nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2020‒06‒29
25 papers chosen by
Sylvain Béal
Université de Franche-Comté

  1. Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion By Ronen Gradwohl; Niklas Hahn; Martin Hoefer; Rann Smorodinsky
  2. Value-Free Reductions By David Pérez-Castrillo; Chaoran Sun
  3. Endogenous Monitoring through Gossiping in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Experimental Evidence By Kamei, Kenju; Nesterov, Artem
  4. The Coordinating Power of Social Norms By Francesco Fallucchi; Daniele Nosenzo
  5. The Corona-Pandemic: A Game-theoretic Perspective on Regional and Global Governance By Alejandro Caparrós; Michael Finus
  6. Computations and Complexities of Tarski's Fixed Points and Supermodular Games By Chuangyin Dang; Qi Qi; Yinyu Ye
  7. Applying the Nash Bargaining Solution for a Reasonable Royalty By David M. Kryskowski; David Kryskowski
  8. Optimization incentives in dilemma games with strategic complementarity By Potters, Jan; Suetens, Sigrid
  9. Collusive Market Allocations By Iossa, Elisabetta; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie; Rey, Patrick
  10. Does equity induce inefficiency? An experiment on coordination By Mamadou Gueye; Nicolas Quérou; Raphaël Soubeyran
  11. A Dynamic Theory of Secessionist vs Centrist Conflict By Esteban, Joan; Flamand, Sabine; Morelli, Massimo; Rohner, Dominic
  12. The importance of being discrete: on the (in-)accuracy of continuous approximations in auction theory By Itzhak Rasooly; Carlos Gavidia-Calderon
  13. Information design in the hold-up problem By Condorelli, Daniele; Szentes, Balázs
  14. Enforcing Climate Agreements: The Role of Escalating Border Carbon Adjustments By Noha Elboghdadly; Michael Finus
  15. On forward invariance in Lyapunov stability theorem for local stability By Dai Zusai
  16. Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips By Piguillem, Facundo; Riboni, Alessandro
  17. Assortative Information Disclosure By Anton Kolotilin; Alexander Wolitzky
  18. Uncertainty and bargaining: A structural econometric approach By Klein, Gordon; Rebolledo, Mayra
  19. Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource Exploitation: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective By Stéphane Gonzalez; Fatma Rostom
  20. A game theoretical approach to homothetic robust forward investment performance processes in stochastic factor models By Juan Li; Wenqiang Li; Gechun Liang
  21. Consistent Investment of Sophisticated Rank-Dependent Utility Agents in Continuous Time By Ying Hu; Hanqing Jin; Xun Yu Zhou
  22. On competitive nonlinear pricing By Andrea Attar; Thomas Mariotti; Francois Salanie
  23. Lords and Vassals : Power, Patronage, and the Emergence of Inequality By Akerlof, Robert; Li, Hongyi; Yeo, Jonathan
  24. Uncertainty, bargaining power and bargaining solutions: An empirical application By Klein, Gordon; Rebolledo, Mayra
  25. Coopetition Against an Amazon By Ronen Gradwohl; Moshe Tennenholtz

  1. By: Ronen Gradwohl; Niklas Hahn; Martin Hoefer; Rann Smorodinsky
    Abstract: The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we study a setting with multiple senders, but in which the receiver interacts with only one sender of his choice: senders commit to signals and the receiver then chooses, at the interim stage, with which sender to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are even slightly uncertain about each other's preferences, the receiver receives all the informational surplus in all equilibria of this game.
    Date: 2020–06
  2. By: David Pérez-Castrillo; Chaoran Sun
    Abstract: We introduce the value-free (v-f ) reductions, which are operators that map a coalitional game played by a set of players to another "similar" game played by a subset of those players. We propose properties that v-f reductions may satisfy, we provide a theory of duality for them, and we characterize several v-f reductions (among which the value-free version of the reduced games propose by Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989, and Oishi et al., 2016). Unlike reduced games, which were introduced to characterize values in terms of consistency properties, v-f reductions are not defined in reference to values. However, a "path-independent" v-f reduction induces a value. We characterize v-f reductions that induce the Shapley value, the stand-alone value, and the Banzhaf value. Moreover, we can connect our approach to the literature on consistency because any value induced by a path-independent v-f reduction is consistent with that reduction.
