|
on Game Theory |
|
Issue of 2014‒06‒14
24 papers chosen by Laszlo A. Koczy Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Obuda University |
| By: | Eric Bahel |
| Abstract: | The notion of veto player was originally introduced in simple games [see Nakamura (1979)], for which every coalition has a value of 0 or 1. In this paper we extend it to monotonic cooperative games with transferable utility: a player has veto power if all coalitions not containing her are worthless. We examine and characterize the core for each one of these "veto games". Moreover, we show the equivalence of the core and the bargaining set. Our work extends the clan games and big-boss games introduced respectively by Potters et al. (1989) and Muto et al. (1988). |
| Keywords: | TU game, veto power, core, objection, bargaining set. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-48&r=gth |
| By: | Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Stephen Morris (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibria which we dub Bayes correlated equilibria. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We introduce a partial order on many player information structures -- which we call individual sufficiency -- under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium in incomplete information games and of the partial order on information structures to others, including Blackwell's for the single player case. |
| Keywords: | Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering |
| JEL: | C72 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909r&r=gth |
| By: | Ana Mauleon (Saint-Louis University — Brussels); Nils Roehl (University of Paderborn); Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE, University of Louvain) |
| Abstract: | The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players’ preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market. |
| Keywords: | Social networks, Constitutions, Stability, Many-to-Many Matchings. |
| JEL: | C72 C78 D85 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:74&r=gth |
| By: | Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group); M. Vittoria Levati (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and DSE, University of Verona); Natalia Montinari (Economics Department, Lund University); Chiara Nardi (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and DSE, University of Verona) |
| Abstract: | In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers. |
| Keywords: | Ultimatum, Yes/No game |
| JEL: | C72 C92 |
| Date: | 2014–05–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-015&r=gth |
| By: | Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc; Klamler, Christian |
| Abstract: | An allocation of indivisible items among n ≥ 2 players is proportional if and only if each player receives a proportional subset—one that it thinks is worth at least 1/n of the total value of all the items. We show that a proportional allocation exists if and only if there is an allocation in which each player receives one of its minimal bundles, from which the subtraction of any item would make the bundle worth less than 1/n. We give a practicable algorithm, based on players’ rankings of minimal bundles, that finds a proportional allocation if one exists; if not, it gives as many players as possible minimal bundles. The resulting allocation is maximin, but it may be neither envy-free nor Pareto-optimal. However, there always exists a Pareto-optimal maximin allocation which, when n = 2, is also envy-free. We compare our algorithm with two other 2-person algorithms, and we discuss its applicability to real-world disputes among two or more players. |
| Keywords: | Fair division; indivisible items; proportionality; envy-freeness |
| JEL: | C71 C78 D61 D63 D74 D78 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:56587&r=gth |
| By: | Azomahou T.T.; Opolot D. (UNU-MERIT) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces epsilon-stability as a generalization of the concept of stochastic stability in learning and evolutionary game dynamics. An outcome of a model of stochastic evolutionary dynamics is said to be epsilon-stable in the long-run if for a given model of mistakes it maximizes its invariant distribution. We construct an efficient algorithm for computing epsilon-stable outcomes and provide conditions under which epsilon-stability can be approximated by stochastic stability. We also define and provide tighter bounds for contagion rate and metastability as measures for characterizing the short-run and medium-run behaviour of a typical stochastic evolutionary model. Keywords Stochastic evolution, network games, epsilon-stable sets, expected waiting time, metastability, contagion rate. |
| Keywords: | Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General; |
| JEL: | C73 D80 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2014036&r=gth |
| By: | Nils Roehl (University of Paderborn) |
| Abstract: | Suppose some individuals are allowed to engage in different groups at the same time and they generate a certain welfare by cooperation. Finding appropriate ways for distributing this welfare is a non-trivial issue. The purpose of this work is to analyze two-stage allocation procedures where first each group receives a share of the welfare which is then, subsequently, distributed among the corresponding members. To study these procedures in a structured way, cooperative games and network games are combined in a general framework by using mathematical hypergraphs. Moreover, several convincing requirements on allocation procedures are discussed and formalized. Thereby it will be shown, for example, that the Position Value and iteratively applying the Myerson Value can be characterized by similar axiomatizations. |
