nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2016‒10‒30
twelve papers chosen by
László Á. Kóczy
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia

  1. A Marginalist Model of Network Formation By Olaizola Ortega, María Norma; Valenciano Llovera, Federico
  2. Expected Worth for 2 × 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes By Michael R. Powers; Martin Shubik; Wen Wang
  3. Bargaining through Approval By Matias Nunez; Jean-François Laslier
  4. Basic Framework for Games with Quantum-like Players By Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky; Ismael Martinez-Martinez
  5. Are dyads conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment By Morone, Andrea; Temerario, Tiziana
  6. On the equivalence of buyer and seller proposals within canonical matching and pricing environments By John Kennes; Daniel le Maire
  7. Valuing Inputs Under Supply Uncertainty : The Bayesian Shapley Value By Pongou, Roland; Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
  8. Large Multi-Objective Generalized Games: Existence and Essential Stability of Equilibria By Sofía Correa; Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
  9. Discrete-Space Agglomeration Model with Social Interactions: Multiplicity, Stability, and Continuous Limit of Equilibria By Akamatsu, Takashi; Fujishima, Shota; Takayama, Yuki
  10. Complexity of inheritance of F-convexity for restricted games induced by minimum partitions By Alexandre Skoda
  11. Rationing Rules and Stable Coalition Structures By Gallo Fernández, Ohiane; Iñarra García, Elena
  12. Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis By Batabyal, Amitrajeet; Yoo, Seung Jick

