|
on Game Theory |
|
Issue of 2014‒06‒07
seven papers chosen by Laszlo A. Koczy Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Obuda University |
| By: | Lars EHLERS |
| Abstract: | We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the -core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the -core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose a -core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the -core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks. |
| Keywords: | General allocation problems, externalities, strategy-proofness, -core. |
| JEL: | C78 D61 D78 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montec:05-2014&r=gth |
| By: | Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo |
| Abstract: | We analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different notions of stability: myopic team-wise stability, which extends to our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, coalitional stability, where agents are perfectly rational and able to coordinate, and stochastic stability, where agents are myopic and errors occur with vanishing probability. We find that, in many cases, coalitional stability in no way refines myopic team-wise stability, while stochastically stable states are feasible states that maximize the overall number of activities performed by teams. |
| Keywords: | team formation; stochastic stability; coalitional stability; networks; marriage theorem. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D85 H41 |
| Date: | 2014–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:56356&r=gth |
| By: | Lauren Larrouy (University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France; GREDEG CNRS) |
| Abstract: | The paper purports to stress how the two major contributions of Bacharach: "Variable Frame Theory" (VFT) and "Team Reasoning" (TR) improve Standard Non-Cooperative Game Theory in some relevant aspects which I point out. The aims are to show: (i) how Bacharach respectively justifies coordination and cooperation within these theories, and (ii) how these improvements in both VFT and TR involve a new conception of players and their rationality. I underline how coordination and cooperation rely on contextual and social determinants, which challenge and even contradict some pillars of standard individual rationality in terms of subjective expected utility, in games. Even if Bacharach's conceptual and methodological choices within these theories induce numerous difficulties, I try to show that Bacharach’s work underlines some of the implications and related problems induced by the mere foundations of standard non-cooperation game theory. |
| Keywords: | non-cooperative game theory, framing, salience, focal points, Team Reasoning, coordination, cooperation, individual rationality, social rationality, collective rationality |
| JEL: | B21 B41 C72 D03 D79 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2014-17&r=gth |
| By: | Didier LAUSSEL; Ngo Van LONG; Joana RESENDE |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the dynamic problem faced by a monopolist rm that produces a durable good (in the primary market) and also participates in the market for complementary goods and services (the aftermarket). Considering the possibility of network effects in both markets, we investigate the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the dynamic game played by the monopolist and the forward-looking consumers. We characterize the evolution of the monopolists equilibrium network and the equilibrium price trajectories. We show that the Coase Conjecture remains valid if there are only primary network effects, while it fails when aftermarket network effects are present. We also fi nd that the properties of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium vary drastically with the intensity of aftermarket network effects. |
| Keywords: | durable good, network externalities, aftermarkets, Coase Conjecture |
| JEL: | L12 L14 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2014&r=gth |
| By: | Klarizze Anne Puzon; Marc Willinger |
| Abstract: | We analyze an institutionalized rent-seeking game in which groups can endogenously choose the prize at stake, e.g. a common-pool resource. In the first stage, groups determine how much of the resource to protect and equally share. In the second stage, the unprotected fraction is competed for in a rent-seeking game. We consider two institutions varying in the extent by which subjects participate: majority voting (i.e. "unrestrained participation" where all group members participate in the protection stage) and dictatorial rule (i.e. "limited participation" where only one member decides in the protection stage) [...] |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lam:wpaper:14-05&r=gth |
| By: | Maria Porter |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the motivation for intergenerational transfers between adult children and their parents, and the nature of preferences for such giving behaviour, in an experimental setting.� Participants in our experiment play a series of dictator games with parents and strangers, in which we vary endowments and prices for giving to each recipient.� We find that preferences for giving are typically rational.� When parents are recipients as opposed to strangers, participants display greater sensitivity to the price of giving, and a higher relative proclivity for giving.� Our findings also provide evidence of reciprocal motivations for giving, as players give more to parents who have full information regarding the context in which giving occurs. |
| Keywords: | transfer motives, intergenerational, dictator games, lab experiments, altruism, reciprocity |
| JEL: | C91 D12 D64 |
| Date: | 2014–05–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:709&r=gth |
| By: | Karl Jandoc (Department of Economics, University of Hawai`i at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawai`i, USA); Ruben Juarez (Department of Economics, University of Hawai`i at Manoa, and University of Hawai`i Economic Research Organization, Honolulu, Hawai`i, USA); James Roumasset (University of Hawai‘i at Manoa & University of Hawai’i Economic Research Organization) |
| Abstract: | Both the economics and the engineering of irrigation design are typically based on the assumption of a single source. The more general economic problem is to determine which sources should be developed and how water should be allocated and delivered to various receptor-farmers. This is a problem in network economics. We begin our exploration with the problem of allocating irrigation water from existing sources when the conveyance structures are already in place. Transporting water from a particular source to a farmer entails a conveyance loss such that only a fraction of water sent from the source is received by the farmer. Optimal allocation requires that irrigation demands are matched with the least-cost source, including conveyance losses. Economic networks are then defined as optimally-matched subnetworks. Allocation within each economic network is then determined by equalizing the marginal products of water across farmers, reckoned at the source. Different cases are considered depending whether the sources have similar or different cost functions. We provide a modest beginning to the problem of endogenous sources by examining the problem of locating a single source within the network. We also provide a possible reconciliation of equity and efficiency objectives |
| Keywords: | Water networks, Spatial efficiency, Conveyance losses. |
| JEL: | Q25 D85 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201416&r=gth |