|
on Game Theory |
|
Issue of 2014‒03‒15
twelve papers chosen by Laszlo A. Koczy Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Obuda University |
| By: | Christian Ewerhart |
| Abstract: | Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter ("2 |
| Keywords: | Tullock contest, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, analytical functions |
| JEL: | C72 D72 C16 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:143&r=gth |
| By: | Mikel Álvarez-Mozos (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa; Universitat de Barcelona (UB)); Oriol Tejada Pinyol (CER-ETH, ETH Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases, our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of agents. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of the latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of an expected coalitional game. Then, we provide two characterization results for this new family of values within the framework of all partition function games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to am algamation of players. Second, as this collusion transformation fails to be meanin gful for simple games in partition function form, we propose another generalization of the Banzhaf value which also builds on probability distributions of the above type. This latter family is characterized by means of a neutrality property which uses an amalgamation transformation of players for which simple games are close |
| Keywords: | Banzhaf value, Externalities, Games in partition function form, Simplegames. |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ewp:wpaper:302web&r=gth |
| By: | Sidartha Gordon (Département d'économie); Ying Chen |
| Abstract: | We introduce a “nestedness” relation for a general class of sender-receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game is nested in game if the players’s optimal actions are closer in game. We show that under some conditions, more information is transmitted in the nested game in the sense that the receiver’s expected equilibrium payoff is higher. The results generalize the comparative statics and welfare comparisons with respect to preferences in the seminal paper of Crawford and Sobel (1982). We also derive new results with respect to changes in priors in addition to changes in preferences. We illustrate the usefulness of the results in three applications: (i) delegation to an intermediary with a different prior, the choice between centralization and delegation, and two-way communication with an informed principal. |
| Keywords: | sender-receiver games, information transmission, nestedness, inter- mediary, delegation, informed principal. |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh&r=gth |
| By: | John Duggan (University of Rochester); Michel Le Breton (Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:roc:rocher:580&r=gth |
| By: | Penélope Hernández (ERI-CES); Guillem Martínez-Canovas (ERI-CES); Manuel Muñoz-Herrera (University of Groningen); Lea Ellwardt (University of Groningen) |
| Abstract: | We examine the interplay between a person's individual preference and the social influence others exert. We provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals are better off coordinating with those around them, but not all prefer the same action. We test our model in an experiment, varying the level of conflicting preferences between individuals. Our findings suggest that preferences are more salient than social influence, under conflicting preferences: subjects relate mainly with others who prefer the same. This leads to two undesirable outcomes: network segregation and social inefficiency. The same force that helps people individually hurts society. |
| Keywords: | Heterogeneity, Social Networks, Formation, Equilibrium selection |
| JEL: | C62 C72 D82 D85 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0114&r=gth |
| By: | Jordi Brandts; David J. Cooper; Roberto A. Weber |
| Abstract: | We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all interventions yield shifts to more efficient equilibria, communication from leaders has a greater effect than incentives. Moreover, leaders who are elected by followers are significantly better at improving their group's outcome than randomly selected ones. The improved effectiveness of elected leaders results from sending more performance-relevant messages. Our results are evidence that the way in which leaders are selected affects their legitimacy and the degree to which they influence followers. Finally, we observed that a combination of factors- incentive increases and elected leaders-yield near universal turnarounds to full efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Leadership, Job Selection, Coordination Failure,Experiments, Communication |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D83 |
| Date: | 2014–03–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:947.14&r=gth |
| By: | Kukushkin, Nikolai S. |
| Abstract: | The acyclicity of individual improvements in a generalized congestion game (where the sums of local utilities are replaced with arbitrary aggregation rules) can be established with a Rosenthal-style construction if aggregation rules of all players are "quasi-separable." Every universal separable ordering on a finite set can be represented as a combination of addition and lexicography. |
| Keywords: | Improvement dynamics; Acyclicity; Separable aggregation; Congestion game |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2014–03–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:54171&r=gth |