| Keywords: | Allocation Rules, Economic and Social Networks, Hypergraphs, Myerson Value, Position Value |
| JEL: | C71 D85 L22 |
| Date: | 2013–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:73&r=gth |
| By: | Kvaløy, Ola (UiS); Luzuriaga, Miguel (UiS) |
| Abstract: | In standard trust games, no trust is the default, and trust generates a potential gain. We investigate a reframed trust game in which full trust is default and where no trust generates a loss. We find significantly lower levels of trust and trustworthiness in loss domain when full trust is default than in gain domain when no trust is default. As a consequence, trust is on average profitable in gain domain, but not in loss domain. We also find that subjects respond more positively to higher trust in loss domain than in gain domain. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Reciprocity; Framing; Defaults; Reference Points; Experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2014–06–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:stavef:2014_006&r=gth |
| By: | Sherstyuk, Katerina; Tarui, Nori; Wengrin, Melinda Podor; Viloria, Jay; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi |
| Abstract: | In many collective action settings, such as decisions on public education or climate change mitigation, actions of a group have welfare consequences for themselves as well as their followers. We conduct laboratory experiments with two-stage predecessor-follower prisoners' dilemma and coordination games with dynamic externalities to study whether concerns for the followers' welfare affect the predecessors' behavior. We find that predecessors often give up own payoffs to avoid imposing negative externalities on the followers, but not to generate positive externalities for the followers. A concern for the followers aligned with own group payoff maximization motive helps to resolve social dilemma and coordination problems; yet, a conflict in motives greatly exacerbates both free-riding and coordination on the payoff-inferior equilibrium. We also find strong evidence of social learning: the followers tend to blindly mimic their own predecessor, but act opposite to their match's predecessor, no matter whether these actions are welfare-improving or not. |
| Keywords: | economic experiments, other-regarding behavior, collective action |
| JEL: | C90 C73 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:hitcei:2014-2&r=gth |
| By: | Miller Moya, Luis Miguel; Ubeda Molla, Paloma |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effect of focal points and initial relative position in the outcome of a bargaining process. We conduct two on-line experiments. In the first experiment we attempt to replicate Güth, Huck and Müller's (2001) results about the relevance of equal splits. In our second experiment, we recover the choices of participants in forty mini-ultimatum games. This design allows us to test whether the equal split or any other distribution or set of distributions are salient. Our data provide no support for a focal-point explanation but we find support for an explanation based on relative position. Our results confirm that there is a norm against hyper-fair offers. Proposers are expected to behave selfishly when the unselfish distribution leads to a change in the initial relative position. |
| Keywords: | bargaining, focal points, relative position |
| JEL: | C78 C92 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:12717&r=gth |
| By: | Azomahou T.T.; Opolot D. (UNU-MERIT) |
| Abstract: | Learning and stochastic evolutionary models provide a useful framework for analyzing repeated interactions and experimentation among economic agents over time. They also provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when multiplicity exists. This paper defines three convergence measures, diffusion rate, expected waiting time and convergence rate, for characterizing the short-run, medium-run and long-run behavior of a typical model of stochastic evolution. We provide tighter bounds for each without making restrictive assumptions on the model and amount of noise as well as interaction structure. We demonstrate how they can be employed to characterize evolutionary dynamics for coordination games and strategic diffusion in networks. Application of our results to strategic diffusion gives insights on the role played by the network topology. For example we show how networks made up of cohesive subgroups speed up evolution between quasi-stable states while sparsely connected networks have the opposite effect of favoring almost global stability. Keywords Learning and evolution, networks, diffusion rate, convergence rate, expected waiting time |
| Keywords: | Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General; |
| JEL: | C73 D80 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2014035&r=gth |
| By: | Sonja Brangewitz (University of Paderborn); Claus-Jochen Haake (University of Paderborn) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994). |
