|
on Game Theory |
| By: | Sylvain Béal (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Eric Rémila (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Philippe Solal (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | We provide a strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule (Béal et al., 2014). Precisely, we design a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the sequential equal surplus division outcome of a superadditive rooted tree TU-game. This mechanism borrowed from the bidding mechanism designed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), but takes into account the direction of the edges connecting any two players in the rood tree, which reflects some dominance relation between them. |
| Keywords: | Implementation,Bidding approach, Rooted tree TU-games, Sequential equal surplus division |
| Date: | 2015–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376910&r=gth |
| By: | Vladislav Damjanovic (Durham Business School) |
| Abstract: | For Traveler's Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games |
| Keywords: | Adaptive Heuristics, Regret Matching, Coarse-Correlated Equilibrium, Travelerís Dilemma Game, Minimal Effrt Coordination Game |
| JEL: | D8 C7 D7 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dur:cegapw:2016_06&r=gth |
| By: | Alejandro Caparrós; Michael Finus |
| Abstract: | We analyze the formation of public good agreements under the weakest-link technology. Coordination of and cooperation on migration policies, money laundering measures and biodiversity conservation e§orts are prime examples of this technology. Whereas for symmetric players, policy coordination is not necessary, for asymmetric players cooperation matters but fails, in the absence of transfers. In contrast, with an optimal transfer scheme, asymmetry may not be an obstacle but an asset for cooperation, with even the grand coalition being stable. We characterize various types and degrees of asymmetry and relate them to the stability of agreements and associate gains from cooperation. |
| Keywords: | public goods, weakest-link technology, coalition formation |
| JEL: | C71 C72 H41 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipp:wpaper:1602&r=gth |
| By: | Cingiz, Kutay (General Economics 0 (Onderwijs)); Flesch, Janos (QE / Mathematical economics and game the); Herings, P. Jean-Jacques (General Economics 1 (Micro)); Predtetchinski, Arkadi (General Economics 1 (Micro)) |
| Abstract: | We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ. Furthermore we derive a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D91 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016036&r=gth |
| By: | Sylvain Béal (UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté); Sylvain Ferrières (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, Leipzig Graduate School of Management, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Eric Rémila (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Philippe Solal (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | We introduce a non linear weighted Shapley value for cooperative games with transferable utility, in which the weights are endogenously given by the players' stand-alone worths. We call it the proportional Shapley value since it distributes the Harsanyi dividend (Harsanyi, 1959) of all coalitions in proportion to the stand-alone worths of its members. We show that this value recommends an appealing payoff distribution in a land production economy introduced in Shapley and Shubik (1967). Although the proportional Shapley value does not satisfy the classical axioms of linearity and consistency (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989), the main results provide comparable axiomatic characterizations of our value and the Shapley value by means of weak versions of these two axioms. Moreover, our value inherits several well-known properties of the weighted Shapley values. |
| Keywords: | potential,proportionality,land production economy,Harsanyi dividends,(Weighted) Shapley value |
| Date: | 2016–08–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01362228&r=gth |
| By: | Pierre Bernhard (BIOCORE - Biological control of artificial ecosystems - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - LOV - Laboratoire d'océanographie de Villefranche - UPMC - Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 - INSU - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marc Deschamps (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté) |
| Abstract: | There are real strategic situations where nobody knows ex ante how many players there will be in the game at each step. Assuming that entry and exit could be modelized by random processes whose probability laws are common knowledge, we use dynamic programming and piecewise deterministic Markov decision processes to investigate such games. We study the dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players in discrete and continuous time for both finite and infinite horizon. Existence of dynamic equilibrium in discrete time is proved and we develop explicit algorithms for both discrete and continuous time linear quadratic problems. In both cases we offer a resolution for a Cournot oligopoly with sticky prices. |
| Keywords: | Nash equilibrium, Dynamic programming, Piecewise Deterministic Markov Decision Process, Cournot oligopoly, Sticky Prices. |
| Date: | 2016–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01394813&r=gth |
