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on Game Theory |
| By: | Mark Whitmeyer |
| Abstract: | This paper extends the sequential search model of Wolinsky (1986) by allowing firms to choose how much match value information to disclose to visiting consumers. This restores the Diamond paradox (Diamond 1971): there exist no symmetric equilibria in which consumers engage in active search, so consumers obtain zero surplus and firms obtain monopoly profits. Modifying the scenario to one in which prices are advertised, we discover that the no-active-search result persists, although the resulting symmetric equilibria are ones in which firms price at marginal cost. |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2011.13900&r=all |
| By: | Sergio Currarini; Francesco Feri; Bjoern Hartig; Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez |
| Abstract: | We design an experiment to study how agents make use of information in networks. Agents receive payoff-relevant signals automatically shared with neighbors. We compare the use of information in different network structures, considering games in which strategies are substitute, complement and orthog- onal. To study the incentives to share information across games, we also allow subjects to modify the network before playing the game. We find behavioral deviations from the theoretical prediction in the use of information, which de- pend on the network structure, the position in the network and the strategic nature of the game. There is also a bias toward oversharing information, which is related to risk aversion and the position in the network. |
| Keywords: | Networks, experiment, information sharing, strategic complements, strategic substitutes, pairwise stability |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D82 D85 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:20/08&r=all |
| By: | Dehez, Pierre (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | How to allocate the probability of success resulting from the joint actions of a group of players? To address this question, Hou et al. (Operations Research Letters 46, 2018) propose to use the Shapley value of a transferable utility game, a "probability game" assuming probabilistic independence. The purpose of the present note is to analyze the properties of probability games and their duals and to study various solution concepts, in particular the core and the Shapley value. We give an axiomatic foundation of the Shapley value on the class of probability games and we investigate the link between different solution concepts, including asymmetric values. |
| Keywords: | Game theory |
| Date: | 2020–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2020035&r=all |
| By: | Bergantiños, Gustavo; Vidal-Puga, Juan |
| Abstract: | Minimum cost spanning tree problems are well known problems in the Operations Research literature. Some agents, located at different geographical places, want a service provided by a common supplier. Agents will be served through costly connections. Some part of the literature has focused, mainly, in studying how to allocate the connection cost among the agents. We review the papers that have addressed the allocation problem using cooperative game theory. |
| Keywords: | minimum cost spanning tree problems; cooperative games; core; Shapley value |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2020–12–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:104911&r=all |
| By: | Galit Ashkenazi-Golan (The School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997800, Israel.); Yevgeny Tsodikovich (Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France.); Yannick Viossat (PSL, Université Paris-Dauphine, CEREMADE UMR7534, Paris, France) |
| Abstract: | A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final bid can depend on new information provided about either the asset or the competitors. This paper examines the effects of new information regarding competitors, seeking to determine what information the auctioneer should provide assuming the set of allowable bids is discrete. The rational strategy profile that maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer is the one where each bidder makes the highest possible bid that is lower than his valuation of the item. This strategy profile is an equilibrium for a large enough number of bidders, regardless of the information released. We compare the number of bidders needed for this profile to be an equilibrium under different information settings. We find that it becomes an equilibrium with fewer bidders when no additional information is made available to the bidders compared to when information regarding the competition is available. As a result, from the auctioneer's revenue perspective, when the number of bidders is unknown, there are some advantages to not revealing information between the stages of the auction. |
| Keywords: | auctions, multistage auctions, BAFO, information utilization |
| JEL: | D44 D82 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2044&r=all |
| By: | Herings, Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium); Vannetelbosch, Vincent (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | We consider marriage problems where myopic and farsighted players in- teract. To study such problems, we use the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set. Blocking occurs by coalitions of size one or two. We require that all blocking players should strictly improve. We pay particular attention to the question whether core elements survive in this environment. This is the case when all players are myopic as well as when all players are farsighted. It also holds for matching problems satisfying the top-coalition property. For general matching problems where all women are farsighted, there is only one core element that can belong to the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set, the woman-optimal stable matching, so all other stable outcomes are excluded for sure. If the woman-optimal stable matching is dominated from the woman point of view by an individually rational matching, then the pairwise myopic- farsighted stable set cannot contain a core element. We show that blocking by coalitions of arbitrary size leads to identical results. |
| Keywords: | Marriage problems ; core ; stable sets ; myopic and farsighted play- ers |
| JEL: | C70 C78 |
| Date: | 2020–11–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2020033&r=all |
| By: | Farjam, Mike; Wolf, Stephan |
| Abstract: | Through an online experiment with 682 participants, we test how inter-generational resource sharing is affected by granting veto power to later generations. We specifically study the over-use of a common-pool resource (CPR) by early generations at the expense of later generations and examine how the veto empowerment of later generations can be used to restrain egoistic tendencies. We compare sequential ultimatum and dictator games of various lengths and find that (1) the CPR consumption of early generations does not depend on the number of generations that follow them; (2) the veto empowerment of later generations leads to a fairer, but ultimately less efficient use of the CPR across generations; and (3) the vetoes are used more carefully if not only previous generations, but also future generations that do not yet have access to the resource are affected by the veto. |
