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on Game Theory |
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Issue of 2014‒06‒28
five papers chosen by Laszlo A. Koczy Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Obuda University |
| By: | Christoph Kuzmics (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) |
| Abstract: | Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games, however, also have other (pure strategy) equilibria with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination. Perhaps surprisingly, in some such games, these Pareto-inefficient equilibria, with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination, are the only evolutionarily stable equilibria of the game. |
| Keywords: | incomplete information, continuously stable strategy, CSS, evolutionary stability, best-response dynamics |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D82 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:501&r=gth |
| By: | Hannu Salonen (Department of Economics, University of Turku) |
| Abstract: | We study non-cooperative link formation games in which players have to decide how much to invest in relationships with other players. The relationship between equilibrium strategies and network centrality measures are investigated in games where there is a common valuation of players as friends. If the utility from relationships with other players is bilinear, then indegree, eigenvector centrality, and the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure put the players in opposite order than the common valuation. If the utility from relationships is strictly concave, then these measures order the players in the same way as the common valuation. |
| Keywords: | link formation games, centrality measures, complete network |
| JEL: | C72 D43 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp92&r=gth |
| By: | Igor Mouraviev (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Frank Riedel (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Linda Sass (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) |
| Abstract: | The paper generalizes Kuhn's Theorem to extensive form games in which players condition their play on the realization of ambiguous randomization devices and use a maxmin decision rule to evaluate the consequences of their decisions. It proves that ambiguous behavioral and ambiguous mixed strategies are payoff- and outcome equivalent only if the latter strategies satisfy a rectangularity condition. The paper also discusses dynamic consistency. In particular, it shows that not only the profile of ambiguous strategies must be appropriately chosen but also the extensive form must satisfy further restrictions beyond those implied by perfect recall in order to ensure that each player respects her ex ante contingent choice with the evolution of play. |
| Keywords: | Kuhn's Theorem, Strategic Ambiguity, Maxmin Utility, Ellsberg Games |
| JEL: | C72 D81 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:510&r=gth |
| By: | Somayeh Koohborfardhaghighi (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy, College of Engineering, Seoul National University); Jorn Altmann (College of Engineering, Seoul National University) |
| Abstract: | Social networks can be differentiated according to the type of entities (i.e., humans or objects) that are represented within them. These networks can be called human networks and social object networks, respectively. Actors in human networks can act strategically to maximize their own payoffs during interactions with other humans. However, actors in social object network (e.g., SaaS service network) are not able to perceive the environment and act strategically upon that at any time. Only when they join the network, humans position them such that it maximizes their payoff. This paper contends that existing network formation models lack sufficient attention to social object networks (e.g., SaaS service networks). Therefore, we propose a new network formation model, through which we are able to explain how a SaaS service network emerges during the service composition procedure by service developers. The new network formulation model not only considers the usage frequency and reputation but also the similarity of the functionalities of the main SaaS services. It also explains how social objects (e.g., SaaS services) can benefit from establishment of links among each other in the network. |
| Keywords: | Software-as-a-Service Network, Network Formation Model, Social Object Networks. |
| JEL: | C02 C6 C15 D85 L86 O33 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snv:dp2009:2014113&r=gth |
| By: | Alexander Karpov (Associate Professor, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Visiting Associate Professor, Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University(2014.5.1-2014.8.31)) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an example of sole apparentement (coalition) that leads to unlimited seat losses. The necessary and sufficient condition of the lack of successful apparentements is discovered. A precise description of an apparentement-proof set is recognized. The probability of the lack of successful apparentement is evaluated. A game-theoretical approach for apparentement formation is applied. |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:896&r=gth |