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on Game Theory |
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Issue of 2013‒09‒25
two papers chosen by Laszlo A. Koczy Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Obuda University |
| By: | Nielsen, Ulrik H. (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Tyran, Jean-Robert (Department of Economics, University of Vienna); Wengström, Erik (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma. |
| Keywords: | Response Time; Free Riding; Public Goods; Experiment |
| JEL: | C70 C90 D03 |
| Date: | 2013–09–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2013_029&r=gth |
| By: | Mehmet Gurdal; Joshua B. Miller; Aldo Rustichini |
| Abstract: | We provide experimental evidence that subjects blame others based on events they are not responsible for. In our experiment an agent chooses between a lottery and a safe asset; payment from the chosen option goes to a principal who then decides how much to allocate between the agent and a third party. We observe widespread blame: regardless of their choice, agents are blamed by principals for the outcome of the lottery, an event they are not responsible for. We provide an explanation of this apparently irrational behavior with a delegated-expertise principal-agent model, the subjects’ salient perturbation of the environment. JEL Classification Numbers: C92; D63; C79. Keywords: Experiments; Rationality; Fairness |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:494&r=gth |