| By: | Burkhard Schipper (Department of Economics, University of California Davis) |
| Abstract: | This article provides a brief survey of the literature on unawareness and introduces the contributions to the special issue on unawareness in Mathematical Social Sciences. First, we provide a brief overview both about epistemic models of unawareness and models of extensive-form games with unawareness. Instead of introducing the approaches in full detail, we illustrate the main differences and similarities with the help of examples. Finally, we discuss the contributions to the special issue on unawareness. |
| Keywords: | Unawareness, awareness, incomplete information, knowledge, belief, extensive-form games |
| JEL: | C70 D80 |
| Date: | 2014–02–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cda:wpaper:14-5&r=gth |
| By: | Bolle, Friedel |
| Abstract: | The launch of a public project requires support from enough members of a group. Members (players) are differently important for the project and have different cost/benefit relations. There are players who profit and players who suffer from the launch of the project. Examples are the Kyoto protocol, voting with different weights (shareholders, the UN with the veto power of the Security Council members), and international scientific or military expeditions. As coordination on one of the usually many pure strategy equilibria is difficult, mixed strategy equilibria are the focus of this investigation. If all players profit from the launch of the project then, despite the unnecessary costs, the requirement of full contributions is a Pareto-improvement to every original threshold. The contribution probabilities of some player types defined by their importance are characterized according to their cost/benefit relations. -- |
| Keywords: | Threshold Public Goods,Provision Point Mechanism,Voting |
| JEL: | D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:345&r=gth |
| By: | Janine Balter; Michela Rancan; Olena Senyuta |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study the Ph.D academic job market. Based on the Gale and Shapley algorithm, we analyse whether a social planner can improve market efficiency by truncation, i.e., exogenously imposing a limit on the number of possible applications. Using simulations, we derive the optimal truncation level which balances the trade-off between being unmatched and gaining a better match in the aggregate. When graduates apply to their most preferred positions, we find that aggregate efficiency can be improved by limiting the number of applications. In particular, the limit can be considerable if the graduates' preferences over the positions are not very correlated. The derived limit is still the best one when graduates respond strategically (applying to universities which are at least individually most preferred at the expenses of those most preferred commonly) in a conservative sense: given the strategic behaviour of the graduates, the market efficiency can be further improved by choosing an even lower limit on the number of applications. Overall, this paper suggests a direction to improve the matching market for Ph.D. candidates by improving the quality of their matches and lowering the hiring costs for universities. |
| Keywords: | Matching markets, Truncation, Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, Preference misrepresentation |
| JEL: | C78 D61 D78 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2014/04&r=gth |
| By: | Caroline D. Thomas (Department of Economics, The University of Texas at Austin); Martin W. Cripps (Department of Economics, University College London) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either: a geometric random variable in the good state, or zero in the bad state. The queue lengthens with each new arrival and shortens if the agents are served or choose to quit the queue. Agents can only observe the evolution of the queue after they arrive, thus each agent solves the experimentation problem of how long to wait to learn about the probability of service. The agents, in addition, benefit from an informational externality by observing the length of the queue and the actions of other agents. There is also a negative payoff externality as those at the front of the queue delay the service of those at the back. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tex:wpaper:140228&r=gth |
| By: | Burkhard Schipper (Department of Economics, University of California Davis) |
| Abstract: | We correlate competitive bidding and profits in symmetric independent private value first-price auctions with salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol in more than 200 subjects. Bids are significantly positively correlated and profits are significantly negatively correlated with basal salivary progesterone but only for females who do not use hormonal contraceptives. Surprisingly, we have null findings for basal testosterone, estradiol, and cortisol for both males and females. We show that our finding for progesterone is not mediated by risk aversion or bidding mistakes. No hormone responds to total profits in the auctions except for a small positive response of the stress hormone cortisol in males. |
| Keywords: | Hormones, Steroids, Testosterone, Estradiol, Progesterone, Cortisol, Contraceptives, Auctions, Gender, Competition, Aggression, Risk-taking, Endocrinological economics |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D44 D81 D87 |
| Date: | 2014–02–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cda:wpaper:14-4&r=gth |