nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2014‒10‒17
four papers chosen by
László Á. Kóczy
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia
  1. On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: Characterization of Continuation Payoff Processes By Mathias Staudigl
  2. A cardinally convex game with empty core By Pintér, Miklós
  3. Dynamic Game of Transboundary Pollution Regulation and Strategic Abatement By Victoria Umanskaya; Charles Mason; Edward Barbier
  4. A flexible, scaleable approach to the international patent 'name game' By Mark Huberty; Amma Serwaah; Georg Zachmann
  1. By: Mathias Staudigl (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Abstract: This note contains complementary information to the paper Staudigl and Steg (2014). We present a martingale characterization of continuation payoff processes in a class of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Our martingale approach allows us to work out a clear connection between the discrete time and continuous time payoff processes. A general proof of convergence is the open issue in this literature, and I strongly belief that the characterization result reported here is the key to solve this problem.
    Keywords: repeated games, public perfect equilibrium, martingale representation
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:526&r=gth
  2. By: Pintér, Miklós
    Abstract: In this note we present a cardinally convex game (Sharkey, 1981) with empty core. Sharkey assumes that V (N) is convex, we do not do so, hence we do not contradict Sharkey's result.
    Date: 2014–10–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2014/16&r=gth
  3. By: Victoria Umanskaya; Charles Mason; Edward Barbier
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:000240:24000063&r=gth
  4. By: Mark Huberty; Amma Serwaah; Georg Zachmann
    Abstract: The inventors in PATSTAT are often duplicates: the same person or company may be split into multiple entries in PATSTAT, each associated to different patents. In this paper, we address this problem with an algorithm that efficiently de-duplicates the data. It needs minimal manual input and works well even on consumer-grade computers. Comparisons between entries are not limited to their names, and thus this algorithm is an improvement over earlier ones that required extensive manual work or overly cautious clean-up of the names. Source code on Github. Download data.
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bre:wpaper:850&r=gth
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