|
on Game Theory |
| By: | Ulrich Faigle (Mathematisches Institut, Universität zu Köln); Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | An interaction system has a finite set of agents that interact pairwise, depending on the current state of the system. Symmetric decomposition of the matrix of interaction coefficients yields the representation of states by self-adjoint matrices and hence a spectral representation. As a result, cooperation systems, decision systems and quantum systems all become visible as manifestations of special interaction systems. The treatment of the theory is purely mathematical and does not require any special knowledge of physics. It is shown how standard notions in cooperative game theory arise naturally in this context. In particular, Fourier transformation of cooperative games becomes meaningful. Moreover, quantum games fall into framework. Finally, a theory of Markov evolution of interaction states is presented that generalizes classical homogeneous Markov chains to the present context. |
| Abstract: | Un système d'interaction a un nombre fini d'agents qui interagissent par paire, dépendant de l'état courant du système. La décomposition symétrique de la matrice d'interaction donne la représentation des états par des matrices auto-adjointes et donc une représentation spectrale. De ce fait, les systèmes de coopération, les systèmes de décision et les systèmes quantiques deviennent tous visibles comme des manifestations de systèmes d'interaction spéciaux. Le traitement de la théorie est purement mathématique et ne requiert pas de connaissance en physique. On montre comment les notions standard de la théorie des jeux coopératifs apparaissent dans ce contexte. En particulier, la transformée de Fourier des jeux coopératifs acquiert une signification. De plus, les jeux quantiques font partie de ce cadre. Enfin, une théorie markovienne de l'évolution des états d'interaction est présentée, qui généralise les chaînes de Markov homogènes classiques au présent contexte. |
| Keywords: | cooperative game,decision system,Fourier transform,interaction system,measurement,quantum game,jeu coopératif,système de décision,évolution,transformée de Fourier,système d'interaction,mesurage,jeux quantique |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01659148&r=gth |
| By: | Vincent Boucher |
| Abstract: | I present a behavioural model of network formation with positive network externalities in which individuals have preferences for being part of a clique. The behavioural model leads to an associated supermodular (Topkis, 1979) normalform game. I show that the behavioural model converges to the greatest Nash equilibrium of the associated normal-form game. I propose an approximate Bayesian computation (ABC) framework, using original summary statistics, to make inferences about individuals' preferences, and provide an illustration using data on high school friendships. |
| Keywords: | Network formation, Supermodular Games, Approximate Bayesian Computation |
| JEL: | D85 C11 C15 C72 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:crrecr:1710&r=gth |
| By: | He, Yinghua; Magnac, Thierry |
| Abstract: | Matching markets often require recruiting agents "programs" to conduct a costly screening of "applicants", who are agents on the other side. A market becomes congested if programs must screen too many applicants. The cost associated with application submission is a Pigouvian tax that mitigates the negative externality that applicants impose on programs. A higher cost reduces congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programs; however, match quality may be in jeopardy. We measure the effects of such Pigouvian taxes by studying variants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with differential application costs. Using data collected in a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without sacrificing matching quality. |
| Keywords: | Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism; Costly Preference Formation; Screening; Stable Matching; Congestion; Matching Market Design |
| JEL: | C78 D50 D61 I21 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:32279&r=gth |
| By: | Antonio Cabrales; Michalis Drouvelis; Zeynep Gurguy; Indrajit Ray |
| Abstract: | We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a possible round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk before the game is played. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that the players are overall truthful about their types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way or two-way talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when they players fully reveal their information; however, they achieve higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. |
| Keywords: | battle of the sexes, private information, cheap talk, coordination |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D83 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6781&r=gth |
| By: | Alexandre Skoda (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We consider restricted games on weighted graphs associated with minimum partitions. We replace in the classical definition of Myerson restricted game the connected components of any subgraph by the subcomponents corresponding to a minimum partition. This minimum partition Pmin is induced by the deletion of the minimum weight edges. We provide five necessary conditions on the graph edge-weights to have inheritance of convexity from the underlying game to the restricted game associated with Pmin. Then, we establish that these conditions are also sufficient for a weaker condition, called F-convexity, obtained by restriction of convexity to connected subsets. Moreover, we prove that inheritance of convexity for Myerson restricted game associated with a given graph G is equivalent to inheritance of F-convexity for the Pmin-restricted game associated with a particular weighted graph G' built from G by adding a dominating vertex, and with only two different edge-weights. Then, we prove that G is cycle-complete if and only if a specific condition on adjacent cycles is satisfied on G'. |
| Keywords: | partitions,restricted game,convex game,communication networks,cooperative game |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01659804&r=gth |
