nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2010‒12‒04
thirteen papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Obuda University

  1. An Incomplete Information Justification of Symmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Games By Christoph Kuzmics; Brian W. Rogers
  2. A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions By Michel Grabisch; Agnieszka Rusinowska
  3. Who should be called to the lab? A comprehensive comparison of students and non-students in classic experimental games By Michèle Belot; Raymond Duch; Luis Miller
  4. A cooperative game-theoretic approach to ALOHA By Marban Sebastian; Ven Peter van de; Borm Peter; Hamers Herbert
  5. Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war By Clara Ponsati; Santiago Sanchez-Pages
  6. When a precedent of donation favors defection in the Prisoner's dilemma By Garapin, A.; Llerena, D.; Hollard, M.
  7. Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets By Alexey I. Kushnir
  8. Taking the initiative. What motivates leaders? By Lisa Bruttel; Urs Fischbacher
  9. A Diamond-Dybvig Model Without Bank Run: the Power of Signaling By Kiss, Hubert Janos
  10. Existence and Testable Implications of Extreme Stable Matchings By Federico Echenique; SangMok Lee; M. Bumin Yenmez
  11. Learning and Experimentation in Strategic Bandit Problems By Klein, Nicolas
  12. Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests By Tymofiy Mylovanov; Andriy Zapechelnyuk
  13. Matching Allocation Problems with Endogenous Information Acquisition By Sophie Bade

