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on Game Theory |
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Issue of 2013‒01‒26
fourteen papers chosen by Laszlo A. Koczy Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Obuda University |
| By: | Brink, R. van den; Herings, P.J.J.; Laan, G. van der; Talman, A.J.J. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that follow from a permission structure on the set of players, in which players need permission to cooperate with other players. We assume the permission structure to be an oriented tree. This means that there is one player at the top of the permission structure and for every other player there is a unique directed path from the top player to this player. We introduce a new solution for these games based on the idea of the Average Tree value for cycle-free communication graph games. We provide two axiomatizations for this new value and compare it with the conjunctive permission value. |
| Keywords: | TU game;restricted cooperation;permission structure;Shapley value;Average Tree value;axiomatization. |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2013001&r=gth |
| By: | Vidal-Puga, Juan |
| Abstract: | In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents' utilities. In this paper, a simple non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an agreement. |
| Keywords: | ordinal bargaining; ordinal Shapley rule |
| JEL: | C78 C72 |
| Date: | 2013–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43790&r=gth |
| By: | Selcuk, O.; Talman, A.J.J. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitional structure in which only certain sets of players, including the set of all players, are able to form feasible coalitions. The solution concept takes into account the marginal contribution of players. This marginal contribution can be a joint contribution of several players and is equally divided among those players. Any set system representing a coalitional structure induces a collection of coalitional trees, whose nodes may consist of subsets of players. As solution we take the average of the marginal contribution vectors that correspond to all coalitional trees. The solution is ecient and several other properties are studied and some special cases are considered. |
| Keywords: | TU game;cooperation structure;marginal contribution;set system;Shapley value |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2013002&r=gth |
| By: | F. Javier Martinez de Albeniz; Carles Rafels; Neus Ybern (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment game with two buyers and two sellers. Five different cases are analyzed depending on the entries of the assignment matrix. We extend the results to the case of 2 m or m 2 assignment games. |
| Keywords: | core, nucleolus, assignment game |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bar:bedcje:2013289&r=gth |
| By: | Machover, Moshé; Terrington, Simon |
| Abstract: | We address simple voting games (SVGs) as mathematical objects in their own right, and study structures made up of these objects, rather than focusing on SVGs primarily as co-operative games. To this end it is convenient to employ the conceptual framework and language of category theory. This enables us to uncover the underlying unity of the basic operations involving SVGs. |
| Keywords: | Simple games; Lattice of simple games; Category |
| JEL: | D7 C71 |
| Date: | 2013–01–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43939&r=gth |
| By: | Gianandrea Staffiero (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business); Filippos Exadaktylos (BELIS, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University); Antonio M. Espín (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.) |
| Abstract: | The rejection of unfair proposals in ultimatum games is often quoted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. In this paper we focus on those responders who accept any proposals, setting the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) at zero. While this behavior could result from the randomization between the two payoff-maximizing strategies (i.e. setting MAO at zero or at the smallest positive amount), it also implies that the opponent’s payoff is maximized and the “pie” remains intact. We match subjects’ behavior as ultimatum responders with their choices in the dictator game, in two large-scale experiments. We find that those who set MAO at zero are the most generous dictators. Moreover, they differ substantially from responders whose MAO is the smallest positive offer, who are the greediest dictators. Thus, an interpretation of zero MAOs in terms of selfish, payoff-maximizing behavior could be misleading. Our evidence indicates that the restraint from punishing others can be driven by altruism and by the desire to maximize social welfare. |
| Keywords: | ultimatum game, dictator game, altruism, social welfare, costly punishment, selfishness, social preferences. |
| Date: | 2013–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:wpaper:13/01&r=gth |
| By: | Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven |
| Abstract: | We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we find that the cooperative value function does not exhibit smooth pasting at the efficient cut-off belief. This finding extends to the boundaries between continuation and stopping regions in Markov perfect equilibria. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium, construct a class of asymmetric equilibria, and elucidate the impact of bad versus good Poisson news on equilibrium outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Strategic Experimentation; Two-Armed Bandit; Bayesian Learning; Poisson Process; Piecewise Deterministic Process; Markov Perfect Equilibrium; Differential-Difference Equation; Smooth Pasting; Continuous Pasting |
| JEL: | C73 D83 O32 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:396&r=gth |
| By: | Gil S. Epstein (Bar-Ilan University); Yosef Mealem |
| Abstract: | This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player's type is known to both players, the other is private information and known only to the player himself. We compare the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of a one-sided private information contest to the Nash equilibrium with no private information, in which both players know the type of the other player. We show conditions under which uncertainty increases the investment of the uninformed player and the rent dissipation of the contest, while decreasing the expected net payoff of the informed player. In addition, we consider conditions under which the informed player – before knowing his own type – prefers that the uninformed player knows his type. Moreover, we show conditions for the existence/non-existence of equilibrium in a two-stage contest in which the informed player declares his type (or does not declare) in the first stage and in the second stage the two players play according to the information available to them. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric contests, rent seeking, incomplete information |
