|
on Game Theory |
|
Issue of 2011‒03‒19
thirteen papers chosen by Laszlo A. Koczy Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Obuda University |
| By: | Virginie Masson (School of Economics, University of Adelaide) |
| Abstract: | We consider a finite population of agents who exchange information and are paired every period to play a game with tension between risk dominance and Pareto efficiency. Agents sample past plays and corresponding payoffs from their information neighborhood, and choose one of two possible actions using either best response or imitation. Information exchanges and possible matchings each constitutes a network. We first provide a complete description of the medium run outcomes and show that in the medium run only information matters. We then identify the conditions whereby either the risk dominant or the Pareto efficient convention is stochastically stable, and show how efficiency in the long run depends on the matching network. |
| Keywords: | Contagion, networks, coordination games, best response, imitation |
| JEL: | C73 D85 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2011-13&r=gth |
| By: | Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Rudolf Berghammer (Computer-Aided Program Development - Institute of Computer Science - Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel); Harrie De Swart (Faculteit Wijsbegeerte-Logica en taalanalyse - Universiteit van Tilburg); Stefan Bolus (Computer-Aided Program Development - Institute of Computer Science - Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel) |
| Abstract: | Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision - making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple games and develop relational specifications for solving some basic problems of them. In particular, we test certain fundamental properties of simple games and compute specific players and coalitions. We also apply relation algebra to determine power indices. This leads to relation-algebraic specifications, which can be evaluated with the help of the BDD-based tool RelView after a simple translation into the tool's programming language. In order to demonstrate the visualization facilities of RelView, we consider an example of the Catalonian Parliament after the 2003 election. |
| Keywords: | Relation algebra ; RelView ; simple game ; winning coalition ; swinger ; dominant player ; central player ; power index |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00574767&r=gth |
| By: | Pascal Billand (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France ; Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France); Christophe Bravard (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France ; Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France); Sudipta Sarangi (Department of Economics, Virginia Tech and Louisiana State University) |
| Abstract: | We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Moreover, our existence proof allows us to characterize a pairwise equilibrium of these networks. |
| Keywords: | networks, existence, spillovers |
| JEL: | C70 D85 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1110&r=gth |
| By: | Vincent Martinet; Pedro Gajardo; Michel De Lara; Héctor Ramírez Cabrera |
| Abstract: | We present a new class of dynamic bargaining problems, called "bargaining problems with intertemporal maximin payoffs," that may reflect sustainability problems having to encompass conflicting issues in the long-run. Each bargainer (or stake-holder) has a representative indicator, namely a function of the state and decisions, and aims at maximizing its minimal value over time. Bargaining on sustainability issues consists in defining the vector of stake-holder's payoffs. We are interested in defining the set of feasible outcomes of such problems. This set is interpreted as a support for a social choice of sustainability objectives. We introduce a MONDAI condition – Monotonicity of Dynamics And Indicators – consistent with many economic problems and, in particular, "environmental economic" sustainability issues. We characterize the set of feasible outcomes for problems satisfying these monotonicity properties, and the bargaining solutions under the axioms of Pareto efficiency and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. We also provide a "satisficing" common decision rule to achieve any given solution. We then examine the time-consistency of the solution under the axioms of Veto Power and Individual Rationality. |
| Keywords: | bargaining theory, dynamics, maximin, monotonicity, feasibility set, sustainability |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-7&r=gth |
| By: | Carfì, David; Ricciardello, Angela |
| Abstract: | In this paper we define the canonical mixed extension of a decision form game. We motivate the necessity to introduce this concept and we show several examples about the new concept. In particular we focus our study upon the mixed equilibria of a finite decision form game. Many devel- opments appear possible for applications to economics, physics, medicine and biology in those cases for which the systems involved do not have natural utility functions but are only capable to react versus the external actions. |
| Keywords: | Decision form game; mixed extension. |
| JEL: | C79 C02 C7 C73 C72 |
| Date: | 2011–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28971&r=gth |
| By: | Sylvain Barde |
| Abstract: | An information-theoretic thought experiment is developed to provide a methodology for predicting endowment distributions in the absence of information on agent preferences. The allocation problem is first presented as a stylised knapsack problem. Although this knapsack allocation is intractable, the social planner can nevertheless make precise predictions concerning the endowment distribution by using its information-theoretic structure. By construction these predictions do not rest on the rationality of agents. It is also shown, however, that the knapsack problem is equivalent to a congestion game under weak assumptions, which means that the planner can nevertheless evaluate the optimality of the unobserved allocation. |
| Keywords: | Information theoretic measure; knapsack problem; congestion game; potential function |
| JEL: | C62 D51 D83 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1103&r=gth |
| By: | Antonio Miralles |
| Abstract: | I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a finite number of object types. I consider the existence of weak priorities discriminating among agents with respect to their rights concerning the final assignment. The respect for priorities ex ante (ex-ante stability) usually precludes ex-ante envy-freeness. Therefore I define a new concept of fairness, called no unjustified lower chances: priorities with respect to one object type cannot justify different achievable chances regarding another object type. This concept, which applies to the assignment mechanism rather than to the assignment itself, implies ex-ante envy-freeness among agents of the same priority type. I propose a variation of Hylland and Zeckhauser' (1979) pseudomarket that meets ex-ante stability, no unjustified lower chances and ex-ante efficiency among agents of the same priority type. Assuming enough richness in preferences and priorities, the converse is also true: any random assignment with these properties could be achieved through an equilibrium in a pseudomarket with priorities. If priorities are acyclical (the ordering of agents is the same for each object type), this pseudomarket achieves ex-ante efficient random assignments. |