| Keywords: | Transfer Pricing, Negotiation, Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution, Incomplete Information |
| JEL: | C78 D82 M41 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:64&r=gth |
| By: | Jacques Durieu (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - Université Pierre-Mendès-France - Grenoble II : EA4625); Philippe Solal (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Lyon - PRES Université de Lyon - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I (UCBL)) |
| Abstract: | We study a local interaction model where agents play a finite n-person game following a perturbed best-response process with inertia. We consider the concept of minimal p-best response set to analyze distributions of actions in the long run. We distinguish between two assumptions made by agents about the matching rule. We show that only actions contained in the minimal p-best response set can be selected provided p is sufficiently small. We demonstrate that these predictions are sensitive to the assumptions about the matching rule. |
| Keywords: | model ; game theory |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01002448&r=gth |
| By: | Gill, David (University of Oxford); Prowse, Victoria L. (Cornell University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability and character skills influence behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive ability: more cognitively able subjects choose numbers closer to equilibrium, converge more frequently to equilibrium play and earn more even as behavior approaches the equilibrium prediction. To understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning based on level-k reasoning. We find a systematic positive relationship between cognitive ability and levels; furthermore, the average level of more cognitively able subjects responds positively to the cognitive ability of their opponents, while the average level of less cognitively able subjects does not respond. Finally, we compare the influence of cognitive ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning. More agreeable and emotionally stable subjects perform better and learn faster, although the effect of cognitive ability on behavior is stronger than that of character skills. |
| Keywords: | cognitive ability, character skills, personality traits, level-k, bounded rationality, learning, convergence, non-equilibrium behavior, beauty contest, repeated games, structural modeling, theory of mind, intelligence, IQ, cognition, Raven test |
| JEL: | C92 C73 D83 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8236&r=gth |
| By: | Azomahou T.T.; Opolot D. (UNU-MERIT) |
| Abstract: | We study the dynamics of individual beliefs and information aggregation when agents communicate via a social network. We provide a general framework of social learning that captures the interactive effects of three main factors on the structure of individual beliefs resulting from such a dynamic process; that is historical factorsprior beliefs, learning mechanismsrational and bounded rational learning, and the topology of communication structure governing information exchange. More specifically, we provide conditions under which heterogeneity and consensus prevail. We then establish conditions on the structures of the communication network, prior beliefs and private information for public beliefs to correctly aggregate decentralized information. The speed of learning is also established, but most importantly, its implications on efficient information aggregation. Keywords Learning, social networks, public beliefs, speed of learning, information aggregation. |
| Keywords: | Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory; |
| JEL: | C70 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2014034&r=gth |
| By: | Holt, Charles; Kydd, Andrew; Razzolini, Laura; Sheremeta, Roman |
| Abstract: | This paper implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more reliable attacker types more frequently, whereas the attackers tend to send less reliable types. Data from laboratory experiments with financially motivated human subjects are consistent with the qualitative patterns predicted by theory. However, we also find several interesting behavioral deviations from the theory. |
| Keywords: | terrorism, profiling, game theory, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 J16 |
| Date: | 2014–05–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:56508&r=gth |
| By: | Daniele Nosenzo (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Theo Offerman (Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam); Martin Sefton (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Ailko van der Veen (Department of Economics, University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate a repeated “inspection game†where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive probabilities of shirking/inspecting while combined payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. We examine the effects of allowing the employer discretion to sanction or reward the employee after observing stage game payoffs. When employers have limited discretion, and can only apply sanctions and/or rewards following an inspection, we find that both instruments are equally effective in reducing shirking and increasing joint earnings. When employers have discretion to reward and/or sanction independently of whether they inspect we find that rewards are more effective than sanctions. In treatments where employers can combine sanctions and rewards employers rely mainly on rewards and outcomes closely resemble those of treatments where only rewards are possible. |