    Keywords: coalitional games, reduced games, axiomatization, consistency, shapley value, duality
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2020–06
  3. By: Kamei, Kenju; Nesterov, Artem
    Abstract: Exogenously given reputational information is known to improve cooperation. This paper experimentally studies how people create such information through reporting of partner’s action choices, and whether the endogenous monitoring helps sustain cooperation, in an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. The experiment results show that most subjects report their opponents’ action choices, thereby successfully cooperating with each other, when reporting does not involve a cost. However, subjects are strongly discouraged from reporting when doing so is costly. As a result, they fail to achieve strong cooperation norms when the reported information is privately conveyed only to their next-round interaction partner. Costly reporting occurs only occasionally, even when there is a public record whereby all future partners can check the reported information. However, groups can then foster cooperation norms aided by the public record, because reported information gets gradually accumulated and becomes more informative over time. These findings suggest that the efficacy of endogenous monitoring depends on the quality of platforms that store reported information.
    Keywords: experiment, cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma game, reputation, reporting, infinitely repeated game.
    JEL: C73 C92 D70 H41
    Date: 2020–05–23
  4. By: Francesco Fallucchi (Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER), Luxembourg); Daniele Nosenzo (Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University)
    Abstract: A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber, 2013). The Krupka-Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka-Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points. We find that the method is robust as long as there are clear normative expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior. In settings where there is a less clear consensus about the social norm, the method is more vulnerable.
    Keywords: Social norms, Krupka-Weber method, Coordination, Focal point, Saliency, Dictator game
    JEL: C72 C91
    Date: 2020–06–19
  5. By: Alejandro Caparrós (Institute for Public Goods and Policies, Spanish National Research Council); Michael Finus (University of Graz, Austria)
    Abstract: We argue that the incentive structure of all individual and coordinated measures across countries to contain the Corona-pandemic is that of a weakest-link public good game. We discuss a selection of theoretical and experimental key results of weakest-link games and interpret them in the light of the Corona-pandemic. First, we highlight that experimental evidence does not support the assumption that coordination can be trivially solved, even among symmetric players. Second, we argue that for asymmetric countries the weakest-link game does not only pose a problem of coordination, but also a problem of cooperation. Third, we show how and under which conditions self-enforcing treaties can foster cooperation. We account for the possibility that countries make mistakes when choosing their actions. Finally, we provide a list of research gaps.
    Date: 2020–06
  6. By: Chuangyin Dang; Qi Qi; Yinyu Ye
    Abstract: We consider two models of computation for Tarski's order preserving function f related to fixed points in a complete lattice: the oracle function model and the polynomial function model. In both models, we find the first polynomial time algorithm for finding a Tarski's fixed point. In addition, we provide a matching oracle bound for determining the uniqueness in the oracle function model and prove it is Co-NP hard in the polynomial function model. The existence of the pure Nash equilibrium in supermodular games is proved by Tarski's fixed point theorem. Exploring the difference between supermodular games and Tarski's fixed point, we also develop the computational results for finding one pure Nash equilibrium and determining the uniqueness of the equilibrium in supermodular games.
    Date: 2020–05
  7. By: David M. Kryskowski; David Kryskowski
    Abstract: There has been limited success applying the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) in assigning intellectual property damages due to the difficulty of applying it to the specific facts of the case. Because of this, parties are not taking advantage of Georgia-Pacific factor fifteen. The intent of this paper is to bring clarity to the NBS so it can be applied to the facts of a case. This paper normalizes the NBS and provides a methodology for determining the bargaining weight in Nash's solution. Several examples are shown demonstrating the use of this normalized form, and a nomograph is added for computational ease.
    Date: 2020–05
  8. By: Potters, Jan; Suetens, Sigrid
    Abstract: We examine whether optimization incentives --- incentives to best-respond --- have an effect on behavior in finitely repeated two-player dilemma games with strategic complements. We run an experiment in which we increase optimization incentives in two different ways compared to a baseline treatment. In the first treatment, the increase in optimization incentives is created by an increase in payoffs on the best-response curve, while its slope remains unchanged. In the second treatment, the increase in optimization incentives takes the form of an increase in the slope of the best-response curve, while best-response payoffs remain unchanged. We find that the impact of optimization incentives is overshadowed by the effect of the slope of the best-response curve. Although an increase in optimization incentives leads subjects to best-respond more frequently when the best-response curve is relatively flat, it leads to more cooperative behavior if it is accompanied by an increase in the slope of the best-response function.