| By: | Drew Fudenberg; Kevin He |
| Abstract: | We define Player-Compatible Equilibrium or "PCE," which imposes cross-player restrictions on magnitudes of the players' "trembles" onto different actions. These restrictions are inspired by the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by inexperienced agents who are unsure of the prevailing distribution of strategies in opponent populations. We show that PCE selects the "intuitive" equilibria in a number of examples where trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) have no bite. We also provide a learning-based microfoundation for PCE in some easy-to-analyze classes of games. Finally, we conduct a lab experiment based on one of our examples and verify PCE leads to better predictions than other equilibrium concepts. |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1712.08954&r=gth |
| By: | HERINGS P. Jean-Jacques (Universiteit Maastricht); MAULEON Ana (Université Saint-Louis, Bruxelles and CORE, UCL); VANNETELBOSCH Vincent (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set, which is based on the notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of match-ings such that there is no myopic-farsighted improving path from any match-ing in the set to another matching in the set (internal stability) and there is a myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching outside the set to some matching in the set (external stability). For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept pre-dicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consist-ing of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted. We present examples where this is the unique myopic-farsighted stable set as well as examples of myopic-farsighted stable sets consisting of a core element di erent from the woman-optimal matching or even of a non-core element. |
| Keywords: | Marriage problems, stable sets, myopic and farsighted players. |
| JEL: | C70 C78 |
| Date: | 2017–04–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2017014&r=gth |
| By: | MAULEON Ana (Université Saint-Louis Bruxelles and CORE); SCHOPOHL Simon (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain); VANNETELBOSCH Vincent (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain) |
| Abstract: | We analyze a model of information centralization in teams where players can only exchange information through an endogenous network. Over several periods each player can either pass or not pass her information to her neighbors. Once one player has central |
| Keywords: | communication network; dynamic network game; information transmission; leadership; pairwise; team project |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2017–11–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2017033&r=gth |
| By: | Dinev, Nikolay (Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF)) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court persuasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated filings and a judge who aims to always take appropriate action. In the model, management makes a preemptive voluntary filing to retain control of the process, and thereby engage in a game of Bayesian Persuasion with asymmetric information vis-à-vis the judge. This mechanism endogenously results in the reorganization of some non-viable companies, and exclusively management-initiated (i.e., voluntary) bankruptcy filings. This paper, therefore, explains why non-viable companies could be permitted to reorganize and why there are repeat offender firms that enter bankruptcy multiple times. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian Persuasion, Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, Asymmetric Information |
| JEL: | C72 D21 D72 D82 D83 G33 K20 K40 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:334&r=gth |
| By: | A Skoda (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We consider restricted games on weighted graphs associated with minimum partitions. We replace in the classical definition of Myerson restricted game the connected components of any subgraph by the subcomponents corresponding to a minimum partition. This minimum partition Pmin is induced by the deletion of the minimum weight edges. We provide a characterization of the graphs satisfying inheritance of convexity from the underlying game to the restricted game associated with P min. |
| Keywords: | partitions ,cooperative game,convex game,restricted game |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01660670&r=gth |
| By: | Áureo de Paula (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London); Seth Richards-Shubik (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Elie Tamer (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a framework for identifying preferences in a large network where links are pairwise stable. Network formation models present difficulties for identifi cation, especially when links can be interdependent: e.g., when indirect connections matter. We show how one can use the observed proportions of various local network structures to learn about the underlying preference parameters. The key assumption for our approach restricts individuals to have bounded degree in equilibrium, implying a finite number of payoff-relevant local structures. Our main result provides necessary conditions for parameters to belong to the identifi ed set. We then develop a quadratic programming algorithm that can be used to construct this set. With further restrictions on preferences, we show that our conditions are also sufficient for pairwise stability and therefore characterize the identifi ed set precisely. Overall, the use of both the economic model along with pairwise stability allows us to obtain effective dimension reduction. |
| Date: | 2017–08–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:35/17&r=gth |
| By: | Vincent Boucher |
| Abstract: | I propose a simple simulation procedure for large games with multiple equilibria. The simulation procedure is based on a best-response dynamic. The implied equilibrium selection mechanism is intuitive: more stable equilibria are selected with higher probability. |
| Keywords: | Potential Games, Equilibrium Selection Mechanism, Basin of Attraction, Coordination Games |
