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on Game Theory |
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Issue of 2013‒09‒28
six papers chosen by Laszlo A. Koczy Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Obuda University |
| By: | CAULIER, Jean-François (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, F-75647 Paris, France); MAULEON, Ana (CEREC, Saint-Louis University, Brussels, Belgium; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium); VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent (CEREC, Saint-Louis University, Brussels, Belgium; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule. |
| Keywords: | networks, coalition structures, allocation rules |
| JEL: | A14 C71 D85 |
| Date: | 2013–07–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2013032&r=gth |
| By: | MAULEON, Ana (CEREC, Saint-Louis University, Brussels, Belgium; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium); SEMPERE-MONERRIS, Jose (Department of Economic Analysis and ERI-CES, University of Valencia, Spain; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent (CEREC, Saint-Louis University, Brussels, Belgium; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | We analyze how different rules for exiting an alliance (simple majority, unanimity or unanimity with side payments) will affect the formation of strategic alliances. We find that no alliance structure is contractually stable under the simple majority rule. Once unanimous consent is required, asymmetric alliance structures consisting of two alliances are contractually stable. In addition, the grand alliance which is the efficient structure is stable. Allowing for side payments to compensate former partners improves efficiency. Finally, we show that different rules of exit may coexist in different alliances in the long run. |
| Keywords: | strategic alliances, coalition formation, contractual stability, exit rules |
| JEL: | C70 L13 |
| Date: | 2013–07–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2013031&r=gth |
| By: | John Geanakoplos; William R. Zame |
| Date: | 2013–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000741&r=gth |
| By: | Ori Weisel (Max Planck Institute of Economics); Ro'i Zultan (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one's own influ- ence on the outcome of the out-group. The way in which this harm is presented and perceived dramatically alters participation decisions. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive-reciprocity-is ruled out by the data. |
| Keywords: | intergroup conflict, intergroup prisoner's dilemma, asymmetric conflict, framing |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D03 D62 D74 H41 |
| Date: | 2013–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-033&r=gth |
| By: | Garicano, Luis; Rayo, Luis |
| Abstract: | An expert must train a novice. The novice initially has no cash, so he can only pay the expert with the accumulated surplus from his production. At any time, the novice can leave the relationship with his acquired knowledge and produce on his own. The sole reason he does not is the prospect of learning in future periods. The profit-maximizing relationship is structured as an apprenticeship, in which all production generated during training is used to compensate the expert. Knowledge transfer takes a simple form. In the first period, the expert gifts the novice a positive level of knowledge, which is independent of the players' discount rate. After that, the novice's total value of knowledge grows at the players' discount rate until all knowledge has been transferred. The inefficiencies that arise from this contract are caused by the expert's artificially slowing down the rate of knowledge transfer rather than by her reducing the total amount of knowledge eventually transferred. We show that these inefficiencies are larger the more patient the players are. Finally, we study the impact of knowledge externalities across players. |
| Keywords: | general human capital; knowledge; relational contracts; skills |
| JEL: | C73 J24 L14 |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9460&r=gth |
| By: | Alessandro Cigno (Università degli Studi di Firenze); Annalisa Luporini (Università degli Studi di Firenze) |
| Abstract: | In an economy where graduate jobs are allocated by tournament, and some of the potential participants cannot borrow against their expected future earnings, the government can increase efficiency and ex ante equity by redistributing wealth or, if that is not possible, by borrowing wholesale and lending to potential participants. Both policies replace some of the less able rich with some of the more able poor and bring education investments closer to their first-best levels. |
| Keywords: | higher education, matching tournaments, credit. |
| JEL: | C78 D82 H42 I22 J24 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2013_15.rdf&r=gth |