    Keywords: Cooperation; Experiments; optimization incentives; repeated game; strategic complementarity
    JEL: C91 D01 D74
    Date: 2020–04
  9. By: Iossa, Elisabetta; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie; Rey, Patrick
    Abstract: Collusive schemes by suppliers often take the form of allocating customers or markets among cartel members. We analyze incentives for suppliers to initiate and sustain such a collusive schemes in a repeated procurement setting. We show that, contrary to some prevailing beliefs, staggered (versus synchronized) purchasing does not make collusion more difficult to sustain or initiate. Buyer defensive measures include synchronized rather than staggered purchasing, first-price rather than second-price auctions, more aggressive or secrete reserve prices, longer contract lengths, withholding information, and avoiding observable registration procedures. Inefficiency induced by defensive measures is an often unrecognized social cost of collusive conduct.
    Keywords: Coordinated effects; sustainability and initiation of collusion; synchronized vs staggered purchasing
    JEL: D44 D82 L41
    Date: 2020–04
  10. By: Mamadou Gueye (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Nicolas Quérou (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Raphaël Soubeyran (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)
    Abstract: In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the relationship between equity and coordination success in a game with Pareto ranked equilibria. Equity is decreased by increasing the coordination payoffs of some subjects while the coordination payoffs of others remain unchanged. Theoretically, in this setting, difference aversion may lead to a positive relationship between equity and coordination success, while social welfare motivations may lead to a negative relationship. Using a within-subject experimental design, we find that less equity unambiguously leads to a higher level of coordination success. Moreover, this result holds even for subjects whose payoffs remain unchanged. Our results suggest that social welfare motivations drives the negative relationship between equity and coordination success found in this experiment. Moreover, our data suggest that the order of treatment matters. Groups facing first the treatment with high inequality in coordination payoffs, then the treatment with low inequality in coordination payoffs, reach the Pareto dominant equilibrium more often in both treatments compared to groups playing first the treatment with low inequality in coordination payoffs, then the treatment with high inequality in coordination payoffs.
    Keywords: equity, effciency,difference aversion,social welfare motivation,coordination game
    Date: 2020–06–05
  11. By: Esteban, Joan; Flamand, Sabine; Morelli, Massimo; Rohner, Dominic
    Abstract: This paper proposes an integrated dynamic theory of bargaining and conflict between ethnic groups, delivering novel predictions on secessionist versus centrist conflict. Ethnic identities, inequality and intertemporal preferences are predicted to impact the risk of secessionist conflict and the risk of centrist conflict in different directions. Beside obtaining a full characterization of equilibrium for every set of conditions, we also show empirical evidence that cultural similarity reduces the scope for secessionist conflict (compared to centrist conflict); that small ethnic groups stick more often to peaceful union; that higher patience and higher group inequality fuels secessionism.
    Keywords: conflict; Patience; Secessions; Surplus Sharing
    JEL: C7 D74
    Date: 2020–04
  12. By: Itzhak Rasooly; Carlos Gavidia-Calderon
    Abstract: While auction theory views bids and valuations as continuous variables, real-world auctions are necessarily discrete. In this paper, we use a combination of analytical and computational methods to investigate whether incorporating discreteness substantially changes the predictions of auction theory, focusing on the case of uniformly distributed valuations so that our results bear on the majority of auction experiments. In some cases, we find that introducing discreteness changes little. For example, the first-price auction with two bidders and an even number of values has a symmetric equilibrium that closely resembles its continuous counterpart and converges to its continuous counterpart as the discretisation goes to zero. In others, however, we uncover discontinuity results. For instance, introducing an arbitrarily small amount of discreteness into the all-pay auction makes its symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium disappear; and appears (based on computational experiments) to rob the game of pure-strategy equilibria altogether. These results raise questions about the continuity approximations on which auction theory is based and prompt a re-evaluation of the experimental literature.
    Date: 2020–06
  13. By: Condorelli, Daniele; Szentes, Balázs
    Abstract: We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer’s distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1=e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer’s equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trade is ex post efficient. These properties are shown to be preserved even when different distributions are differentially costly as long as the cost is monotone in the dispersion of the distribution.
