nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2010‒06‒18
ten papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Obuda University

  1. A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments By Vincent Anesi
  2. On the coincidence between the Shimomuras bargaining sets and the core By Josep M. Izquierdo; Carles Rafels
  3. A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Large Generalized Games with Atomic Players By Álvaro Riascos Villegas; Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
  4. Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching: The case of private values By Rene Saran; Roberto Serrano
  5. Networks and Markets. The dynamic impacts of information, matching and transaction costs on trade By Yuki Kumagai
  6. Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching: The Case of Private Values By Rene Saran; Roberto Serrano
  7. Multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center By Oriol Tejada; Marina Nunez
  8. Simulation Based Estimation of Discrete Sequential Move Games of Perfect Information By Wang, Yafeng; Graham, Brett
  9. Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods. By Pierre Dehez
  10. Strategic Network Disruption and Defense By Britta Hoyer; Kris De Jaegher

  1. By: Vincent Anesi (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the tournament game introduced by Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1993) [The bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 182-201]. The exploration of a specific class of Markov perfect equilibria in these "dynamic tournament games" yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments - the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We find that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets.
    Keywords: Electoral competition, stable set, stationary Markov equilibrium, weak tournament, solution theory
    JEL: C71 C73 D72
    Date: 2010–05
  2. By: Josep M. Izquierdo; Carles Rafels (Universitat de Barcelona)
    Abstract: A necessary condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets dened by Shimomura (1997) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility is provided. To this aim, a set of payo vectors, called max-payo vectors, are introduced. This necessary condition simply checks whether these vectors are core elements of the game.
    Keywords: max-payo vectors, core, bargaining set, cooperative games
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2010
  3. By: Álvaro Riascos Villegas; Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
    Abstract: Consider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players. Only atomic players are required to have convex sets of admissible strategies and quasi-concave objective functions. In this context, we prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, a result that extends Rath (1992, Theorem 2) to generalized games and gives a direct proof of a special case of Balder (1999, Theorem 2.1). Our proof has the merit of being simple, based only on standard fixed point arguments and finite dimensional real analysis.
    Date: 2010–05–02
  4. By: Rene Saran; Roberto Serrano
    Abstract: In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run predictions are minimal sets that are closed under “the same or better reply” operations. Under additional assumptions in each case, the prediction boils down to pure Nash equilibria, pure ex-post equilibria or pure minimax regret equilibria. These three paradigms exhibit nice robustness properties in the sense that they are independent of beliefs about the exogenous uncertainty of type spaces. The results are illustrated in second-price auctions, first-price auctions and Bertrand duopolies.
    Keywords: fixed and random matching; incomplete information; ex-post regret learning; nash equilibrium; ex-post equilibrium; minimax regret equilibrium; second-price auction;first-price auction;bertrand duopoly
    JEL: C72 C73 D43 D44 D82 D83
    Date: 2010–06–08
  5. By: Yuki Kumagai (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore strategic incentives to use trade networks rather than markets and shed light on the dynamic relation between the two distinct trading systems: a formal system of markets and a decentralised system of networks. We investigate the issues in the infinitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game with random matching. The existing literature emphasises the impor- tance of information transmission in sustaining long-run cooperation in repeated personal transactions under perfect observability. By con- trast, we show that a folk theorem may hold if we change the way traders are matched, without introducing any information sharing. We also examine different stages of the evolution of trading system. The study states conditions under which agents prefer to trade on networks rather than in markets.
    Keywords: Repeated trade; Moral hazard; Matching; Transaction costs; Networks; Institutions
    JEL: F10 C73 D02
    Date: 2010–05
  6. By: Rene Saran; Roberto Serrano
    Date: 2010–06–08
  7. By: Oriol Tejada; Marina Nunez (Universitat de Barcelona)
    Keywords: core-center, nucleolus, multi-sided assignment games
    JEL: C71 C78
    Date: 2010
  8. By: Wang, Yafeng; Graham, Brett
    Abstract: We propose simulation based estimation for discrete sequential move games of perfect information which relies on the simulated moments and importance sampling. We use importance sampling techniques not only to reduce computational burden and simulation error, but also to overcome non-smoothness problems. The model is identified with only weak scale and location normalizations, monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples.
    Keywords: Game-Theoretic Econometric Models; Sequential-Move Game; Method of Simulated Moments; Importance Sampling; Conditional Moment Restrictions.
    JEL: C13 C35 C01 C72
    Date: 2010–07–08
  9. By: Pierre Dehez
    Abstract: A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to know how much they should each contribute. We model this compensation problem as a cost sharing game to which standard allocation rules are applied and related to the solution resulting from the auction procedures proposed by Kleindorfer and Sertel (1994).
    Keywords: public goods, cost sharing, core, nucleolus, Shapley value.
    JEL: C71 H41 M41
    Date: 2010
  10. By: Britta Hoyer; Kris De Jaegher
    Abstract: Networks are one of the essential building blocks of society. Not only do firms cooperate in R&D networks, but firms themselves may be seen as networks of information-exchanging workers. Social movements increasingly make use of networks to exchange information, just as on the negative side criminal and terrorist networks use them. However, the literature on networks has mainly focused on the cooperative side of networks and has so far neglected the competition side of networks. Networks themselves may face competition from actors with opposing interests to theirs. Several R&D networks may compete with one another. The firm as a network of employees obviously faces competition. In particular, given the importance of connectivity for networks, competing networks may try to disrupt each other, by trying to convince key players in competing networks to defect, or to stop sponsoring key links (strategic network disruption). In response, networks that face competition will adapt their structure, and will avoid vulnerable network structures. Such network competition is what our paper is concerned with.
    Keywords: Strategic Network Disruption, Strategic Network Design, Noncooperative Network Games
    JEL: C72 D85
    Date: 2010–06

This nep-gth issue is ©2010 by Laszlo A. Koczy. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.