  1. By: Olaizola Ortega, María Norma; Valenciano Llovera, Federico
    Abstract: We develop a network-formation model where the quality of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a link-formation "technology" , an increasing strictly concave function which is the only exogenous ingredient in the model. The revenue from the investments in links is the information that the nodes receive through the network. Two approaches are considered. First, assuming that the investments in links are made by a planner, the basic question is that of the efficient investments, either relative to a given infrastructure (i.e. a set of feasible links) or in absolute terms. It is proved that efficient networks belong to a special class of weighted nested split graph networks. Second, assuming that links are the result of investments of the node-players involved, there is the question of stability in the underlying network-formation game, be it restricted to a given infrastructure or unrestricted. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of the complete and star networks, and nested split graph networks in general, are obtained.
    Keywords: network, formation, efficiency, stability, nested, core, periphery, split, graphs
    JEL: A14 C72 D85
    Date: 2016–08–18
  2. By: Michael R. Powers (Tsinghua University); Martin Shubik (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Wen Wang (Nankai University)
    Abstract: We offer a detailed examination of a broad class of 2 x 2 matrix games as a first step toward considering measures of resource distribution and efficiency of outcomes. In the present essay, only noncooperative equilibria and entropic outcomes are considered, and a crude measure of efficiency employed. Other solution concepts and the formal construction of an efficiency index will be addressed in a companion paper.
    Keywords: 2 × 2 matrix games, efficiency, coordination, worth of coordination
    JEL: C63 C72 D61
    Date: 2016–10
  3. By: Matias Nunez (Thema, Université de Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), PSE - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their average and median utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.
    Keywords: Two-agents,Approval Voting,Efficiency,Partial Honesty
    Date: 2015–06
  4. By: Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), PSE - Paris School of Economics); Ismael Martinez-Martinez (DUCE - Dusseldorf Institute for Competition Economics - Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf [Düsseldorf])
    Abstract: We develop a framework for the analysis of strategic interactions under the constructive preference perspective à la Kahneman and Tversky formalized in the Type Indeterminacy model. The players are modeled as systems subject to measurements and characterized by quantum-like uncertain preferences. The decision nodes are modeled as, possibly non-commuting, operators that measure preferences modulo strategic reasoning. We define a Hilbert space of types spanned by the players' eigentypes representing their potential preferences in different situations. We focus on pure strategy TI games of maximal information where all uncertainty stems from the intrinsic indeterminacy of preferences. We show that preferences evolve in a non-deterministic manner with actions along the play: they are endogenous to the interaction. We propose the notion of cashing-on-the-go to compute a player's utility, and the Type Indeterminate Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept relying on best-replies at the level of the eigentypes. We illustrate an example exhibiting the phenomenon of the manipulation of rivals' preferences.
    Keywords: Hilbert space of types,Type Indeterminacy,Superposition of preferences,Actions as projections,Cashing-on-the-go,Type Indeterminate Nash Equilibrium
    Date: 2014–12
  5. By: Morone, Andrea; Temerario, Tiziana
    Abstract: We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the strategy-method, we found that more than one third of the dyads are conditional cooperators, whereas 18% can be categorised as free riders.
    Keywords: Voluntary contributions; Conditional cooperation; Free riding; Strategy-method; Experiments;
    JEL: C91 C92 H41
    Date: 2016–10
  6. By: John Kennes (Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Denmark); Daniel le Maire (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
    Abstract: This paper considers equilibrium proposals by either buyers or sellers in the canonical ‘urnball’ matching market. The proposals can either be posted prices announced by buyers; posted prices announced by sellers; or announcements by sellers (or by buyers) to entertain price proposals, as in auctions. We derive the expected revenue equivalence of these different modes of proposing in this canonical trading environment.
    Keywords: Matching, pricing, frictions
    JEL: D44 C78 D83
    Date: 2016–10–25
  7. By: Pongou, Roland; Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
    Abstract: We consider the problem of valuing inputs in a production environment in which input supply is uncertain. Inputs can be workers in a firm, risk factors for a disease, securities in a financial market, or nodes in a networked economy. Each input takes its values from a finite set, and uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over this set. First, we provide an axiomatic solution to our valuation problem, defining three intuitive axioms which we use to uniquely characterize a valuation scheme that we call the a priori Shapley value. Second, we solve the problem of valuing inputs a posteriori--that is, after observing output. This leads to the Bayesian Shapley value. Third, we consider the problem of rationalizing uncertainty when the inputs are rational workers supplying labor in a non-cooperative production game in which payoffs are given by the Shapley wage function. We find that probability distributions over labor supply that can be supported as mixed strategy Nash equilibria always exist. We also provide an intuitive condition under which we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We present several applications of our theory to real-life situations.
    Keywords: Input valuation, uncertainty, a priori Shapley value, Bayesian Shapley value, rationalizability
    JEL: C70 D20 D80 J30
    Date: 2016–10–25
  8. By: Sofía Correa; Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
    Abstract: We characterize the existence and the essential stability of Weak Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equilibria in multi-objective generalized games with a continuum of players.
    Date: 2016–09
  9. By: Akamatsu, Takashi; Fujishima, Shota; Takayama, Yuki
    Abstract: This study examines the properties of equilibrium, including the stability, of discrete-space agglomeration models with social interactions. The findings reveal that while the corresponding continuous-space model has a unique equilibrium, the equilibrium in discrete space can be non-unique for any finite degree of discretization by characterizing the discrete-space model as a potential game. Furthermore, it indicates that despite the above result, any sequence of discrete-space models' equilibria converges to the continuous-space model's unique equilibrium as the discretization of space is refined.
    Keywords: Social interaction; Agglomeration; Discrete space; Potential game; Stability; Evolutionary game theory
    JEL: C62 C72 C73 D62 R12
    Date: 2016–10–23
  10. By: Alexandre Skoda (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Let G = (N,E,w ) be a weighted communication graph (with weight function w on E ). For every subset A ⊆ N, we delete in the subset E (A ) of edges with ends in A, all edges of minimum weight in E (A ). Then the connected components of the corresponding induced subgraph constitue a partition of A that we Pmin(A ). For every game (N , v ), we define the Pmin-restricted game (N , v ) by v (A = ∑F∈ Pmin (A) v(F ) for all A ⊆ N. We prove that we can decide in polynomial time if there is inheritance of F-convexity from N , v ) to the Pmin-restricted game (N , v ) where F-convexity is obtained by restricting convexity to connected subsets
    Keywords: graph, complexity, supermodularity, partitions,communication networks, cooperative game, convex game,restricted game
    Date: 2016–07
  11. By: Gallo Fernández, Ohiane; Iñarra García, Elena
    Keywords: hedonic, games, rationing, problems, core, satbility
    JEL: C71 D63 D79
    Date: 2016–10–05
  12. By: Batabyal, Amitrajeet; Yoo, Seung Jick
    Abstract: In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals (1 and 2) who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function of individual i as a function of this individual’s own effort and the effort applied by individual j,i≠j, in three distinct cases. Next, we compute the ith individual’s best response function. Finally, we analyze effort application by two identical pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations. In the first (second) nation, arranged marriages are uncommon (common) and hence it is relatively difficult (straightforward) for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. We explain why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the second nation.
    Keywords: Arranged Marriage, Effort, Net Utility, Static Game, Strategic Complements
    JEL: D13 J12
    Date: 2016–03–19

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