    JEL: L81
    Date: 2020–02–01
  14. By: Noha Elboghdadly (University of Bath, UK and Alexandria University, Egypt); Michael Finus (University of Graz, Austria)
    Abstract: Border carbon adjustments (BCAs) have been suggested as a measure to reduce carbon leakage in the presence of unilateral climate policies and/or to enforce cooperative climate agreements. In an intra-industry trade model, this paper studies whether and under which conditions a sequence of escalating threats of implementing BCA-measures could be successful in enforcing a fully cooperative agreement. We start from a situation where moving from non-cooperative production-based carbon taxes to a socially optimal tax is not attractive to the environmentally less concerned country. We then test whether the threat of imposing BCA-measures, in the form of import tariffs or, additionally, complemented by export rebates, will enforce cooperation. We show that import tariffs are the least distortionary policy instrument but the weakest threat, and import tariffs with a full export rebate is the most distortionary instrument if implemented but the most effective threat to enforce cooperation. In an escalating penalty game, we determine the subgame-perfect equilibrium path along which threats must be deterrent but also credible. We show that BCA-measures help to enforce cooperation, reduce global emissions and are welfare improving if they need to be implemented. However, whenever full cooperation would generate the highest global welfare gains, BCAs fail to establish cooperation, a version of the paradox of cooperation, as proposed by Barrett (1994).
    Keywords: Border carbon adjustments; escalating penalties; enforcement of cooperation; carbon leakage.
    JEL: C7 F12 F18 Q58 H23
    Date: 2020–06
  15. By: Dai Zusai
    Abstract: Forward invariance of a basin of attraction is often overlooked when using a Lyapunov stability theorem to prove local stability; even if the Lyapunov function decreases monotonically in a neighborhood of an equilibrium, the dynamic may escape from this neighborhood. In this note, we fix this gap by finding a smaller neighborhood that is forward invariant. This helps us to prove local stability more naturally without tracking each solution path. Similarly, we prove a transitivity theorem about basins of attractions without requiring forward invariance. Keywords: Lyapunov function, local stability, forward invariance, evolutionary dynamics.
    Date: 2020–06
  16. By: Piguillem, Facundo; Riboni, Alessandro
    Abstract: Most fiscal rules can be overridden by consensus. We show that this does not make them ineffectual. Since fiscal rules determine the outside option in case of disagreement, the opposition uses them as ``bargaining chips" to obtain spending concessions. We show that under some conditions this political bargain mitigates the debt accumulation problem. We analyze various rules and find that when political polarization is high, harsh fiscal rules (e.g., government shutdown) maximize the opposition's bargaining power and leads to lower debt accumulation. When polarization is low, less strict fiscal limits (e.g, balanced-budget rule) are preferable. Moreover, we find that the optimal fiscal rules could arise in equilibrium by negotiation. Finally, by insuring against power fluctuations, negotiable rules yield higher welfare than strict ones.
    Keywords: fiscal rules; Government Debt; Government shutdown=; legislative bargaining; Political Polarization
    JEL: D72 H2 H6
    Date: 2020–04
  17. By: Anton Kolotilin (School of Economics, UNSW Business School); Alexander Wolitzky (Department of Economics, MIT)
    Abstract: We consider a standard persuasion problem in which the receiver’s action and the state of the world are both one-dimensional. Fully characterizing optimal signals when utilities are non-linear is a daunting task. Instead, we develop a general approach to understanding a key qualitative property of optimal signals: their assortative structure, which describes the overall pattern of what states are pooled together. We derive simple conditions—driven by intuitive economic properties, such as supermodularity and submodularity of preferences—for the optimality of positive and negative assortative patterns of information disclosure. Our approach unifies a wide range of previous findings and generates new applications.
    Keywords: persuasion, information design, assortative matching
    JEL: C78 D82 D83
    Date: 2020–06
  18. By: Klein, Gordon; Rebolledo, Mayra
    Abstract: This paper proposes a structural econometric model to analyze the influence of uncertain disagreement outcomes on the settlement of new agreements between parties with uneven bargaining power. By including the the findings of theoretical literature on the requirements to reach agreements under uncertain disagreement conditions, and using an asymmetric Nash bargaining framework, our proposal is able to estimate not only the bargaining solutions but also the bargainers' uncertainties and determine whether a new compromise could be reach under such uncertainty or not.
    Date: 2020
  19. By: Stéphane Gonzalez (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Fatma Rostom (UP1 UFR02 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR d'Économie - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, Chaire Energie & Prospérité - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - X - École polytechnique - ENSAE ParisTech - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - Institut Louis Bachelier, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)
    Abstract: The article explores the implications of natural resource scarcity in terms of global cooperation and trade. We investigate whether there exist stable international long-term agreements that take into account the disparities between countries in terms of geological endowments and productive capacity, while caring about future generations. For that purpose, we build an original cooperative game framework, where countries can form coalitions in order to optimize their discounted consumption stream in the long-run, within the limits of their stock of natural resources. We use the concept of the recursive core that satisfies both coalitional stability and time consistency. We show that this set is nonempty, stating that an international long-term agreement along the optimal path will be self-enforcing. The presented model can be viewed as a tool to refresh the common look at the North-South opposition and sets the conceptual framework for the exploration of a fair sharing of the fruits of global economic growth.