| Keywords: | Inspection Game; Costly Monitoring; Discretionary Incentives; Rewards; Punishment; Experiment. |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2014-04&r=gth |
| By: | Andersson, Tommy (Department of Economics, Lund University); Ehlers, Lars (Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal); Svensson, Lars-Gunnar (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the situation when tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in but can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the last 30-35 years (U.K. Housing Act 1980 is a leading example). The main objective with this type of legislation is to transfer the ownership of the houses from the public authority to the tenants. To achieve this goal, the selling prices of the public houses are typically heavily subsidized. The legislating body then faces a trade-off between achieving the goals of the legislation and allocating the houses efficiently. This paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individual rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable in a restricted preference domain that contains "almost all" preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public authority to the tenants. This rule is also weakly preferred to the current U.K. system by both the existing tenants and the public authority. Finally, a dynamic process that finds the outcome of the identified rule, in a finite number of steps, is provided. |
| Keywords: | Public housing; existing tenants; equilibrium; minimum equilibrium prices; maximum trade; group non-manipulability; dynamic price process |
| JEL: | C71 C78 D71 D78 |
| Date: | 2014–06–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2014_023&r=gth |
| By: | Charles Z. Zheng (University of Western Ontario) |
| Abstract: | Existence of a monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proved for a multistage game of first-price auctions with interbidder resale, with any finite number of ex ante different bidders. Endogenous gains at resale complicate the winner’s curse and upset previous fixed-point methods to prove existence of monotone equilibria. This paper restructures the fixed-point approach with respect to comparative statics of the resale mechanisms strategically chosen after the auction. Despite speculation possibilities and the discontinuity-inducing uniform tie-breaking rule, at our equilibrium any bid that stands a chance to win is strictly increasing in the bidder’s use value. |
| Keywords: | none available |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uwo:epuwoc:20141&r=gth |
| By: | Brams, Steven J; Kilgour, D. Marc |
| Abstract: | In U.S. presidential elections, voters in noncompetitive states seem not to count—and so have zero voting power, according to the Banzhaf and other voting-power indices—because they cannot influence the outcome in their states. But because the electoral votes of these states are essential to a candidate's victory, it seems that they do count, but in a different way. We measure the power of voters in noncompetitive states by modeling how these states structure the contest in the competitive states, as illustrated in the 2012 election. Barack Obama’s lead of 46 electoral votes over Mitt Romney in the 41 noncompetitive states and the District of Columbia gave him 5.5 times as many ways of winning in the 9 competitive states as Romney had. Also, Romney’s winning coalitions were weaker by two additional measures: They were 2.4 times more vulnerable, and 5.5 times more fragile than Obama’s. Compared with being tied with Romney in the noncompetitive states, Obama’s lead in these states contributed very substantially to his victory. |
| Keywords: | US presidential elections; Electoral College; voting power |
| JEL: | C71 C78 D63 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:56582&r=gth |
| By: | Charles Figuieres (Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, INRA); David Masclet (CREM, Centre de Recherches en Economie et Management, Université de Rennes 1); Marc Willinger (Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, INRA; Université Montpellier 1) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a general framework that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in most experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. Each player balances her material utility loss from contributing with her psychological utility loss of deviating from her moral ideal. The novel and central idea of our model is that peoples moral motivation is "weak": their judgement about what is the right contribution to a public good can evolve in the course of interactions, depending partly on observed past contributions and partly on an intrinsic "moral ideal". Under the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents, average voluntary contributions can decline with repetition of the game. Our model also explains other regularities observed in experiments, in particular the phenomenon of over-contributions compared to the Nash prediction and the so-called restart effect, and it is compatible with the conditional cooperation hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | CONDITIONAL COOPERATION, VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, MORAL MOTIVATION, EXPERIMENTS ON PUBLIC GOODS GAMES., THEORIE DES JEUXÂ , bien public, économie expérimentale, bien public |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inr:wpaper:46420&r=gth |