| Date: | 2021–01–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:759ks&r=all |
| By: | Frédéric Marty; Thierry Warin |
| Abstract: | This article demonstrates the inner relationship between gatekeepers and their complementors and the impact of information sharing on the overall market competition intensity and the economic surplus allocation. Several competition law-based cases are grounded on the incompleteness and information asymmetry in which complementors have to make their decisions. In this article, the situation of the complementors is all the more unfavourable when their partnership with the gatekeeper is a durable one. We use a game theory-based model to explain this trajectory. The informational imperfections undermine the bargaining power of the complementors and raise the potential cost of the exit option out of the ecosystem. In this perspective, we envisage regulatory remedies as data portability as proposed by the E.U. Commission Digital Markets Act. |
| Keywords: | Gatekeeper,Keystone Player,Market Dominance,Innovation,Kill Zones, |
| JEL: | L12 L41 L86 |
| Date: | 2020–12–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2020s-70&r=all |
| By: | Andrzej Baranski Author e-mail: a.baranski@nyu.edu; Diogo Geraldes Author e-mail: diogogeraldes@gmail.com; Ada Kovaliukaite Author e-mail: ada.kovaliukaite@nyu.edu; James Tremewan Author e-mail: james.tremewan@auckland.ac.nz (Division of Social Science) |
| Abstract: | Does the gender composition of committees affect negotiations in majoritarian bargaining? We report the results of an experiment in which subjects are placed in triads to negotiate the division of a sum of money under majority rule and the gender composition of the group is manipulated, ranging from all female (FFF), female majority (FFM), male majority (MMF), to all male (MMM). Results show that men are more likely to make the opening offer, and contrary to our hypothesis, agreements are reached fastest in MMM and slowest in FFF. The proportion of grand coalitions is increasing in the number of females while minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) increase monotonically in the number of males. MWCs are disproportionately more likely to be same-gender in MMF, which leads to a gender gap in earnings compared to FFM. When provisional MWCs form prior to a final agreement, excluded men are more proactive than excluded women in attempting to break the coalition by making alluring offers, which partially explains why mixed gender MWCs are less frequent in MMF compared to FFM. Notably, some females adopt male-type behavior in MMF regarding their initial proposals and aggressiveness when left out from a MWC. |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nad:wpaper:20210060&r=all |
| By: | Ben D'Exelle; Christine Gutekunst; Arno Riedl |
| Abstract: | Men and women negotiate differently, which might create gender inequality in access to resources as well as efficiency losses due to disagreement. We study the role of gender and gender pairing in bilateral bargaining, using a lab-in-the-filed experiment in which pairs of participants bargain over the division of a fixed amount of resources. We vary the gender composition of the bargaining pairs as well as the disclosure of the participants’ identities. We find gender differences in earnings, agreement and demands, but only when the identities are disclosed. Women in same-gender pairs obtain higher earnings than men and women in mixed-gender pairs. This is the result of the lower likelihood of disagreement among women-only pairs. Women leave more on the bargaining table, conditional on their beliefs, which contributes to the lower disagreement and higher earnings among women-only pairs. |
| Keywords: | bargaining, gender, gender pairing, beliefs, experiment |
| JEL: | C90 J16 O12 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8750&r=all |
| By: | Thomas Byrne; S\'andor P. Fekete; J\"org Kalcsics; Linda Kleist |
| Abstract: | We study competitive location problems in a continuous setting, in which facilities have to be placed in a rectangular domain $R$ of normalized dimensions of $1$ and $\rho\geq 1$, and distances are measured according to the Manhattan metric. We show that the family of 'balanced' facility configurations (in which the Voronoi cells of individual facilities are equalized with respect to a number of geometric properties) is considerably richer in this metric than for Euclidean distances. Our main result considers the 'One-Round Voronoi Game' with Manhattan distances, in which first player White and then player Black each place $n$ points in $R$; each player scores the area for which one of its facilities is closer than the facilities of the opponent. We give a tight characterization: White has a winning strategy if and only if $\rho\geq n$; for all other cases, we present a winning strategy for Black. |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2011.13275&r=all |
| By: | Tim Johnson; Oleg Smirnov |
| Abstract: | We study a spatial, one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism's behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its choice of when to implement that strategy across a set of discrete time slots. Cooperators evolve to fixation regularly in the model when we add time slots to lattices and small-world networks, and their portion of the population grows, albeit slowly, when organisms interact in a scale-free network. This selection for cooperators occurs across a wide variety of time slots and it does so even when a crucial condition for the evolution of cooperation on graphs is violated--namely, when the ratio of benefits to costs in the PD does not exceed the number of spatially-adjacent organisms. |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2011.14440&r=all |
| By: | Kfir Eliaz; Alexander Frug |
| Abstract: | We introduce a new channel for breakdown of cheap talk communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Our framework has the following novel feature: conditional on interacting, both parties agree on the optimal action in each state, but there are sender types with which the receiver prefers not to interact. We show that for a broad class of preferences, any interval equilibrium induces only finitely many actions in the support of the receiver's strategy. We also show that introducing a second stage with noisy signals on the sender type has a dramatic effect on the first-stage communication. |
| Keywords: | cheap talk, Contagion |
| JEL: | D83 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1224&r=all |