| JEL: | C62 C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:crrecr:1709&r=gth |
| By: | Mustapha Ridaoui (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Christophe Labreuche (Thales Research and Technology [Palaiseau] - THALES) |
| Abstract: | We consider MultiCriteria Decision Analysis models which are defined over discrete attributes, taking a finite number of values. We do not assume that the model is monotonically increasing with respect to the attributes values. Our aim is to define an importance index for such general models, encompassing Generalized-Additive Independence models as particular cases. They can be seen as being equivalent to k-ary games (multichoice games). We show that classical solutions like the Shapley value are not suitable for such models, essentially because of the efficiency axiom which does not make sense in this context. We propose an importance index which is a kind of average variation of the model along the attributes. We give an axiomatic characterization of it. |
| Abstract: | On considère des modèles de décision multicritère qui sont définis sur des attributs discrets, prenant un nombre fini de valeurs. On ne suppose pas que le modèle est monotone croissant par rapport aux valeurs d'attributs. Notre but est de définir un indice d'importance pour de tels modèles généraux, incluant les modèles d'indépendance additive généralisée comme cas particulier. Ils peuvent être vus comme étant équivalent aux jeux k-ary (jeux multichoix). Nous montrons que les solutions classiques comme la valeur de Shapley ne conviennent pas pour de tels modèles, essentiellement parce que l'axiome d'efficience est sans signification dans ce contexte. Nous proposons un indice d'importance qui est une sorte de variation moyenne du modèle selon un attribut. Nous en donnons une caractérisation axiomatique. |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01659796&r=gth |
| By: | Camille Cornand (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira (BETA - Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We propose a unified framework bridging the gap between team and competition issues, in order to reconsider the social value of private and public information in price and quantity games under imperfect and dispersed information, and to compare the corresponding outcomes in terms of equilibrium and social welfare. The informational distortion associated with the competition motive may lead to a negative social value of private information and reverse the perfect information result in favor of strategic substitutability as the source of higher profit and social welfare. Abstract We propose a unified framework bridging the gap between team and competition issues, in order to reconsider the social value of private and public information in price and quantity games under imperfect and dispersed information, and to compare the corresponding outcomes in terms of equilibrium and social welfare. The informational distortion associated with the competition motive may lead to a negative social value of private information and reverse the perfect information result in favor of strategic substitutability as the source of higher profit and social welfare. |
| Keywords: | public information,dispersed information,quantity game,strategic substitutability,price game,anti-coordination,strategic complementarity,coordination,competition,beauty contest |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01614815&r=gth |
| By: | Proto, Eugenio (University of Warwick); Sgroi, Daniel (University of Warwick); Nazneen, Mahnaz (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Existing research supports two opposing mechanisms through which positive mood might affect cooperation. Some studies have suggested that positive mood produces more altruistic, open and helpful behavior, fostering cooperation. However, there is contrasting research supporting the idea that positive mood produces more assertiveness and inward-orientation and reduced use of information, hampering cooperation. We find evidence that suggests the second hypothesis dominates when playing the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Players in an induced positive mood tend to cooperate less than players in a neutral mood setting. This holds regardless of uncertainty surrounding the number of repetitions or whether pre-play communication has taken place. This finding is consistent with a text analysis of the pre-play communication between players indicating that subjects in a more positive mood use more inward-oriented, more negative and less positive language. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to use text analysis in pre-play communication. |
| Keywords: | Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation, positive mood |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11130&r=gth |
| By: | Walkowitz, Gari |
| Abstract: | Motivated by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and evidence from previous studies, this paper makes a contribution to conducting dictator-game experiments under resource constraints. Using a holistic and strictly controlled approach, we systematically assess the validity of common cost-saving dictator-game variants. We include five common approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators; paying only some subjects or decisions; role uncertainty at the time of the transfer decision; a combination of random decision payment and role uncertainty. To test the validity of subjects’ dictator-game decisions, we relate them to complementary individual difference measures of generosity: social value orientation, personal values, and a donation to charity. In line with previous evidence, our data show that dictator behavior is quite sensitive to the applied methods. The standard version of the dictator game has the highest validity. Involving fewer receivers than dictators and not paying for all decisions yields comparably valid results. These methods may, therefore, represent feasible alternatives for the conduct of dictator games under contraints. By contrast, in the dictator-game variants where only some subjects are paid or where subjects face uncertainty about their final player role, the expected associations with other measures of generosity are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also biased upwards. We conclude that these methods are inappropriate when the researchers are interested in valid individual measures of generosity. |