| JEL: | D72 C72 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2013-01&r=gth |
| By: | Rodica Branzei; Marco Dall'Aglio; Stef H. Tijs |
| Abstract: | Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classical results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) that characterize division rules which correspond to solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game. Finally, we analyze the difficulties with incorporating the uncertainty about the estate. |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1301.3096&r=gth |
| By: | Di Bartolomeo Giovanni; Papa Stefano |
| Abstract: | Our paper aims to investigate conditional and unconditional motivations in investment games by using a counterfactual methodology and attitudinal survey and self-reported information about participants’ behavior. We have combined different methodologies to verify the coherence between participants’ actions, beliefs and perceptions |
| Keywords: | Conditional and unconditional other-regarding preferences, triadic approach, investment game, frame effect |
| JEL: | D03 C91 D83 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ter:wpaper:0099&r=gth |
| By: | Alexandra Litsa (University of Caen Basse-Normandie - CREM UMR CNRS 6211); Jean-François Maguet (University of Caen Basse-Normandie - CREM UMR CNRS 6211) |
| Abstract: | In traditional school choice theory, the assignment mechanisms of students to schools suppose preferences for students and priorities for schools. In this paper, interested in the admission of students to colleges, we assume that all agents have priorities over the members of the opposite side. By considering that students have priorities over colleges, we reduce the incoherence and unfairness of assignments in order to respect the best possible students' educational needs. |
| Keywords: | Matching, Preference, Priority, Coherence, Fairness, Mechanism |
| JEL: | C78 D03 D63 I20 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201301&r=gth |
| By: | Angelo Antoci (University of Sassari); Simone Borghesi (University of Siena); Mauro Sodini (University of Pisa) |
| Abstract: | The present paper investigates the functioning of an Emission Trading System (ETS) and its impact on the diffusion of environmental-friendly technological innovation in the presence of firms’ strategic behaviours and sanctions to non-compliant firms. For this purpose, we study an evolutionary game model with random matching, namely, a context in which a population of firms interact through pairwise random matchings. We assume that each firm has to decide whether to adopt a new clean technology or keep on using the old technology that requires pollution permits to operate and that the strategy whose expected payoff is greater than the average payoff spreads within the population at the expense of the alternative strategy (the so-called replicator dynamics). We investigate the technological dynamics and the stationary states that emerge from the model. From the analysis of the model, we show that by properly modifying the penalty on non-compliant firms, it is possible to shift from one dynamic regime to another and that an increase in permits trade can promote the diffusion of innovative pollution-free technologies. |
| Keywords: | Emissions Trading, Technological Innovation, Random Matching, Evolutionary Game, Penalty System, Strategic Behaviour |
| JEL: | C62 C63 C73 C78 O33 Q55 Q58 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.79&r=gth |
| By: | Simon Dietz (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science); Carmen Marchiori (Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science); Alessandro Tavoni (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science) |
| Abstract: | The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a strong analogy with the behaviour of an individual or firm in other strategic contexts. In reality, however, various domestic special interests shape environmental policy, including how national governments cooperate on cross-border issues. Therefore in this paper we introduce to a classic model of international environmental cooperation the phenomenon of domestic political competition, whereby lobby groups seek to influence policy by offering to fund political campaigning. We use the model to establish some general conditions for the effects of lobbying on the stringency of policy and the size of coalitions cooperating to provide an environmental good. Using specific functional forms, we obtain a range of further results, including circumstances in which the omission of lobbying results in environmental protection being underestimated. |
| Keywords: | Game Theory, International Environmental Agreements, Lobbying, Special-Interest Groups, Strategic Cooperation |
| JEL: | C7 H41 K33 Q2 Q54 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.76&r=gth |
| By: | Samir Sbabou (University of Caen Basse-Normandie - CREM UMR CNRS 6211, France); Hatem Smaoui (CEMOI, Université de la Réunion); Abderrahmane Ziad (University of Caen Basse-Normandie - CREM UMR CNRS 6211, France) |
| Abstract: | La première partie propose une revue de littérature sur les jeux de congestions et les jeux de potentiel exact. La deuxième partie traite les jeux de congestion à choix unique dans le cas symétrique et propose une formule simple et pratique permettant de trouver l'ensemble de tous les équilibres de Nash. La troisième partie analyse la famille des jeux de congestion à choix unique non symétriques. Ici l'effet de congestion n'est pas le même sur l'ensemble des joueurs. Lorsqu'il existe seulement deux ressources ou lorsque la partition est exacte (), une preuve constructive est présentée et permet de calculer plus facilement (au moins) un équilibre de Nash, sans faire appel ni aux fonctions de potentiel (Rosenthal, 1973), ni aux mécanismes d'amélioration (Milchtaich, 1996). Enfn, nous examinons la possibilité d'exploiter nos résultats dans certaines applications des jeux de congestion telles que les jeux de congestion réseau et les jeux d'allocation de tâches. |
| Keywords: | Jeux de congestion, Jeux de potentiel, Fonction de potentiel, Équilibre de Nash, Symétrique, Non symétrique, Choix unique, Réseau, Allocation de tâches, Voie d'amélioration, FIP |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201303&r=gth |