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on Game Theory |
| By: | Aymeric Lardon (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis) |
| Abstract: | In this article we study Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies under the α and β-approaches (Aumann 1959). Although the convexity property does not always hold, we show that it is satisfied when firms' marginal costs are not too heterogeneous. Furthermore, we prove that the core of any game can be partially characterized by associating a Bertrand oligopoly TU-game derived from the most efficient technology. Such a game turns to be an efficient convex cover (Rulnick and Shapley 1997) of the original one. This result implies that the core is non-empty and contains a subset of payoff vectors with a symmetric geometric structure easy to compute. |
| Date: | 2014–11–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01081803&r=all |
| By: | Francoise Forges (CEREMADE - Université Paris Dauphine (Paris 9), LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine); Ulrich Horst (Department of Mathematics - Humboldt University Berlin); Antoine Salomon (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine) |
| Abstract: | We define feasible, posterior individually rational solutions for two-person Bayesian games with a single informed player. Such a solution can be achieved by direct signalling from the informed player and requires approval of both players after the signal has been sent. Without further assumptions on the Bayesian game, a solution does not necessarily exist. We show that, if the uninformed player has a "uniform punishment strategy"against the informed one, the existence of a solution follows from the existence of Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. We consider the extension of the result when both players have private information. We are grateful to |
| Date: | 2014–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01094061&r=all |
| By: | Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit (Cardiff Business School) |
| Abstract: | We consider a Bayesian game, namely the Battle of the Sexes with private information, in which each player has two types, High and Low. We allow cheap talk regarding players’ types before the game and prove that the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium exists for a low range of prior probability of the High-type. This equilibrium has a desirable type-coordination property: it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium when the players’ types are different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful, for a medium range of prior probability of the High-type. |
| Keywords: | Battle of the Sexes; Private Information; Cheap Talk; Coordination; Full Revelation |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2015/7&r=all |
| By: | Kenan Huremovic (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université) |
| Abstract: | Network structure has a significant role in determining the outcomes of many socioeconomic relationships, including antagonistic ones. In this paper we study a situation in which agents, embedded in a network, simultaneously play interrelated bilateral contest games with their neighbours. Spillovers between contests induce complex local and global network effects. We first characterize the equilibrium of the game on an arbitrary fixed network. Then we study a network formation model, introducing a novel but intuitive link formation protocol. As links represent negative relationships, link formation is unilateral while link destruction is a bilateral action. The unique stable network topology is the complete k-partite network with partitions of different sizes. This model also provides a micro-foundation for the concept of structural balance, and the main results go in line with theoretical and empirical findings from other disciplines, including biology and sociology. |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01154676&r=all |
| By: | Maojiao Ye; Guoqiang Hu |
| Abstract: | In this paper, an aggregate game approach is proposed for the modeling and analysis of energy consumption control in smart grid. Since each electricity user's cost function depends on the aggregate load, which is unknown to the end users, an aggregate load estimator is employed to estimate it. Based on the communication among the users about their estimations on the aggregate load, Nash equilibrium seeking strategies are proposed for the electricity users. By using singular perturbation analysis and Lyapunov stability analysis, a local convergence result to the Nash equilibrium is presented for energy consumption game that may have multiple Nash equilibria. For energy consumption game with unique Nash equilibrium, it is shown that the players' strategies converge to the Nash equilibrium non-locally. More specially, if the unique Nash equilibrium is an inner Nash equilibrium, the convergence rate is quantified. Energy consumption game with stubborn players is investigated. Convergence to the best response strategies for the rational players is ensured. Numerical examples are provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed methods. |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1508.02636&r=all |
| By: | Yann Bramoullé (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université); Rachel Kranton (Duke University, Department of Economics - Duke University (Durham, USA)) |
| Abstract: | This chapter studies games played on fixed networks. These games capture a wide variety of economic settings including local public goods, peer effects, and technology adoption. We establish a common analytical framework to study a wide game class. We unearth new connections between games in the literature and in particular between those with binary actions, like coordination and best-shot games, and those with continuous actions and linear best replies. We review and advance existing results by showing how they tie together within the common framework. We discuss the game-theoretic underpinnings of key notions including Bonacich centrality, maximal independent sets, and the lowest and largest eigenvalue. We study the interplay of individual heterogeneity and the network and we develop a new notion - interdependence - to analyze how a shock to one agent affects the action of another agent. We outline directions for future research. |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01180657&r=all |
| By: | Matias Nunez (Thema, Université de Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their average and median utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game. |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01168675&r=all |
| By: | Stéphane Goria (CREM - CREM-EA3476 - Centre de Recherche sur les Médiations - Université Paul Verlaine - Metz) |
| Abstract: | In recent years two expressions to qualify partial or complete use of elements from games in non-play contexts have emerged. These expressions are those of serious games and gamification. A serious game and serious game is a game developed for professional purposes, which uses a fun interface to achieve professional goals. Gamification is a process that borrows design elements to make video games more friendlest serious activities, dynamic, motivating, etc. The gamification process does not aim to develop a serious game or transform a serious business in a serious game, but we can consider that a sufficiently advanced gamification process produces a serious game. In this paper, we focus on the concept of serious games to wonder about the transformation process that can lead to it. We begin our discussion by examining what is a serious game, from its literature, as well as in terms of structure, context and attitude of the game. This then allows us to consider from the process gamification, five other processes that can lead to the development of a serious game. |
