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on Game Theory |
| By: | Takaaki Abe (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University); Yukihiko Funaki (Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for nonempty core in partition function form games. We generalize the Bondareva-Shapley condition for partition function form games and present the existence conditions for the pessimistic core and the optimistic core. In addition, we study the condition for the core defined by exogenously provided partitions. The balanced collections in partition function form and some applications are also discussed. |
| Keywords: | Cooperative games; Partition function; Core; Externalities |
| JEL: | C71 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wap:wpaper:1502&r=gth |
| By: | Bernhard Kasberger; Karl H. Schlag |
| Abstract: | Bidding optimally in first-price auctions is complicated. In the classical equilibrium framework, optimal bidding relies on detailed beliefs about other bidders' value distributions and bidding functions. This article shows how to and a robust bidding rule that does well with minimal information and thus achieves good performance in many situations. Robust bidding means to minimize the maximal difference between the payoff and the payo that could be achieved if one knew the other bidders' value distributions and bidding functions. We derive robust bidding rules under di erent scenarios, including complete uncertainty. Our bid recommendations are evaluated with experimental data. |
| JEL: | C72 D44 D81 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vie:viennp:1707&r=gth |
| By: | Krumer, Alex; Megidish, Reut; Sela, Aner |
| Abstract: | We study the optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in these tournaments with either one or two prizes. Our results show that the players who wish to maximize their expected payoffs or their probabilities of winning have different preferences about the order of games under tournaments with one or two prizes. We analyze the optimal allocations of players for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total effort in the tournaments with one and two prizes, and by comparing between them, it is demonstrated that in order to maximize the players' expected total effort the designer should allocate only one prize. |
| Keywords: | Multi-stage contests, all-pay auctions, first-mover advantage, second-mover advantage, round-robin tournaments |
| JEL: | D00 L00 D20 D44 O31 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2017:13&r=gth |
| By: | Yasushi Asako (Waseda University); Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda University); Kozo Ueda (Waseda University and Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA)); Nobuyuki Uto (Waseda University) |
| Abstract: | This study experimentally analyzes tradersíchoices, with and without asymmetric information, based on the riding-bubble model. While asymmetric information has been necessary to explain a bubble in past theoretical models, our experiments show that traders have an incentive to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric information. This Önding implies a possibility that information symmetry promotes cooperation. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise, even with symmetric information. |
| Keywords: | riding bubbles, crashes, asymmetric information, experiment, clock game |
| JEL: | C72 D82 D84 E58 G12 G18 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wap:wpaper:1613&r=gth |
| By: | Chatterji, Shurojit (School of Economics, Singapore Management University); Sen, Arunava (Indian Statistical Institute); Zeng, Huaxia (School of Economics, Singapore Management University) |
| Abstract: | This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul conjecture (Barberà 2010). |
| Keywords: | Random social choice functions; strategy-proofness; compromise; single-peaked preferences. |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2016–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:smuesw:2016_011&r=gth |
| By: | Michele Lombardi (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow); Naoki Yoshihara (Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst) |
| Abstract: | A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of more than 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the n-person SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. It establishes a condition which is both necessary and sufficient for the partially-honest Nash implementation. If all individuals are partially-honest, then all SCRs that satisfy the property of unanimity are partially-honestly Nash implementable. The partially-honest Nash implementation of SCRs is examined in a variety of environments. |
| Keywords: | Nash implementation, pure strategy Nash equilibrium, partial-honesty, Condition mu^* |
| JEL: | C72 D71 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ums:papers:2017-15&r=gth |
| By: | Simon Martin; Karl H. Schlag |
| Abstract: | When should one pay the ferryman? When should one pay for delivery of a good if there are no institutions or these are too costly to enforce contracts? We suggest to break up the transaction into many small rounds of investment and payment. We show that the e?cient investment can be implemented in an e-subgame perfect equilibrium for any given e if there are su?ciently many rounds of investment. This shows that when the horizon is ?nite, the holdup problem that emerges from backwards induction is not robust. Equilibria with stable and robust strategies require more periods. |
| JEL: | D23 C72 L14 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vie:viennp:1706&r=gth |
| By: | Bisceglia, Michele; Cellini, Roberto; Grilli, Luca |
| Abstract: | This article proposes a differential-game model, in order to analyze markets in which regional regulation is operative and competition is based on quality. The case we have in mind is healthcare public service, where consumers (patients) choose the provider mainly basing on the providers' location and the quality of services, while prices play a more limited role. In most European countries, within the same State, regional (or local) providers compete on quality to attract demand. Market regulation is set at national and/or regional level. Our model highlights the features of equilibrium in such a framework, and specifically investigates how the differences in product quality evolve among regions, and how inter-regional demand flows behave. Differently from some available similar models (that do not take into account the regional dimension of the decision process), we find that quality differentials among regions may persist in equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Healthcare Services; Diffrential Game; Quality Competition;� Regional Regulators. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 I11 I18 L13 R38 |
| Date: | 2017–10–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:81758&r=gth |
| By: | Katherine A. Moos (Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a theory of why the state enacted social policy that regulated the length of the working day in 19th century industrial England. This paper will argue that, far from being capable of self-regulation, the capitalist labor market during Britain’s industrial revolution is best conceptualized as consisting of two major social coordination problems resulting from conflicting interests between and within capital and labor. Left unregulated, this dual social coordination problem caused the overexploitation of labor, with dire consequences for both the capitalist and working classes. The reason why this coordination problem could not self-correct was because the wage-labor bargain contained the externality of unwaged household labor. The existence of this externality became deleterious to firms’ profitability and workers’ survival, especially given the high levels of female labor force participation. This social coordination problem justified and required state regulation into industrial relations. By conceptualizing protective policy as the solution to a dual social coordination problem caused by conflicting interests among heterogeneous firms and workers, this paper extends the Polanyian framework with an explicit theory of exploitation based on the classical theory of competition and a feminist emphasis on social reproduction and unwaged labor. |
| Keywords: | English Factory Legislation, Social Coordination Problem, Game Theory, Labor Policy, Regulation, Hours of Work, Child Labor, Female Labor Force Participation |
| JEL: | B54 C72 J88 N3 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ums:papers:2017-17&r=gth |