| Keywords: | Dictator Game, Costs, Incentives, Unbalanced Matching, Random Payment, Role Uncertainty, Social Value Orientation, Personal Values, Donation, Methodology, Experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D3 |
| Date: | 2017–11–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83309&r=gth |
| By: | Cesar Martinelli (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University); Thomas R. Palfrey (Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | We survey selectively lab experiments on voting games including pre-play activities such as communication and other forms of information release. We focus on a few areas that have received much attention in the last few decades, including costly voting and other collective action problems, coordination in elections with more than two alternatives, electoral competition and democratic accountability with imperfect Information, and legislative bargaining. We identify three forces that appear to be operating when communication is allowed: equilibrium, efficiency, and (underlying both) coordination. |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1065&r=gth |
| By: | MAULEON Ana (Université Saint-Louis Bruxelles and CORE); ROEHL Nils (University of Paderborn); VANNETELBOSCH Vincent (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain) |
| Abstract: | We develop a general theoretical framework that allows us to study the group structures that are going to emerge at equilibrium when individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. We introduce the notion of constitution in order to |
| Keywords: | overlapping coalitions, group structures, constitutions, stability, many-to-many matchings |
| JEL: | C72 C78 D85 |
| Date: | 2017–08–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2017022&r=gth |
| By: | Tim Roughgarden |
| Abstract: | This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity. The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii) to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures, focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No background in game theory is assumed. |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1801.00734&r=gth |
| By: | Bhattacherjee, Sanjay; Sarkar, Palash |
| Abstract: | In a weighted majority voting game, the weights of the players are determined based on some socio-economic parameter. A number of measures have been proposed to measure the voting powers of the different players. A basic question in this area is to what extent does the variation in the voting powers reflect the variation in the weights? The voting powers depend on the winning threshold. So, a second question is what is the appropriate value of the winning threshold? In this work, we propose two simple ideas to address these and related questions in a quantifiable manner. The first idea is to use Pearson's Correlation Coefficient between the weight vector and the power profile to measure the similarity between weight and power. The second idea is to use standard inequality measures to quantify the inequality in the weight vector as well as in the power profile. These two ideas answer the first question. Both the weight-power similarity and inequality scores of voting power profiles depend on the value of the winning threshold. For situations of practical interest, it turns out that it is possible to choose a value of the winning threshold which maximises the similarity score and the also minimises the difference in the inequality scores of the weight vector and the power profile. This provides an answer to the second question. Using the above formalisation, we are able to quantitatively argue that it is sufficient to consider only the vector of swings for the players as the power measure. We apply our methodology to the voting games arising in the decision making processes of the International Monetory Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). In the case of IMF, we provide quantitative evidence that the actual winning threshold that is currently used is sub-optimal and instead propose a winning threshold which has a firm analytical backing. On the other hand, in the case of EU, we provide quantitative evidence that the presently used threshold is very close to the optimal. |
| Keywords: | Voting games, weighted majority, power measure, correlation, inequality, Gini index, coefficient of variation. |
| JEL: | C1 C15 D72 D78 Y1 |
| Date: | 2017–12–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83168&r=gth |
| By: | Artem Hulko; Mark Whitmeyer |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes a simple game with $n$ players. Fix a mean in interval $[0, 1]$ and let each player choose any random variable distributed on that interval with the given mean. The winner of the zero-sum game is the player whose random variable has the highest realization. We show that the position of the mean within the interval is crucial. Remarkably, if the given mean is above a crucial threshold then the equilibrium must contain a point mass on $1$. The cutoff is strictly decreasing in the number of players, $n$; and for fixed $\mu$, as the number of players is increased, each player places more weight on $1$ at equilibrium. We also characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game when the mean is sufficiently low. |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1712.08716&r=gth |
| By: | Charles Bellemare; Alexander Sebald; Sigrid Suetens |
| Abstract: | Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes. |
| Keywords: | guilt sensitivity, psychological game theory, Heterogeneity, stakes, dictator game |
| JEL: | A13 C91 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:crrecr:1708&r=gth |
| By: | Guimaraes, Bernardo; Machado, Caio; Pereira, Ana Elisa |