| Abstract: | Ces dernières années deux expressions relatives à l'utilisation partielle ou complète d'éléments issus des jeux dans des contextes non ludiques ont vu le jour. Ces expressions sont celles de serious game et de gamification. Un serious game ou jeu sérieux est un jeu développé à des fins professionnelles qui utilise une interface ludique pour atteindre des objectifs professionnels. La gamification correspond à un processus qui emprunte des éléments de design des jeux vidéo pour rendre activités sérieuses plus sympathiques, dynamiques, motivantes, etc. Le processus de gamification n'a pas pour objectif de développer un serious game ou de transformer une activité sérieuse en un serious game, mais nous pouvons considérer qu'un processus de gamification suffisamment poussé produit un serious game. Dans cet article, nous prenons comme centre de réflexion le concept de serious game pour nous interroger sur les processus de transformations qui peuvent y aboutir. Nous débutons notre propos en étudiant ce qu'est un serious game, vis-à-vis de sa littérature, mais aussi en termes de structure, de contexte et d'attitude de jeu. Ceci nous permet ensuite d'envisager à partir du processus de gamification, cinq autres processus qui peuvent aboutir au développement d'un serious game. |
| Date: | 2014–09–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01089152&r=all |
| By: | Christophe Bravard (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble 2); Liza Charroin (UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS) |
| Abstract: | Networks facilitate the exchange of goods and information and create benefits. We consider a network composed of complementary nodes, i.e., nodes that need to be connected to generate a positive payoff. This network may face intelligent attacks on links. To study how the network should be designed, we develop a strategic model, inspired by Dziubiński and Goyal (2013), with two players: a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer has two potential ways to defend her network: forming destructible links among the given set of nodes to increase connectivity or protecting a group of nodes (with indestructible links). Links formation and protections (indestructible links) are costly. The Adversary then allocates her resources to attack links. We examine two situations which differ according to the number of protections available to the Designer. Our main findings are that if the number of protections is not limited, the Designer should either protect all the nodes, or create a large number of (destructible) links to absorb the Adversary's attack; if the available number of protections is limited, then a strategy that uses protections and links can be the equilibrium. |
| Date: | 2015–07–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01176928&r=all |
| By: | Min Zhu (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS) |
| Abstract: | Boundedly rational people may engage in strategic behavior under the Deferred Acceptance mechanism, resulting in unstable outcome and reducing overall welfare. How to reduce strategic behavior is thus of importance for field implementation. I address this issue in a laboratory experiment by looking at whether experienced people can transmit what they have learned and promote truth-telling behavior. In this experiment, subjects repeatedly play the matching game induced by the Deferred Acceptance mechanism for a finite number of periods, and then offer advice about best strategies to their successors. Participants in succeeding sessions are either given advice from their predecessors or observe histories of previous sessions. I find that advice given by predecessors can help subjects coordinate on truth-telling behavior and the Pareto efficient stable outcome (but this effect is not statistically significant in correlated preference environment). On the contrary, observing histories has ambiguous effect on truth-telling adoption. This implies that policy makers can encourage real people to adopt truth-telling in the field by providing them with collections of good advice from people who have already participated in matching market. |
| Date: | 2015–07–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01176926&r=all |
| By: | Raïssa-Juvette Samba (Université Marien Ngouabi); Rhonya Adli (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1) |
| Abstract: | In most societies, the social practice of paying dowry tends to decline and sometimes to disappear. In contrast, a system of marriages negotiated between families continues to exist in India; a marriage squeeze and a real dowry inflation are observed throughout the country. This paper brings a nice application of methods used in the classical matching markets: existence of stable outcomes and a minimum equilibrium dowry, coincidence between the set of stable outcomes and the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes. We further discuss strategic questions and address issues comparative statics when a marriage squeeze yields in the Indian marriage market. |
| Date: | 2015–07–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01180569&r=all |
| By: | Maxime Agbo (African School of Economics); Damien Rousselière (AGROCAMPUS OUEST [Le Rheu] - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1, Granem - Groupe de Recherche ANgevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Agrocampus Ouest - Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage); Julien Salanié (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS) |
| Abstract: | We build a theoretical model to study a market structure of a marketing cooperative with direct selling, in which many farmers are members of an agricultural marketing cooperative. They can sell their production either to the cooperative or on an oligopolistic local market. We show that the decision to sell to the cooperative induces an anti-competitive effect on the direct selling market. The cooperative facilitates collusion on the local market by making farmers softer competitors on that market. Conversely, direct selling may create a "healthy emulation" among farmers, leading to more production benefiting the cooperative. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01098762&r=all |
| By: | Raicho Bolijov (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS - Polytechnique - X); Alfred Galichon (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS - Polytechnique - X) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with transferable utility and heterogeneity in tastes. When the matching surplus is quadratic, the marginal distributions of the characteristics are normal, and when the heterogeneity in tastes is of the continuous logit type, as in Choo and Siow (2006), we show that the optimal matching distribution is also jointly normal and can be computed in closed form from the model primitives. Conversely, the quadratic surplus function can be identified from the optimal matching distribution, also in closed-form. The analytical formulas make it computationally easy to solve problems with even a very large number of matches and allow for quantitative predictions about the evolution of the solution as the technology and the characteristics of the matching populations change. |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01169654&r=all |
| By: | Thilo Klein |
| Abstract: | In many economic situations, market participation requires that agents form groups subject to exogenous rules. Consider a microfinance institution that decides on rules for diversifying borrower groups in terms of their exposure to income shocks. Such rules affect group repayment by influencing both who matches with whom (direct effect) and who participates in the market (participation). I develop the key trade-off for conflicting predictions of extant theoretical models and estimate both effects separately. Group formation creates an endogeneity problem, but a matching model exploits the exogenous variation from counterfactual groups. I find that while diversification has no participation effect it has a significant positive direct effect. |
| Keywords: | microcredit; joint liability risk; diversification; market design; stable matching; endogeneity; selection model; agriculture; Thailand |
| JEL: | C11 C31 C34 C36 C78 D02 D82 G21 O16 Q14 |
| Date: | 2015–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1521&r=all |