nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2014‒01‒24
nine papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Obuda University

  1. The ex ante α-core for normal form games with uncertainty By Youcef Askoura; Mohammed Sbihi; Hamid Tikobaini
  2. Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods By Cox, Caleb
  3. An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities By Tommy ANDERSSON; Lars EHLERS
  4. An experimental study of uncertainty in coordination games By Ioannou, Christos A.; Makris, Miltiadis
  5. Strategy-Proof Package Assignment By Erlanson, Albin; Szwagrzak, Karol
  6. Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games By Gwenaël Piaser
  7. Appariement: des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth By Francoise Forges; Guillaume Haeringer; Vincent Iehlé
  8. Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes By Dahm, Matthias; Esteve, Patrícia,
  9. A Note on Cooperative Strategies in Gladiators' games By Jérôme Ballet; Damien Bazin; Radu Vranceanu

  1. By: Youcef Askoura (Chercheur Indépendant - Aucune); Mohammed Sbihi (MAIAA - ENAC - Laboratoire de Mathématiques Appliquées, Informatique et Automatique pour l'Aérien - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile - ENAC); Hamid Tikobaini (LMPA - Laboratoire des Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées - Université Mouloud MAMMERI de Tizi-Ouzou)
    Abstract: In this paper we study the existence of the α-core for an n-person game with incomplete information. We follow a Milgrom-Weber-Balder formulation of a game with incomplete information. The players adopt behavioral strategies represented by Young measures. The game unrolls in one step at the ex ante stage. In this context, the mixed-extensions of the utility functions are not quasi-concave, and as a result the classical Scarf's theorem cannot be applied. An approximation argument is used to overcome this lack of concavity.
    Keywords: α-core; game with incomplete information; normal form games; behavioral strategies; game with uncertainty
    Date: 2013–03–01
  2. By: Cox, Caleb
    Abstract: I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can lead to under-contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who condition expectations only on their private information contribute too little, despite the absence of free-riding incentives. In a laboratory experiment, subjects indeed under-contribute relative to equilibrium. Using modified games with different belief conditioning effects, I verify that under-contribution is due to improper belief conditioning. I find little evidence of learning over multiple rounds of play.
    Keywords: Public goods; experiments; cursed equilibrium; game theory
    JEL: C72 C92 D71 H41
    Date: 2014–01–21
  3. By: Tommy ANDERSSON; Lars EHLERS
    Abstract: We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.
    Keywords: least manipulable envy-free rules, algorithm
    JEL: C71 C78 D63 D71 D78
    Date: 2013
  4. By: Ioannou, Christos A.; Makris, Miltiadis
    Abstract: Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Coordination games. The former assume that agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals, whereas the latter, following Myerson (2000), model the number of actual players as a Poisson random variable to capture population uncertainty in large games. Given that their predictions differ, it is imperative to understand which type of uncertainty drives behavior, if any. Recent experimental literature findings that inexperienced (in the sense of limited game-play) subjects' behavior is similar in Global and Common Knowledge Coordination games, thus casting doubts on whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals is an important determinant of such behavior. We design an experiment to study the behavior of inexperienced subjects in Global, Poisson and Common Knowledge Coordination games. Our findings corroborate the above experimental literature. More importantly, they also suggest that uncertainty about the number of actual players in large games does influence inexperienced subjects' behavior. In addition, inexperienced subjects' behavior under such uncertainty is, in fact, consistent with the theoretical prediction of Poisson Coordination games
    Date: 2014–01–11
  5. By: Erlanson, Albin (Department of Economics, Lund University); Szwagrzak, Karol (Department of Economics, University of Southern Denmark)
    Abstract: We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Peyton Young, 1987, Mathematics of Operations Research 12 (3), 397-414.), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.
    Keywords: Package assignment; Indivisible objects; Strategy-proofness
    JEL: C70 D61 D63 D70
    Date: 2013–12–13
  6. By: Gwenaël Piaser
    Abstract: It is argued that the revelation principle in multi-principal multi-agent games cannot be generalized. In other words, one cannot restrict attention to incentive compatible mechanisms, even if the concept of information is enlarged.
    Keywords: Direct Mechanisms, Incentive compatible, Multiprincipals.
    JEL: D82
    Date: 2014–01–06
  7. By: Francoise Forges (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine, CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS : UMR7534 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine); Guillaume Haeringer (Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica - Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona); Vincent Iehlé (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine, CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS : UMR7534 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine)
    Abstract: Alvin Roth et Lloyd Shapley ont reçu en 2012 le prix de sciences économiques de la Banque Royale de Suède à la mémoire d'Alfred Nobel, pour leurs travaux sur l'organisation centralisée de certains marchés économiques, qui dépendent de l'appariement d'agents de deux types distincts (des élèves et des écoles, par exemple). Shapley est le co-auteur, avec David Gale, de l'article fondateur du domaine, qui propose un algorithme pour atteindre un appariement stable. Roth a dirigé la restructuration de la procédure d'affectation des internes dans les hôpitaux aux Etats Unis et la conception d'un marché lié à la transplantation de reins. Après avoir rendu compte de ces contributions, nous évoquons aussi le rôle déterminant de Shapley en théorie des jeux.
    Keywords: appariement, conception de marché, jeu coopératif, stabilité
    Date: 2013–12–01
  8. By: Dahm, Matthias; Esteve, Patrícia,
    Abstract: Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. Examples are gender quotas or a prize for national competitors in an international competition. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Contestants differ in ability and agents with relatively low ability belong to a disadvantaged minority. All contestants compete for the main prize, but only disadvantaged agents can win the extra prize. We show that an extra prize is a powerful tool to ensure participation of disadvantaged agents. Moreover, for intermediate levels of the disadvantage of the minority, introducing an extra prize increases total equilibrium effort compared to a standard contest. Thus, even a contest designer not interested in affirmative action might establish an extra prize in order to enhance competition. Keywords: Asymmetric contest, equality of opportunity, affirmative action, discrimination, prize structure, exclusion principle. JEL: C72, D72, I38, J78
    Keywords: Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica), Política pública, Política laboral, Discriminació positiva, Igualtat d'oportunitats, Preus -- Control, 33 - Economia,
    Date: 2013
  9. By: Jérôme Ballet (UMI RESILIENCES - Unité mixte internationale Résiliences - Institut de recherche pour le développement [IRD] : UMI236 - Centre ivoirien de recherches économiques et sociales (CIRES) - Université de Cocody (CIV)); Damien Bazin (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR7321 - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis [UNS]); Radu Vranceanu (Economics Department - ESSEC Business School, THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS : UMR8184 - Université de Cergy Pontoise)
    Abstract: Gladiatorial combat was in reality a lot less lethal than it is depicted in the cinema. This short paper highlights how cooperative strategies could have prevailed in the arenas, which is generally what happened during the Games. Cooperation in the arena corresponded to a situation of the professionalization of gladiators, who been trained in gladiatorial schools. This case provides an analogy of the conditions under which cooperation occurs in a context of competition between rival companies.
    Keywords: sustainable competition; cooperation rule; gladiatorial combat
    Date: 2013–05–16

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