| Abstract: | We start by presenting the general model of dynamic coordination with timing frictions and some key theoretical results. We prove the model features a unique rationalizable equilibrium, present a method to solve the social planner problem and derive expressions for the equilibrium threshold in limiting cases. With this toolkit in hand, we get analytical results for a case with linear preferences and present several applications, ranging from network externalities to statistical discrimination and to macroeconomics. Besides generating insights for specific questions, the applications illustrate the potential of the model to accommodate a large set of economic problems. Last, we show extensions of the framework that allow for endogenous hazard rates, preemption motives and ex-ante heterogeneous agents. |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2017–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:86149&r=gth |
| By: | Emeric Henry (ECON - Département d'économie - Sciences Po); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics); Roberto Galbiati (ECON - Département d'économie - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | We study how cooperation-enforcing institutions dynamically affect values and behavior using a lab experiment designed to create individual specific histories of past institutional exposure. We show that the effect of past institutions is mostly due to " indirect " behavioral spillovers: facing penalties in the past increases partners' cooperation in the past, which in turn positively affects ones' own current behavior. We demonstrate that such indirect spillovers induce persistent effects of institutions. However, for interactions that occur early on, we find a negative effect of past enforcement due to differential learning under different enforcement institutions. |
| Keywords: | Laws,social values,cooperation,learning,spillovers,persistence of institutions,repeated games,experiments |
| Date: | 2017–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01613850&r=gth |
| By: | Allen, Lindsay; Barkowski, Scott; Harris, Matthew; McLaughlin, Joanne Song; Pohl, R. Vincent; Skira, Meghan; Waldron, James |
| Abstract: | We describe a bingo-style game intended to be played at economics conferences. Early results from implementation of the game by economists at conferences suggest that fun increases more than a full standard deviation. Further study of the effects of the game are ongoing. |
| Keywords: | Bingo; Conferences; Fun |
| JEL: | Y90 |
| Date: | 2017–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83074&r=gth |
| By: | Régis Chenavaz (LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information - Télécom ParisTech - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Corina Paraschiv (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IUF - Institut Universitaire de France - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche); Gabriel Turinici (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris-Dauphine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IUF - Institut Universitaire de France - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche) |
| Abstract: | Dynamic pricing of new products has been extensively studied in monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. But, the optimal control and differential game tools used to investigate the pricing behavior on markets with a finite number of firms are not well-suited to model competitive markets with an infinity of firms. Using a mean-field games approach, this paper examines dynamic pricing policies in competitive markets, where no firm exerts market power. The theoretical setting is based on a diffusion modeì a la Bass. We prove both the existence and the uniqueness of a mean-field game equilibrium, and we investigate mean tendencies and firms dispersion in the market. Numerical simulations show that the competitive market splits into two separate groups of firms depending on their production experience. The two groups differ in price and profit. Thus, high prices and profits do not have to signal anticompetitive practices, stimulating the debate on market regulation. |
| Keywords: | competitive markets,mean-field games,Dynamic pricing,new products diffusion |
| Date: | 2017–09–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01592958&r=gth |
| By: | Sela, Aner |
| Abstract: | We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information where contestants have non-linear effort functions. Before the contest begins, the designer offers the option of insurance for which a contestant pays a premium for the contest designer who reimburses this contestant's cost of effort if he does not win. We demonstrate that contests with insurance may be profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize his expected revenue as based on the contestants expected total effort, the premium of the insured contestants, and their reimbursement. |
| Keywords: | all-pay auctions; Contests; Insurance; reimbursement |
| JEL: | D44 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12456&r=gth |
| By: | Grüner, Hans Peter; Tröger, Thomas |
| Abstract: | How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly and monetary transfers are not feasible? Considering symmetric voters with private valuations, we show that it is utilitarian-optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternativedependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Standard quorum rules are not optimal. We develop a perturbation method to characterize equilibria in the case of small participation costs and show that leaving participation voluntary increases welfare for linear rules that are optimal under compulsory participation. |
| Keywords: | Mechanisms design , optimal voting rules , costly voting , compulsory voting , quorum rules |
| JEL: | D71 D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:43628&r=gth |
| By: | LAMAS Alejandro (NEOMA Business School); CHEVALIER Philippe (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain) |
| Abstract: | We study the joint dynamic pricing and lot-sizing problem when firms operate in a competitive environ-ment. Bearing in mind that a dynamic pricing strategy is successful when customers understand it, we assume each firm selects prices from a discrete set. T |
| Keywords: | production, dynamic pricing, competition, lot-sizing, joint production/marketing decisions |
| Date: | 2017–08–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2017023&r=gth |