| By: | Sylvain Béal (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Eric Rémila (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Philippe Solal (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | This article studies values for cooperative games with transferable utility. Numerous such values can be characterized by axioms of Ψ ε-associated consistency, which require that a value is invariant under some parametrized linear transformation Ψ ε on the vector space of cooperative games with transferable utility. Xu et al. (2008, 2009, Linear Algebra Appl.), Xu et al. (2013, Linear Algebra Appl.), Hamiache (2010, Int. Game Theory Rev.) and more recently Xu et al. (2015, Linear Algebra Appl.) follow this approach by using a matrix analysis. The main drawback of these articles is the heaviness of the proofs to show that the matrix expression of the linear transformations is diagonalizable. By contrast, we provide quick proofs by relying on the Jordan normal form of the previous matrix. |
| Keywords: | Shapley value,Associated consistency, Jordan normal form, center of imputation set, equal allocation of nonseparable costs |
| Date: | 2015–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376909&r=gth |
| By: | Jan Christoph Schlegel |
| Abstract: | We study the allocation of indivisible objects (e.g. school seats) to agents by lotteries. Agents have preferences over different objects and have different priorities at different objects. The priorities can contain indifferences, some agents may have the same priority at some object. A lottery is ex-ante stable if there does not exist an agent-object pair such that we can increase the probability of matching this pair at the expense of agents, who have lower priority at the object, and of objects which are less preferred by the agent. As a first result, we show that this fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched. The number of pairs in the support depends on how many indifferences in the priorities the lottery exploits. In the extreme case where no object is matched with positive probability to two equal priority agents, the lottery is almost degenerate. Otherwise, the size of the support is completely determined by the size of the lowest priority classes of which agents are matched to the respective objects. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties. As a second result, we derive a new characterization of the set of lotteries that can be decentralized by a pseudo-market with priority-specific pricing as introduced by He et al. (2015). These allocations coincide with the ex-ante stable lotteries that do not admit a strong stable improvement cycle. |
| Keywords: | Matching; School Choice, Lotteries, Ex-Ante Stability, Pseudo-Markets |
| JEL: | C78 D47 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.23&r=gth |
| By: | Liza Charroin (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2) |
| Abstract: | In the benchmark model of Bala and Goyal (2000) on network formation, the equilibrium network is asymmetric and unfair as agents have different payoffs. While they are prominent in reality, asymmetric networks do not emerge in the lab mainly because of fairness concerns. We extend this model with a sequential linking decision process to ease coordination and with heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity is introduced with the presence of a special agent who has either a higher monetary value or a different status. The equilibrium is asymmetric and unfair. Our experimental results show that thanks to sequentiality and fairness concerns, individuals coordinate on fair and efficient networks in homogeneous settings. Heterogeneity impacts the network formation process by increasing the asymmetry of networks but does not decrease the level of fairness nor efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Network formation, sequentiality, heterogeneity, fairness, asymmetry |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01368067&r=gth |
| By: | Csoka, Péter (corvinus university of budapest); Herings, P. Jean-Jacques (General Economics 1 (Micro)) |
| Abstract: | We consider a situation in which agents have mutual claims on each other, summarized in a liability matrix. Agents' assets might be insufficient to satisfy their liabilities leading to defaults. In case of default, bankruptcy rules are used to specify the way agents are going to be rationed. A clearing payment matrix is a payment matrix consistent with the prevailing bankruptcy rules that satisisfies limited liability and priority of creditors. Since clearing payment matrices and the corresponding values of equity are not uniquely determined, we provide bounds on the possible levels equity can take. Unlike the existing literature, which studies centralized clearing procedures, we introduce a large class of decentralized clearing processes. We show the convergence of any such process in finitely many iterations to the least clearing payment matrix. When the unit of account is sufficiently small, all decentralized clearing processes lead essentially to the same value of equity as a centralized clearing procedure. As a policy implication, it is not necessary to collect and process all the sensitive data of all the agents simultaneously and run a centralized clearing procedure. |
| JEL: | C71 G10 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016037&r=gth |
| By: | Sylvain Béal (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); André Casajus (Leipzig Graduate School of Management); Frank Huettner (Leipzig Graduate School of Management) |
| Abstract: | We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-games) where the graph does not necessarily affect the productivity but can influence the way the players distribute the worth generated by the grand coalition. Thus, we can envisage values that are efficient instead of values that are component efficient. For CO-games with connected graphs, efficiency and component efficiency coincide. In particular, the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) is efficient for such games. Moreover, fairness is characteristic of the Myerson value. We identify the value that is efficient for all CO-games, coincides with the Myerson value for CO-games with connected graphs, and satisfies fairness. |