  1. By: Christoph Kuzmics; Brian W. Rogers
    Date: 2010–11–22
  2. By: Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
    Abstract: In the paper, a yes-no model of influence is generalized to a multi-choice framework. We introduce and study weighted influence indices of a coalition on a player in a social network, where players have an ordered set of possible actions. Each player has an inclination to choose one of the actions. Due to mutual influence among players, the final decision of each player may be different from his original inclination. In a particular case, the decision of the player is closer to the inclination of the influencing coalition than his inclination was, i.e., the distance between the inclinations of the player and of the coalition is greater than the distance between the decision of the player and the inclination of the coalition in question. The weighted influence index which captures such a case is called the weighted positive influence index. We also consider the weighted negative influence index, where the final decision of the player goes farther away from the inclination of the coalition. We consider several influence functions defined in the generalized model of influence and study their properties. The concept of a follower of a given coalition, and its particular case, a perfect follower, are defined. The properties of the set of followers are analyzed.
    Keywords: weighted positive influence index, weighted negative influence index, influence function, follower of a coalition, perfect follower, kernel
    Date: 2010
  3. By: Michèle Belot; Raymond Duch (Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College, University of Oxford); Luis Miller
    Abstract: This study compares the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games. We find that students are more likely to behave as homo-economicus agents than non-students in games involving other-regarding preferences (Dictator Game, Trust Game and Public Good Game). These differences persist even when controlling for demographics, cognitive ability and risk preferences. In games that do not engage other-regarding preferences (Beauty-contest and Second-price Auction) there is limited evidence of differences in behaviour between subject pools. In none of the five games is there evidence of significant differences in comprehension between students and non-students. Within subject analyses indicate that students are highly consistent in their other-regarding preferences while non-student subjects are inconsistent across other-regarding games. Our findings suggest that experiments using students will provide a lower bound estimate of other-regardedness in the general population while exaggerating the stability of other-regarding preferences.
    Keywords: lab experiments, convenience samples, other-regarding preferences, consistency
    JEL: C72 C81 C91
    Date: 2010–10
  4. By: Marban Sebastian; Ven Peter van de; Borm Peter; Hamers Herbert (METEOR)
    Abstract: The performance of wireless networks suffers from collisions. These occur when multiplewireless nodes transmit simultaneously, and their signals interfere with each other. To reduce collisions, nodes may use a randomized protocol to regulate their behavior. An example of such a protocol is slotted ALOHA, in which at the beginning of each time slot all nodes have a fixed probability to start a transmission for the duration of that slot. In this paper we consider a wireless network where all nodes use slotted ALOHA, and we investigate the impact of cooperation among nodes. Full cooperation eliminates collisions between nodes, which clearly has a positive impact on the network performance, measured by the aggregate node throughput. We are interested in how to allocate the corresponding performance gains obtained from cooperation among the nodes. In order to study this allocation problem, we define and analyze a corresponding cooperative ALOHA game. We show that this type of game is convex and we consider three solution concepts: the core, the Shapley value, and the compromise value. Further, we introduce the set of Weighted Gain Splitting (WGS) allocation rules, and show that this set coincides with the core of the game. These WGS rules can be used to provide an alternative characterization of the Shapley value. Finally, we analyze how the cooperative solution concepts change with the parameters of the wireless network.
    Keywords: operations research and management science;
    Date: 2010
  5. By: Clara Ponsati; Santiago Sanchez-Pages
    Abstract: We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.
    Keywords: Conflict, Income redistribution, Natives, Immigrants.
    JEL: C78 D74
    Date: 2010–11–18
  6. By: Garapin, A.; Llerena, D.; Hollard, M.
    Abstract: In this paper we examine the question of wether a collective activity can influence cooperation in a subsequent repeated one shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. We conduct two series of experiments. The first consists of control experiments in which 30 periods of a PD game are played, with a random re-matching of the pairs in every period. In a second series of experiments, subjects first play a donation game and then the PD game. In the donation game they collectively discuss the amount of a donation to a given charity, before putting the question to an individual and anonymous vote. Cooperation levels in the PD games preceded by the donation game are signficantly lower than those observed in the control experiment.
    JEL: C72 C91 C92
    Date: 2010
  7. By: Alexey I. Kushnir
    Date: 2010–11–22
  8. By: Lisa Bruttel; Urs Fischbacher
    Abstract: Taking the initiative is a crucial element of leadership and an important asset for many jobs. We assess leadership in a game in which it emerges spontaneously since people have a non-obvious possibility to take the initiative. Combining this game with small experimental games and questionnaires, we investigate the motives and personality characteristics that entail leadership. We find efficiency concerns, generosity, and attention seeking as important determinants of leadership. Response time patterns and the results from the cognitive reflection test show that cognitive resources are relevant in the decision to lead.
    Keywords: leading-by-example, social preferences, experiment
    Date: 2010
  9. By: Kiss, Hubert Janos (Departamento de Análisis Económico (Teoría e Historia Económica). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.)
    Abstract: This paper introduces the possibility of signaling into a finite-depositor version of the Diamond-Dybvig model. More precisely, the decision to keep the funds in the bank is assumed to be unobservable,but depositors are allowed to make it observable by signaling, at a cost. Depositors decide consecutively whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding balances in the bank, and they choose if they want to signal the latter decision. If the cost of signaling is moderate, then bank runs do not occur. Moreover,no signals are made, so the unconstrained-efficient allocation is implemented without any costs.
    Keywords: bank run; sequential game; signaling; iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies; coordination.
    JEL: C72 D82 G21
    Date: 2010–11
  10. By: Federico Echenique; SangMok Lee; M. Bumin Yenmez
    Date: 2010–11–22
  11. By: Klein, Nicolas
    Date: 2010–11–03
  12. By: Tymofiy Mylovanov (Penn State University); Andriy Zapechelnyuk (Queen Mary, University of London)
    Abstract: This paper studies optimal decision rules for a decision maker who can consult two experts in an environment without monetary payments. This extends the previous work by Holmström (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) who consider environments with one expert. In order to derive optimal decision rules, we prove a "constant-threat" result that states that any out-of-equilibrium pair of recommendations by the experts are punished with an action that is independent of their reports. A particular property of an optimal decision rule is that it is simple and constant for a large set of experts' preferences and distribution of their private information. Hence, it is robust in the sense that it is not affected by errors in specifying these features of the environment. By contrast, the constructions of optimal outcomes absent commitment or with only one expert are sensitive to model details.
    Keywords: Communication, Information, Noise, Experts, Constant threat
    JEL: C72 D82 D83
    Date: 2010–11
  13. By: Sophie Bade (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
    Abstract: The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the first-best might not be implementable. Moreover, it might not even be possible to implement the second-best through trade. In addition, the paper highlights the use of randomness in setting incentives for efficient learning. The trade-offs among simultaneous and sequential learning and among efficient learning and efficient allocations are discussed.
    Keywords: Bubbles, Rational Expectations, Bonuses, Compensation Schemes, Financial Crises, Financial Policy
    JEL: C78
    Date: 2010–11

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