| By: | Simon Gächter (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Christian Thöni (Centre Walras-Pareto, University of Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | Social preferences and social influence effects (“peer effectsâ€) are well documented, but little is known about how peers shape social preferences. Settings where social preferences matter are often situations where peer effects are likely too. In a gift-exchange experiment with independent payoffs between two agents we find causal evidence for peer effects. Efforts are positively correlated but with a kink: agents follow a low-performing but not a high-performing peer. This contradicts major theories of social preferences which predict that efforts are unrelated, or negatively related. Some theories allow for positively-related efforts but cannot explain most observations. Conformism, norm following and social esteem are candidate explanations. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, voluntary cooperation, peer effects, reflection problem, gift-exchange; conformism; social norms; social esteem, experiments. |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2014-03&r=gth |
| By: | Arnaud Dragicevic (Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière) |
| Abstract: | The invasion by the spreading species is one of the most serious threats to biodiversity and ecosystem functioning. Despite a number of empirical and theoretical studies, there is still no general model about why or when settlement becomes invasion. The purpose of this work is to test a model of Bayesian population dynamics relying on best-response strategies that could helpin resource management and bioeconomic modeling. Given the species survival probability, our static game unveils a breaking-level probability in mixed-strategies, where it is in the interest of exotic species to invade and in the interest of native species to resist. In dynamic setting, we introduce a stochastic version of the balance equation based on conditional probabilities. When the species survival probability and the availability of resources in the ecosystem are respectively high and low, the dynamics shows that the rebalancing of subpopulations operates at a high pace. |
| Abstract: | L’invasion par des espèces envahissantes est l’une des menaces des plus sérieuses pour la biodiversité et le fonctionnement des écosystèmes. En dépit d’un certain nombre d’études empiriques et théoriques, il n’y a toujours pas de modèle général sur le pourquoi du comment l’établissement devient une invasion. Le but de ce travail est de tester un modèle bayésien de dynamique des populations en s’appuyant sur les stratégies de meilleure réponse qui pourraient aider à la gestion des ressources et la modélisation bioéconomique. Compte tenu de la probabilité de survie des espèces, notre jeu statique révèle un seuil de probabilité de rupture dans les stratégies mixtes, où il est dans l’intérêt des espèces exotiques d’envahir et dans l’intérêt des espèces natives de résister. Dans le cadre dynamique, nous introduisons une version stochastique de l’équation d’équilibre basée sur les probabilités conditionnelles. Lorsque la probabilité de survie des espèces et la disponibilité des ressources dans l’écosystème sont respectivement élevée et faible, la dynamique montre que le rééquilibrage des souspopulations s’opère de manière soutenue. |
| Keywords: | bioeconomics, game theory, balance equation, bayesian population dynamics, biodiversity, invasive species, bioeconomics, game theory, balance equation, bayesian population dynamics, biodiversity, invasive species, équation d'équilibre, modèle bayésien, modèle bioéconomiquebiodiversitéespèce invasive |
| JEL: | C61 C62 C73 Q5 Q56 Q57 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inr:wpaper:210787&r=gth |
| By: | Theodore L. Turocy (University of East Anglia); Lucas Rentschler (Universidad Francisco Marroquin) |
| Abstract: | We analyze symmetric, two-player all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations and general discrete signal structures. We extend the previous literature by being able to analyze auctions in which an increase in a bidder's posterior expected value for winning the auction is likely to be accompanied by a corresponding increase for the other bidder. Such environments are `highly competitive' in the sense that the bidder's higher valuation also signals that the other bidder has an incentive to bid aggressively. We present a construction which computes all symmetric equilibria, and show how, in highly competitive environments, the search problem this construction faces can be complex. In equilibrium, randomization can take place over disjoint ranges of bids, with equilibrium supports having a potentially rich structure. |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:aepppr:2012_63&r=gth |