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on Game Theory |
| By: | ISKAKOV, Mikhail; ISKAKOV, Alexey; d'ASPREMONT, Claude (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | A non-cooperative solution, the Equilibrium in Secure Strategies (EinSS), is defined that extends the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when it does not exist and is meant to solve games where players are "cautious", i.e. looking for secure positions and avoiding threats. This concept abstracts and unifies various ad hoc solutions already formulated in various applied economic games that have been discussed extensively in the literature. It complements usefully mixed strategy Nash equilibria that are usually not explicit and difficult to interpret in these games. Like the Nash equilibrium, the EinSS is a static concept, and the basic requirement of excluding at equilibrium some deviations remains. But it also appeals to dynamic intuitions, tolerating at equilibrium the possibility of some deviations, which would be blocked by counter-deviations punishing the deviator. This is in line with the "objection-counter- objection" rationale first introduced in cooperative games. A general existence theorem is provided and then applied to the price-setting game in Hotelling location model, to Tullock's rent-seeking contests and to Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly. Finally competition in the insurance market game is re-examined and the Rothchild-Stiglitz- Wilson contract shown to be an EinSS even when the Nash equilibrium breaks down. |
| Keywords: | Noncooperative games, Equilibrium existence, Discontinuous games, Equilibrium in secure strategies, Hotelling model, Tullock contest, Insurance market, Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly |
| JEL: | C72 D03 D43 D72 L12 L13 |
| Date: | 2016–10–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2016051&r=gth |
| By: | Alex Dickson (Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde) |
| Abstract: | Consider an environment in which individuals are organised into groups, they contribute to the collective action of their group, and are influenced by the collective actions of other groups; there are externalities between groups that are transmitted through the aggregation of groups’ actions. The theory of ‘aggregative games’ has been successfully applied to study games in which players’ payoffs depend only on their own strategy and a single aggregation of all players’ strategies, but the setting just described features multiple aggregations of actions—one for each group—in which the nature of the intra-group strategic interaction may be very different to the inter-group strategic interaction. The aim of this contribution is to establish a framework within which to consider such ‘multiple aggregate games’; present a method to analyse the existence and properties of Nash equilibria; and to discuss some applications of the theory to demonstrate how useful the technique is for analysing strategic interactions involving individuals in groups. |
| Keywords: | aggregative game, group interaction, contests, public goods, bilateral oligopoly |
| JEL: | C72 D01 D72 H41 L13 |
| Date: | 2017–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:str:wpaper:1701&r=gth |
| By: | Hubert Stahn (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the main differences between the Shapley Values of a set of taxa introduced by Haake et al. [4] and Fuchs and Jin [3], the latter having been found identical to the Fair Proportion Index (Redding and Mooers [10]). In line with Shapley [13], we identify the cooperative game basis for each of these two classes of phylogenetic games and use them (i) to construct simple formulas for these two Shapley values and (ii) to compare these different approaches. Using the set of weights of a phylogenetic tree as a parameter space, we then discuss the conditions under which these two values coincide and, if they are not the same, revisit Hartman's [5] convergence result. Finally, we compare the species ranking induced by these two values. Considering the Kendal and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, simulations show that these rankings are strongly correlated. |
| Keywords: | biodiversity,phylogenetic trees,Shapley value,Fair Proportion index |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01630069&r=gth |
| By: | Azacis, Helmuts (Cardiff Business School) |
| Abstract: | We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping ge- nerations of agents. It is assumed that the preferences of agents do not change during their lifetime. A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of the preferences of agents who are alive in that period. We show that any social choice function satisfying mild necessary conditions is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long. |
| Keywords: | Repeated Implementation, Subgame Perfect Implementa- tion, Overlapping Generations, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D71 D82 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2017/16&r=gth |
| By: | Garfinkel, Michelle (University of California-Irvine); Syropoulos, Constantinos (Drexel University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study alternative forms of conflict resolution, both peaceful and non-peaceful, between two countries that compete for claims to a resource used to produce potentially traded goods. Consistent with the classical liberal argument, peace supports mutually beneficial trade, whereas war preempts it. War always induces countries to allocate resources into non-contractible arming ("guns") for superiority in conflict. Under peaceful settlement, countries might choose to arm as well for gaining leverage in negotiations, but arming is typically less than what it is under war. Building on the observation that arming itself affects the countries' bargaining sets, we compare the efficiency properties of division rules generated by three prominent bargaining solutions - namely, splitting the surplus, equal sacrifice, and Nash bargaining - and show how they depend on the gains from trade. |
| Keywords: | Resource disputes; gains from trade; negotiated settlements; variable threats; endogenous bargaining set |
| JEL: | C72 C78 D30 D74 F51 |
| Date: | 2017–11–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:drxlwp:2017_013&r=gth |
| By: | Estévez-Fernández , M.A. (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Borm, Peter (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Fiestras,; Mosquera,; Sanchez, |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus. It is seen that, contrary to the nucleolus, the 1-nucleolus can be computed in polynomial time due to a characterization using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. Sufficient conditions on a compromise stable game are derived such that the 1-nucleolus and the nucleolus coincide. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:a8ce6687-c87a-4131-98f7-335336afa04d&r=gth |