| Keywords: | efficiency, fairness,communication graph, efficient extension, Shapley value,Myerson value |
| Date: | 2015–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376904&r=gth |
| By: | Arianna Galliera |
| Abstract: | The incentive scheme in a multi-task experiment might trigger different types of behavior in participants. This experimental study allows participants to decide between being paid for a random task or the average across all tasks. In a bargaining game buyer and seller have partly conflicting interests and are asymmetrically informed. Participants choose the incentive scheme based on past experience where we also control for individual characteristics. Although payment method is likely correlated to risk preferences it also might be influenced by egodefensive concerns. Will, for example, participants avoid cumulative payment which reveals, more reliably, own performance? So far little research is devoted to the analysis of self-selected Random Lottery Incentives and Cumulative Scheme both on individual and social results. This paper aims to fill the gap. |
| Keywords: | bargaining, experiment, gender, payment scheme. |
| JEL: | C78 C91 D82 J16 J33 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1602&r=gth |
| By: | Sylvain Béal (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Eric Rémila (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Philippe Solal (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | A new class of allocation rules combining marginalistic and egalitarian principles is introduced for cooperative TU-games. It includes some modes of solidarity among the players by taking the collective contribution of some coalitions to the grand coalition into account. Relationships with other class of allocation rules such as the Egalitarian Shapley values and the Procedural values are discussed. Two axiomatic characterizations are provided: one of the whole class of allocation rules, and one of each of its extreme points. |
| Keywords: | null player,Solidarity,TU-games,Egalitarian Shapley value,Procedural values |
| Date: | 2015–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376906&r=gth |
| By: | Sylvain Béal (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Sylvain Ferrières (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Eric Rémila (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Philippe Solal (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | Many axiomatic characterizations of values for cooperative games invoke axioms which evaluate the consequences of removing an arbitrary player. Balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980) and balanced cycle contributions (Kamijo and Kongo, 2010) are two well-known examples of such axioms. We revisit these characterizations by nullifying a player instead of deleting her/him from a game. The nullification (Béal et al., 2014a) of a player is obtained by transforming a game into a new one in which this player is a null player, i.e. the worth of the coalitions containing this player is now identical to that of the same coalition without this player. The degree with which our results are close to the original results in the literature is connected to the fact that the targeted value satisfies the null player out axiom (Derks and Haller, 1999). |
| Keywords: | Shapley value, balanced contributions,Player nullification, equal allocation of,non-separable costs, potential |
| Date: | 2016–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376911&r=gth |
| By: | Joseph Abdou (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nikolaos Pnevmatikos (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We study the asymptotic value of a frequency-dependent zero-sum game following a differential approach. In such a game the stage payoffs depend on the current action and on the frequency of actions played so far. We associate in a natural way a differential game to the original game and although it presents an irregularity at the origin, we prove existence of the value on the time interval [0,1]. We conclude, using appropriate approximations, that the limit of Vn as n tends to infinity, exists and that it coincides with the value of the associated continuous time game. |
| Keywords: | stochastic game, frequency dependent payoffs, continuous-time game,Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01400267&r=gth |
| By: | Aner Sela (BGU); Ezra Einy (BGU); 0ri Haimanko (BGU); Diego Moreno (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Avishay Aiche (University of Haifa); Benyamin Shitovitz (University of Haifa) |
| JEL: | C72 D44 D82 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1614&r=gth |
| By: | Natalia Borzino (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)); Enrique Fatas (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)); Emmanuel Peterle (UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate trust and trustworthiness in a networked investment game in which two senders interact with a receiver. We investigate to what extent senders and receivers comply with an exogenous and non-binding recommendation. We also manipulate the level of information available to senders regarding receiver’s behavior in the network. We compare a baseline treatment in which senders are only informed about the actions and outcomes of their own investment games to two information treatments. In the reputation treatment, senders receive ex ante information regarding the average amount returned by the receiver in the previous period. In the transparency treatment, each sender receives ex post additional information regarding the returning decision of the receiver to the other sender in the network. Across all treatments and for both senders and receivers, the non-binding rule has a significant and positive impact on individual decisions. Providing senders with additional information regarding receiver’s behavior affects trust at the individual level, but leads to mixed results at the aggregate level. Our findings suggest that reputation building, as well as allowing for social comparison could be efficient ways for receivers to improve trust within networks. |