    Keywords: Non-renewable natural resources,Cooperative games,Recursive core
    Date: 2019
  20. By: Juan Li; Wenqiang Li; Gechun Liang
    Abstract: This paper studies an optimal forward investment problem in an incomplete market with model uncertainty, in which the dynamics of the underlying stocks depends on the correlated stochastic factors. The uncertainty stems from the probability measure chosen by an investor to evaluate the performance. We obtain directly the representation of the power robust forward performance process in factor-form by combining the zero-sum stochastic differential game and ergodic BSDE approach. We also establish the connections with the risk-sensitive zero-sum stochastic differential games over an infinite horizon with ergodic payoff criteria, as well as with the classical power robust expected utility for long time horizons.
    Date: 2020–05
  21. By: Ying Hu; Hanqing Jin; Xun Yu Zhou
    Abstract: We study portfolio selection in a complete continuous-time market where the preference is dictated by the rank-dependent utility. As such a model is inherently time inconsistent due to the underlying probability weighting, we study the investment behavior of sophisticated consistent planners who seek (subgame perfect) intra-personal equilibrium strategies. We provide sufficient conditions under which an equilibrium strategy is a replicating portfolio of a final wealth. We derive this final wealth profile explicitly, which turns out to be in the same form as in the classical Merton model with the market price of risk process properly scaled by a deterministic function in time. We present this scaling function explicitly through the solution to a highly nonlinear and singular ordinary differential equation, whose existence of solutions is established. Finally, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the scaling function to be smaller than 1 corresponding to an effective reduction in risk premium due to probability weighting.
    Date: 2020–06
  22. By: Andrea Attar (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole); Thomas Mariotti (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole); Francois Salanie (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole)
    Abstract: We study a discriminatory limit-order book in which market makers compete in nonlinear tariffs to serve a privately informed insider. Our model allows for general nonparametric specifications of preferences and arbitrary discrete distributions for the insider's private information. Adverse selection severely restricts equilibrium outcomes: in any pure-strategy equilibrium with convex tariffs, pricing must be linear and at most one type can trade, leading to an extreme form of market breakdown. As a result, such equilibria exist only under exceptional circumstances that we fully characterize. These results are strikingly different from those of existing analyses that postulate a continuum of types. The two approaches can be reconciled when we consider epsilon-equilibria of games with a large number of market makers or a large number of types.
    Keywords: adverse selection,competing mechanism,limit-order book
    Date: 2019
  23. By: Akerlof, Robert (University of Warwick); Li, Hongyi (UNSW Business School); Yeo, Jonathan (University of Warwick)
    Abstract: This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study competitions for power — and the role of patronage in such competitions. We construct and analyze a new game — the “chicken-and-egg game” — in which chickens correspond to positions of power andeggsarethegame’scurrency. We find that power tends to accumulate, through a “power begets power” dynamic, in the hands of “lords.” Other subjects behave like their vassals in the sense that they take lords’ handouts rather than compete against them. We observe substantial wealth inequality as well as power inequality. There are also striking gender differences in outcomes — particularly in rates of lordship. In a second treatment, where we eliminate patronage by knocking out the ability to transfer eggs, inequality is vastly reduced and the “power begets power” dynamic disappears.
    Date: 2020
  24. By: Klein, Gordon; Rebolledo, Mayra
    Abstract: We compare the traditional model for structurally estimating bargaining power solutions assuming certainty on the disagreement payoffs against a model assuming evenly distributed bargaining power and uncertainty on disagreement profits. We find substantial differences in the distribution of the rent resulted from each of these models and it was hinted how the assumptions may have a role on the identification of the rent's distribution
    Date: 2020
  25. By: Ronen Gradwohl; Moshe Tennenholtz
    Abstract: This paper studies cooperative data-sharing between competitors vying to predict a consumer's tastes. We design optimal data-sharing schemes both for when they compete only with each other, and for when they additionally compete with an Amazon---a company with more, better data. In both cases we show that participants benefit from such coopetition. We then apply the insights from our optimal schemes to more general settings.
    Date: 2020–05

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