
on Game Theory 
By:  Mao, Liang 
Abstract:  We analyze the design of optimal international environmental agreement (IEA) by a threestage coalition formation game. A certain degree of participation uncertainty exists in that each country choosing to sign the IEA for its best interest has a probability to make a mistake and end up a nonsignatory. The IEA rule, which specifies the action of each signatory for each coalition formed, is endogenously determined by a designer, whose goal is to maximize the expected payoff of each signatory. We provide an algorithm to determine an optimal rule and compare this rule to some popular rules used in the literature. 
Keywords:  International environmental agreement; coalition formation; participation uncertainty, stable coalition 
JEL:  C72 H41 Q54 
Date:  2017–05–15 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79145&r=gth 
By:  Andrea Gallice; Ignacio Monzon 
Abstract:  Abstract We propose a simple mechanism that sustains full cooperation in oneshot social dilemmas among a finite number of selfinterested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Position uncertainty provides an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so. Full contribution can then emerge in equilibrium. Our mechanism also leads to full cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma. 
Keywords:  Social Dilemmas; Position Uncertainty; Public Goods; Voluntary Contributions; Fundraising 
JEL:  C72 D82 H41 
Date:  2016 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:493&r=gth 
By:  Koessler, Frédéric; Skreta, Vasiliki 
Abstract:  We study how to optimally sell a good in a bilateral asymmetric information monopoly setting with interdependent values when the informed seller can voluntarily and costlessly provide evidence about the good's characteristics. Equilibrium allocations are feasible and immune to deviations to any mechanism. We show that there is an exante profitmaximizing selling procedure that is an equilibrium of the mechanismproposal game. In contrast to posted price settings, information unravelling of product characteristics may fail even when all buyer types agree on the ranking of product quality. 
Keywords:  Informed principal; consumer heterogeneity; interdependent valuations; product information disclosure; mechanism design; certification 
JEL:  C72 D82 
Date:  2017–05 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12049&r=gth 
By:  Antoine Mandel (PSE  Paris School of Economics, CES  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne  UP1  Université PanthéonSorbonne  CNRS  Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Xavier Venel (CES  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne  UP1  Université PanthéonSorbonne  CNRS  Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE  Paris School of Economics) 
Abstract:  We provide an analytical approach to the problem of influence maximization in a social network when two players compete by means of dynamic targeting strategies. We formulate the problem as a twoplayer zerosum stochastic game. We prove the existence of the uniform value: if the players are sufficiently patient, both players can guarantee the same meanaverage opinion without knowing the exact discount factor. Further, we put forward some elements for the characterization of equilibrium strategies. In general, players must implement a tradeoff between a forwardlooking perspective, according to which they shall aim at maximizing the future spread of their opinion in the network, and a backwardlooking perspective, according to which they shall aim at counteracting their opponent's previous actions. When the influence potential of players is small, an equilibrium strategy is to systematically target the agent with the largest eigenvector centrality. 
Abstract:  Nous proposons une approche analytique au problème de maximisation de l'influence dans un réseau social entre deux joueurs utilisant des stratégies dynamiques. Le problème est formulé comme un jeu stochastique à somme nulle. Nous prouvons l'existence de la valeur uniforme et donnons une caractérisation partielle des stratégies d'équilibre. Nous montrons notamment que lorsque l'influence exercée par les agents est faible, ces derniers doivent systématiquement cibler l'agent avec la centralité "vecteur propre" la plus élevée. 
Keywords:  Stochastic games,Social network,Dynamic games,Targeting,Jeux stochastiques,Jeux dynamiques,Réseaux sociaux 
Date:  2017–04 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs01524453&r=gth 
By:  Condorelli, Daniele; Galeotti, Andrea; Skreta, Vasiliki 
Abstract:  We endogenize intermediaries' choice to operate as agents or merchants in a market where there are frictions due to asymmetric information about consumption values. A seller has an object for sale and can reach buyers only through intermediaries. Intermediaries can either mediate the transaction by buying and reselling  the merchant mode  or refer buyers to the seller for a fee  the agency mode. When the seller can condition the minimum selling price to the intermediaries' business model choice, all intermediaries specialize in agency. The seller's and intermediaries' joint profits equal the seller's profits when he has access to all buyers. When the seller's trading protocol does not depend on the business mode adopted by intermediaries, hybrid agencymerchant mode are adopted in equilibrium. Banning the agency mode can decrease welfare since the merchant mode is associated with additional allocative distortions due to asymmetric information compared to agency. 
Keywords:  asymmetric information; intermediaries; referrals; resale 
JEL:  C72 D44 
Date:  2017–05 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12048&r=gth 
By:  Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–11 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:105&r=gth 
By:  Andrés Salamanca (TSE  Toulouse School of Economics  Toulouse School of Economics) 
Abstract:  Several valuelike solutions concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and nontransferable utility. 