| Keywords: | Information, Taxation, Trust,Experimental economics, Investment game |
| Date: | 2016–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01375081&r=gth |
| By: | Sylvain Béal (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Eric Rémila (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Philippe Solal (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | This article introduces a discount parameter and a weight function in Myerson's (1977) classical model of cooperative games with restrictions on cooperation. The discount parameter aims to reflect the time preference of the agents while the weight function aims to reflect the importance of each node of a graph. We provide axiomatic characterizations of two types of solution that are inspired by the hierarchical outcomes (Demange, 2004). |
| Keywords: | invariance with respect to cone amalgamation, discounted tree solutions,Graph games, discount parameter, weight function, generalized standardness, δ-reducing agent |
| Date: | 2015–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01377923&r=gth |
| By: | Andrej Angelowski (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Daniela Di Cagno (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Werner Güth (Luiss Guido Carli, Rome; Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt; Max Planck Institute on Collective Goods, Bonn); Francesca Marazzi (Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata); Luca Panaccione (Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata) |
| Abstract: | In a circular neighborhood, each member contributes repeatedly to two local public goods with the left and the right neighbor. All two-person public good games are structurally independent in spite of their overlapping player sets. Heterogeneity across neighbors is introduced by two randomly selected participants, the "Bad" Apples, either by being less productive or by being excluded from periodic information feedback about their neighbors' contributions. We study how "Bad" Apples affect their neighbors and through them also other group members. Both types of "Bad" Apples spoil the basket, reducing total voluntary contributions compared to a baseline with no "Bad" Apples. Furthermore, we find that "Bad" Apples not only affects their direct neighbors, but also, through behavioral spillovers, the whole neighborhood. However, the two types of "Bad" Apples affect their neighborhood in opposite ways. Whereas less productive "Bad" Apples are least cooperative, "Bad" Apples excluded from feedback information are most cooperative. In the latter case, the reduction of total contributions is caused by the direct neighbors of "Bad" Apples. |
| Keywords: | Public goods, behavioral spillovers, experiments, voluntary contribution mechanism, heterogeneity. |
| JEL: | C91 C72 H41 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1604&r=gth |
| By: | Sylvain Béal (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Sylvain Ferrières (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, Leipzig Graduate School of Management); Eric Rémila (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Philippe Solal (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | A variant of the h-index introduced in García-Pérez (2009), called the iterated h-index, is studied to evaluate the productivity of scholars. It consists of successive applications of the h-index so as to obtain a vector of h-indices. In particular, the iterated h-index fixes a drawback of the h-index since it allows for (lexicographic) comparisons of scholars with the same h-index. Two types or results are presented. Firstly, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the iterated h-index, which rests on a new axiom of consistency and extensions of axioms in the literature to a richer framework. Secondly, we apply the h-index and iterated h-index to offer alternative sport rankings in tennis, football and basketball. These applications clearly demonstrate that the iterated h-index is much more appropriate than the classical h-index. |
| Keywords: | h-index,iterated h-index,axioms,sports ranking |
| Date: | 2016–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01394818&r=gth |
| By: | Sylvain Béal (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); André Casajus (Leipzig Graduate School of Management); Frank Huettner (Leipzig Graduate School of Management) |
| Abstract: | We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph. The most well-known such values are component-efficient and characterized by some link-deletion property. We study efficient extensions of such values: for a given component-efficient value, we look for a value that (i) satisfies efficiency, (ii) satisfies the link-deletion property underlying the original component-efficient value, and (iii) coincides with the original component-efficient value whenever the underlying graph is connected. Béal et al. (2015) prove that the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) admits a unique efficient extension, which has been introduced by van den Brink et al. (2012). We pursue this line of research by showing that the average tree solution (Herings et al., 2008) and the compensation solution (Béal et al., 2012a) admit similar unique efficient extensions, and that there exists no efficient extension of the position Value (Meessen, 1988; Borm et al., 1992). As byproducts, we obtain new characterizations of the average tree solution and the compensation solution, and of their efficient extensions. |
| Keywords: | component fairness, position value,Efficient extension, average tree solution, compensation solution, relative fairness, balanced total threats, Myerson value,component-wise egalitarian solution |
