposes, that each principal selects his preferred continuation equilibrium in the agents' game. |
| Keywords: | Competing Mechanisms,Equilibrium Existence |
| Date: | 2022–09–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03790171&r=gth |
| By: | Dufwenberg, Martin; Feldman, Paul; Servátka, Maroš; Tarrasó, Jorge; Vadovič, Radovan |
| Abstract: | Lab evidence on trust games involves more cooperation than conventional economic theory predicts. We explore whether this pattern extends to a field setting where we are able to control for (lack of) repeat-play and reputation: the taxi market in Mexico City. We find a remarkably high degree of trustworthiness, even with price-haggling which was predicted to reduce trustworthiness. |
| Keywords: | trustworthiness, honesty, reciprocity, field experiment, haggling, taxis, Mexico City |
| JEL: | C72 C90 C93 |
| Date: | 2022–09–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:115044&r=gth |
| By: | Gabriele Camera (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Lukas Hohl (University of Basel and Federal Finance Administration); Rolf Weder (University of Basel) |
| Abstract: | International economic theory suggests that people should embrace economic integration because it promises large gains. But policy reversals such as Brexit indicate a desire for economic disintegration. Here we report results of an experiment of how size and cross-country distribution of gains from integration influence individuals’ inclination to cooperate to reap its intended benefits and to embrace or reject integration. The design considers an indefinitely repeated helping game with multiple equilibria and strategic uncertainty. The data reveal that inequality of potential gains neither affected behavior nor reduced support for economic integration. However, integration may lead to disappointing, unequally distributed welfare gains, undermining support for the policy. This suggests that to better assess integration policies, we should account for the spillover effects of integration on behavior. Miscalculating this behavioral aspect may undermine the intended development goals and motivate calls for dramatic policy-reversals. |
| Keywords: | economic opportunity, endogenous institutions, globalization, indefinitely repeated games, social dilemmas |
| JEL: | C70 C90 F02 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:22-16&r=gth |
| By: | Ugo Bolletta; Luca Paolo Merlino |
| Date: | 2022–06–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/351083&r=gth |
| By: | Thomas Kuhn (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Chemnitz University of Technology); Radomir Pestow; Anja Zenker |
| Abstract: | We study the endogenous formation of climate coalitions linked to a preferential free trade arrangement. In a multi-stage strategic trade and participation game, coalition and fringe countries dispose of a discriminatory tariff on dirty imports as well as emission permits imposed on domestic producers and traded on a common permit market inside the coalition, or respectively local markets outside. The participation game is solved by Monte-Carlo simulation, while the general equilibrium and the policy game are solved analytically. We find that preferential free trade can create effective climate coalitions in terms of depth and breadth. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change, International Environmental Agreements, Preferential Free Trade, Issue Linkage, Emission Permits |
| JEL: | Q54 Q56 F18 F15 Q58 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tch:wpaper:cep057&r=gth |
| By: | Oguzhan Akcin; Robert P. Streit; Benjamin Oommen; Sriram Vishwanath; Sandeep Chinchali |
| Abstract: | There are a multitude of Blockchain-based physical infrastructure systems, operating on a crypto-currency enabled token economy, where infrastructure suppliers are rewarded with tokens for enabling, validating, managing and/or securing the system. However, today's token economies are largely designed without infrastructure systems in mind, and often operate with a fixed token supply (e.g., Bitcoin). This paper argues that token economies for infrastructure networks should be structured differently - they should continually incentivize new suppliers to join the network to provide services and support to the ecosystem. As such, the associated token rewards should gracefully scale with the size of the decentralized system, but should be carefully balanced with consumer demand to manage inflation and be designed to ultimately reach an equilibrium. To achieve such an equilibrium, the decentralized token economy should be adaptable and controllable so that it maximizes the total utility of all users, such as achieving stable (overall non-inflationary) token economies. Our main contribution is to model infrastructure token economies as dynamical systems - the circulating token supply, price, and consumer demand change as a function of the payment to nodes and costs to consumers for infrastructure services. Crucially, this dynamical systems view enables us to leverage tools from mathematical control theory to optimize the overall decentralized network's performance. Moreover, our model extends easily to a Stackelberg game between the controller and the nodes, which we use for robust, strategic pricing. In short, we develop predictive, optimization-based controllers that outperform traditional algorithmic stablecoin heuristics by up to $2.4 \times$ in simulations based on real demand data from existing decentralized wireless networks. |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2210.12881&r=gth |
| By: | Wen, Jun; Diao, Yu; Wang, Leonard F. S.; Sun, Ji |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we formulate a mixed triopoly with product differentiation and consumer cognition in which a welfare-maximizing public firm and CSR-concerned private firms conduct quantities competition. The government decides the optimal degree of privatization of public firm. We find that the privatization degree of public firm is closely related to product differentiation and consumer cognition. When private firm enters, whether CSR efforts are made or not, the degree of privatization will be higher. Furthermore, if the public firm is the leader of the industry, government’s optimal choice of privatization is not to privatize. The total output level, consumer surplus and social welfare are lower than those of Cournot competitors. |
| Keywords: | Privatization; Corporate Social Responsibility; Mixed Triopoly; Consumer Cognition |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L21 L31 M14 |
| Date: | 2022–10–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:115169&r=gth |