Keywords:  incomplete information, nontransferable utility,Cooperative games 
Date:  2017–02–15 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal01500966&r=gth 
By:  Miryana Grigorova (KVW  Centre for Risk and Insurance, Hanover); Peter Imkeller (Institut für Mathematik [Humboldt]  Humboldt Universität zu Berlin [Berlin]); Youssef Ouknine ([MRCCAD]  Department of Mathematics [Marrakech]  UCA  University Cadi Ayyad); MarieClaire Quenez (LPMA  Laboratoire de Probabilités et Modèles Aléatoires  UPMC  Université Pierre et Marie Curie  Paris 6  UPD7  Université Paris Diderot  Paris 7  CNRS  Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) 
Abstract:  We formulate a notion of doubly reflected BSDE in the case where the barriers $\xi$ and $\zeta$ do not satisfy any regularity assumption. Under a technical assumption (a Mokobodzkitype condition), we show existence and uniqueness of the solution. In the case where $\xi$ and $\zeta$ are assumed to be rightuppersemicontinuous, the solution is characterized in terms of the value of a corresponding $\mathcal{E}^f$Dynkin game, i.e. a game problem over stopping times with (nonlinear) $f$expectation, where $f$ is the driver of the doubly reflected BSDE. In the general case where the barriers do not satisfy any regularity assumptions, the solution of the doubly reflected BSDE is related to the value of "an extension" of the previous nonlinear game problem over a larger set of "stopping strategies" than the set of stopping times. This characterization is then used to establish a comparison result and \textit{a priori} estimates with universal constants. 
Keywords:  saddle points, $f$expectation, nonlinear expectation, Dynkin game,Doubly reflected BSDEs, backward stochastic differential equations, game option 
Date:  2017–03–30 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal01497914&r=gth 
By:  Trockel, Walter (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–15 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:231&r=gth 
By:  Bos, Olivier; Truyts, Tom 
Abstract:  We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in four auction formats: firstprice, secondprice, allpay and the English auction. We obtain a strict ranking in terms of expected revenues: the firstprice and allpay auctions dominate the English auction but are dominated by the secondprice auction. 
Keywords:  Costly signaling; D1 criterion; social status; art auctions; charity auctions. 
JEL:  D44 D82 
Date:  2017 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79181&r=gth 
By:  Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–11 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:16&r=gth 
By:  Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–11 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:15&r=gth 
By:  Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–12 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:136&r=gth 
By:  Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–11 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:114&r=gth 
By:  Sudhölter, Peter (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–10 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:232&r=gth 
By:  Morone, Andrea; Nuzzo, Simone; Temerario, Tiziana 
Abstract:  The recent literature on individual vs. group decisions over risk has brought about divergent results, mainly depending on the institutional rules through which groups take decisions. While some studies where group decisions relied on the majority rule showed no appreciable difference between individuals and groups’ preferences, others where unanimity among group members was required found collective decisions to be less risk averse than individual ones. Of course, these studies share the imposition of a choice rule to determine the groups’ outcome. Alternatively, in the study at hand, we elicited groups’ preferences over risk using a consensus rule, i.e. leaving groups free to endogenously solve the potential disagreement among their members, just as in many real life instances. Our results from a logit regression unambiguously show that individuals’ preferences are systematically further from the risk neutrality than those of groups. In particular, individuals are more risk seeker than groups when facing gambles with positive expected payoff difference and more risk averse in the opposite case. 
Keywords:  Risk attitudes, group’s behaviour 
JEL:  C91 C92 D01 
Date:  2017–05–23 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79332&r=gth 
By:  Sylvain Béal (Université de Bourgogne FrancheComté, CRESE); Eric Rémila (Université de SaintEtienne, Gate); Phillippe Solal (Université de SaintEtienne, Gate) 
Abstract:  We introduce three natural collective variants of the wellknown axiom of Desirability (Maschler and Peleg, 1966), which require that if the (per capita) contributions of a rst coalition are at least as large as the (per capita) contributions of a second coalition, then the (average) payo in the rst coalition should be as large as the (average) payo in the second coalition. These axioms are called Coalitional desirability and Average coalitional desirability. The third variant, called Uniform coalitional desirability applies only to coalitions with the same size. We show that Coalitional desirability is very strong: no value satis es simultaneously this axiom and Eciency. To the contrary, the combination of either Average coalitional desirability or Uniform coalitional desirability with Eciency and Additivity characterizes the Equal Division value. 
Keywords:  Desirability, Coalitional desirability, Average coalitional desirability, Uniform coalitional desirability, Equal Division value, Shapley value. 
Date:  2017–04 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:201708&r=gth 
By:  Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–11 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:132&r=gth 
By:  Tiziano De Angelis; Fabien Gensbittel; St\'ephane Villeneuve 
Abstract:  This paper studies a 2players zerosum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zerosum Dynkin game on a bidimensional diffusion $(X,Y)$. Then we characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which each player stops at the hitting time of $(X,Y)$ to a set with moving boundary. A detailed description of the stopping sets for the two players is provided along with global $C^1$ regularity of the value function. 
Date:  2017–05 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1705.07352&r=gth 
By:  Wallmeier, HansMartin (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–11 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:146&r=gth 
By:  Claudia Cerrone (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Leonhard K. Lades (University of Stirling, Economics) 
Abstract:  The model of timeinconsistent procrastination by O'Donoughe and Rabin shows that individuals who are not aware of their presentbias (naïve) procrastinate more than individuals who are aware of it (sophisticated) or are not presentbiased (timeconsistent). This paper tests this prediction. We classify participants into types using a novel measure, and require them to perform a realeffort task on one out of three dates. We find that sophisticated participants perform the task significantly later than naïve participants. Our data suggest that this result may be explained by habit formation. 
JEL:  C72 C73 D03 D91 
Date:  2017–05 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_08&r=gth 
By:  Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–11 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:92&r=gth 
By:  Heuer, Martin (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–11 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:149&r=gth 
By:  Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) 
Date:  2017–05–11 
URL:  http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:91&r=gth 