| Date: | 2015–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376907&r=gth |
| By: | Merkel, Anna; Lohse, Johannes |
| Abstract: | Economists are increasingly interested in the cognitive basis of pro-social behavior. Using response time data, several authors have claimed that "fairness is intuitive". In light of conflicting empirical evidence, we provide theoretical arguments showing under which circumstances an increase in "fair" behavior due to time pressure provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al., 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective difficulty of making a choice affects choices under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous interpretation of time pressure effects contingent on the choice situation. To explore our theoretical considerations and to retest the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis, we analyze choices in two-person prisoner’s dilemma and binary dictator games. As in previous experiments, we exogenously manipulate response times by placing subjects under time pressure or forcing them to delay their decisions. In addition, we manipulate the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair relative to the selfish option across all choice situations. Our main finding is that time pressure does not increase the fraction of fair choices relative to time delay irrespective of the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair option. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive". |
| Keywords: | distributional preferences; cooperation; response times; time pressure; cognitive processes; drift diffusion models |
| Date: | 2016–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0627&r=gth |
| By: | Alejandro Caparrós; Jean-Christophe Péreau |
| Abstract: | We discuss a model of gradual coalition formation with positive externalities in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to negotiate multilaterally or sequentially over climate change. We show that the leader may choose a sequential path, and that the choice is determined by the convexity of the TU-game and the free-rider payo§s of the followers. Except in a few clearly deÖned cases, the outcome of the negotiation process is always the grand coalition, although the process may need some time. This holds for the standard IEA game with heterogeneous players even if the grand coalition is not stable in a multilateral context. We also analyze the role of a facilitating agency. The agency has an incentive to speed up intra-stage negotiations and to extend the period between negotiation stages in a sequential process. |
| Keywords: | multilateral bargaining, endogenous coalition formation, international negotiations, mediator, international environmental agreements |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipp:wpaper:1509&r=gth |
| By: | Hideo Konishi (Boston College); Chen-Yu Pan (Wuhan University) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one-sidedly biased district profile, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district profile. In contrast, with limited freedom in gerrymandering, both partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering tend to prescribe the same policy. Friedman and Holden (2009) find no significant empirical difference between bipartisan and partisan gerrymandering in explaining incumbent reelection rates. Our result suggests that gerrymanderers may not be as free in redistricting as popularly thought. |
| Keywords: | electoral competition, partisan gerrymandering, bipartisan gerrymandering, policy convergence/divergence, pork-barrel politics |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:922&r=gth |
| By: | Zareena Begum Irfan (Madras School of Economics); Jeeva Mary Jacob (Madras School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Management of regulated water systems has become increasingly complex due to rapid socio-economic growth and environmental changes in river basins over recent decades. This paper focusses on the public-owned river water utility river basin conflicts that are increasingly marked by a heightened attention because of the political discourse surrounding it. In order to promote cooperation and resolve conflicts between states in a basin, policy makers must vigorously try to get the dialogue process on and avoid deadlocks in the process. Little theoretical and empirical research exists to understand when these negotiations are most effective and the mechanics behind these negotiations. Here we draw from diverse literature, economic and geographical, to capture and integrate the design elements associated with effective utility regulation along rivers on a national and international level. The utility sharing of waters of the river Cauvery has been the bone of contention of a serious conflict between the Indian states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Decades of negotiations have not bore fruit till date. Even if treaties have been signed, they have been rejected and till date enforcement mechanisms are not put in place so as to hasten the negotiation process so as to avoid further escalation of irregularities in the water utilization. This study aims at defining few enforcement mechanisms based on the latest agreement brought out by the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal 2007 which was rejected and though appeals were filed by riparian states no amendments have been made so far. Non-Cooperative games have been used to model the regulation of the water utility and policy implications there on have been drawn out. |
| Keywords: | Water utility, Game Theory, Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt Classification-JEL: C72, D74, Q25, Q34, Q58 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mad:wpaper:2016-142&r=gth |