| By: | Moise Nken (Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada); Halis Murat Yildiz (Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada); |
| Abstract: | Using an endogenous preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model under all possible multilaterally negotiated bound tariff rates, we examine the effects of multilateral trade liberalization on the role of PTAs in achieving global free trade. We first show that, when countries are completely symmetric, no country has an incentive to unilaterally deviate (free ride) from free trade network while exclusion incentives arise when bound tariffs are sufficiently low. Due to the relatively flexible nature of the FTA formation, such exclusion incentives go unexercised and free trade always obtains as the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) of the FTA game. However, such flexibility does not exist under the CU game and thus countries are able to exercise the exclusion incentive and free trade fails to be CPNE when the bound tariff rates are sufficiently low. We then consider a scenario where countries are asymmetric with respect to their comparative advantage. The country with a weaker comparative advantage has an incentive to free ride on trade liberalization of the other two countries and lower bound tariff rates disciplines this incentive via limiting the ability to set optimal tariffs. As a result, multilateral free trade is more likely to be a CPNE as the multilateral negotiated bound tariff rates decline. This result provides support for the idea that multilateral trade liberalization acts as a complement to the FTA formation in achieving global free trade. |
| Keywords: | Bound Tariff Rates, Coalition proof Nash equilibrium, Free Trade Agreement, Customs Union, Exclusion Incentive, Free Riding Incentive |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp068&r=gth |
| By: | Daske, Thomas |
| Abstract: | How agents assess the (in-)tangible externalities that others might impose on them can strongly influence strategic interaction. This study explores mechanism design for agents whose externality assessments and private payoffs, exclusive of externalities, are all subject to asymmetric information; utility is quasi-linear and transferable. An allocation rule will be called strongly Bayesian implementable if it is Bayesian implementable for arbitrary type distributions. Under reasonable assumptions, the following result is established: A Paretian allocation rule is strongly Bayesian implementable through budget-balanced transfers if and only if it maximizes the sum of private payoffs exclusive of externalities. The corresponding mechanism is necessarily externality-robust in that it leaves agents' externality assessments strategically inoperative. The result emphasizes the critical incentive-theoretical role of the welfare judgment inherent to social choice. Strong Bayesian implementation of a welfare judgment inconsistent with externality-ignoring utilitarianism violates budget balance and thus entails incentive costs. |
| Keywords: | (behavioral) mechanism design,externalities,robust implementation,social welfare,bargaining |
| JEL: | C70 C72 D62 D63 D82 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:172494&r=gth |
| By: | Gensbittel, Fabien; Grün, Christine |
| Abstract: | We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that the players have access to stopping times with respect to different filtrations. We show the existence of a value in mixed stopping times and provide a variational characterization for the value as a function of the initial distribution of the Markov chains. We also prove a verification theorem for optimal stopping rules which allows to construct optimal stopping times. Finally we use our results to solve explicitly two generic examples. |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:32183&r=gth |
| By: | Jørgen Vitting Andersen (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne); Philippe de Peretti (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | We introduce a new methodology that enables the detection onset of convergence towards Nash equilibria, in simple market games with infinite larges strategy spaces. The method works by constraining on a special and finite subset of strategies. We illustrate how the method can be used to… in a series of experiments |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:17058&r=gth |
| By: | Antonin Macé (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille) |
| Abstract: | I study the measurement of the influence of scientists based on bibliographic data. I propose a new measure that accounts for indirect influence and allows to compare scientists across different fields of science. By contrast, common measures of influence that “count citations”, such as the h-index, are unable to satisfy either of these two properties. I use the axiomatic method in two opposite ways: to highlight the two limitations of citation- counting schemes and their independence, and to carefully justify the assumptions made in the construction of the proposed measure. |
| Keywords: | intellectual influence,networks,comparability across fields,axiomatic method |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01630095&r=gth |
| By: | Guilhem Lecouteux (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur) |
| Date: | 2017–11–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01633126&r=gth |
| By: | Senda Ounaies (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne & Department of Mathematics - University El Manar Tunis); Jean-Marc Bonnisseau (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics); Souhail Chebbi (Department of Mathematics - King Saud University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we consider a production economy with an unbounded attainable set where the consumers may have non-complete non-transitive preferences. To get the existence of an equilibrium, we provide an asymptotic property on preferences for the attainable consumptions and we use a combination of nonlinear optimization and fixed point theorem on truncated economies together with an asymptotic argument. We show that this condition holds true if the set of attainable allocations is compact or, when preferences are representable by utility functions, if the set of attainable individually rational utility levels is compact. This assumption generalizes the CPP condition of Allouch (2002) and covers the example of Page et al. (2000) when the attainable utility levels set is not compact. So we extend the previous existence results with non compact attainable sets in two ways by adding a production sector and considering general preferences |
| Keywords: | production economy; non compact attainable allocations; quasi-equilibrium; nonlinear optimization |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:16056r&r=gth |