| Keywords: | Random Assignment; Fairness; Stability; School Choice. |
| Date: | 2011–03–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:864.11&r=gth |
| By: | Bettina Klaus; Flip Klijn |
| Abstract: | In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based on a fixed population of agents and fixed resources -- we refer to this condition as local consistency and to his condition on the priority structure as local acyclicity. We identify a related but stronger necessary and sufficient condition (unit acyclicity) on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a more standard global consistency property. Next, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism to satisfy converse consistency principles. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition (local shift-freeness) on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies local converse consistency. Interestingly, local acyclicity implies local shift-freeness and hence the student-optimal stable mechanism more frequently satisfies local converse consistency than local consistency. Finally, in order for the student-optimal stable mechanism to be globally conversely consistent, one again has to impose unit acyclicity on the priority structure. Hence, unit acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure for the student-optimal stable mechanism to satisfy global consistency or global converse consistency. |
| Keywords: | acyclicity, consistency, converse consistency, student placement. |
| JEL: | D63 C78 |
| Date: | 2011–03–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:866.11&r=gth |
| By: | Pascal Billand (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France ; Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France); Christophe Bravard (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France ; Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France); Sudipta Sarangi (Department of Economics, Virginia Tech and Louisiana State University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we pursue the work of H. Haller and al. (2005, [10]) and examine the existence of equilibrium networks, called Nash networks, in the noncooperative two-way flow model (Bala and Goyal, 2000, [1]) with partner heterogeneous agents. We show through an example that Nash networks do not always exist in such a context. We then restrict the payoff function, in order to find conditions under which Nash networks always exist. We give two properties : increasing differences and convexity in the first argument of the payoff function, that ensure the existence of Nash networks. It is worth noting that linear payoff functions satisfy the previous properties. |
| Keywords: | Nash networks, two-way flow models, partner heterogeneity |
| JEL: | C72 D85 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1111&r=gth |
| By: | Christopher Bruce; Jeremy Clark |
| Abstract: | In many cases governments invite interest groups to use collaborative bargaining to resolve environmental conflicts. If the parties fail to reach agreement, the government threatens to impose a backstop policy. Bargaining models have predicted that any agreements will be influenced, variously, by self-interest, equity, or entitlement (to the status quo). Although most such models assume that the parties are well informed about one another’s utility functions, this assumption conflicts with the reality of negotiations over environmental policy. We develop a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of private information. Subjects who bargain under this constraint are almost as likely to reach (approximately efficient) agreements as those bargaining under full information. We also find that equity plays a less important role, and entitlement a more important role, under private information than under full information. There is only limited evidence to suggest that parties are drawn to the Nash bargain. |
| JEL: | C92 D74 H44 Q58 |
| Date: | 2011–03–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clg:wpaper:2011-07&r=gth |
| By: | Pascal Billand (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France ; Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France); Christophe Bravard (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France ; Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France); Sudipta Sarangi (Department of Economics, Virginia Tech and Louisiana State University) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a partner heterogeneity assumption in the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]). Our goal consists in the characterization of strict Nash networks with regard to the set of resources obtained by players. We use the notion of condensation network which allows us to divide the population in sets of players who obtain the same resources and we order these sets according to the resources obtained. Accordingly, we can examine the relationship between heterogeneity and asymmetries in networks. We establish that the nature of heterogeneity plays a crucial role on asymmetries observed in equilibrium networks. |
| Keywords: | Nash networks, one-way flow model, condensation networks, chain, inf-semi-lattice |
| JEL: | C72 D85 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1108&r=gth |
| By: | Francesco de Sinopoli; Leo Ferraris; Giovanna Iannantuoni |
| Abstract: | In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strate- gic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters. |
| Keywords: | Proportional Election, Strategic Voting, Ideological Voting |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:205&r=gth |
| By: | Edward Hunter Christie; Pavel K. Bev; Volodymyr Golovko |
| Abstract: | This report contains three separate papers, each addressing selected issues concerning natural gas policy and security of gas supply in Europe. The over-arching themes are vulnerability (to supply disruptions, to supplier pricing power) and fragmentation; and measures designed to overcome them, namely interconnection and consolidation of bargaining power. The first paper contains a review of some of the economic effects of, and subsequent policy reactions to, the January 2009 cut of Russian gas supplies through the Ukraine Corridor, with a particular focus on Bulgaria and on EU policy. The second paper provides an analysis of the current state of gas relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, with a focus on the Ukrainian perspective and on recent political developments in that country. The third paper provides an analysis of the case for consolidating buyer power in line with the concept of an EU Gas Purchasing Agency. |
| Keywords: | Natural gas, security of supply, supply disruption, interconnector, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, European Union, energy policy, fragmentation, bargaining power, countervailing power, gas purchasing agency |
| JEL: | C78 L11 Q34 Q48 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wsr:ecbook:2011:i:iii-003&r=gth |