nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2010‒04‒24
ten papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Obuda University

  1. Multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core By Oriol Tejada
  2. Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent By Tan, Jonathan H.W.; Breitmoser, Yves; Bolle, Friedel
  3. Assignment markets with the same core By F. Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz1; Marina Nunez; Carles Rafels2
  4. Trade through endogenous intermediaries By Kilenthong, Weerachart; Qin, Cheng-Zhong
  5. The effects of punishment in dynamic public-good games By Guererk, Oezguer; Rockenbach, Bettina; Wolff, Irenaeus
  6. Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market Under Bilateral Monopoly By Kenji Fujiwara; Ngo Van Long
  7. Claim Problems and Egalitarian Criteria. By Javier Arin; Juan Miguel Benito
  8. Matching with Trade-offs: Revealed Preferences over Competiting Characteristics By Alfred Galichon; Bernard Salanié
  9. Vote or Shout By Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R
  10. MATCHING WITH PHANTOMS By Bruno Decreuse

  1. By: Oriol Tejada (Universitat de Barcelona)
    Abstract: We introduce the class of multi-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games, which generalizes the well-kown two-sided B ohm-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided B ohm- Bawerk assignment game by means of an associated convex game defined on the set of sectors instead of the set of sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of these games is stable in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern.
    Keywords: homogeneous goods, core, assignment games, multi-sided markets, extreme points
    JEL: C70 C78
    Date: 2010
  2. By: Tan, Jonathan H.W.; Breitmoser, Yves; Bolle, Friedel
    Abstract: We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in consent games but, in contrast, as much as socially efficient outcomes in dissent games. In our experiment, inexperienced subjects contribute high in consent games and low in dissent games, but behavior converges toward equilibrium predictions over time and eventually experienced subjects contribute as predicted: low in consent games and high in dissent games. Observed deviations from equilibrium in consent games are best explained by level-k reasoning, and those in dissent games are best explained by hierarchical reasoning formalized as nested logit equilibrium.
    Keywords: public good; contribution game; bounded rationality; mechanism
    JEL: C71 C44 H41
    Date: 2010–04–09
  3. By: F. Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz1; Marina Nunez; Carles Rafels2 (Universitat de Barcelona)
    Abstract: In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a nite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sucient condition under which the join-semilattice reduces to a lattice is also given.
    Keywords: core, semilattice, assignment game
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2010
  4. By: Kilenthong, Weerachart; Qin, Cheng-Zhong
    Abstract: We apply an intermediation game of Townsend (1983) to analyze trade in an exchange economy through endogenous intermediaries. In this game, each trader has the opportunity to become an intermediary by oering to buy or sell unlimited quantities of the commodities at a certain price vector and for a certain group of customers subject to feasibility constraint. An intermediary will not be active unless some of its customers subsequently choose to trade with it. We introduce an "intermediation core" and show that the subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations of the intermediation game are contained in the intermediation core, similar to the inclusion of competitive equilibrium allocations in the core usually studied. We also identify, in terms of the supporting intermediary structures, intermediation core allocations which are also subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations of the intermediation game. These results provide both a characterization and welfare properties of subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations of the intermediation game.
    Keywords: intermediation; core; subgame-perfect equilibrium
    JEL: D50 C71 C72
    Date: 2010–04–13
  5. By: Guererk, Oezguer; Rockenbach, Bettina; Wolff, Irenaeus
    Abstract: Considerable experimental evidence shows that although costly peer-punishment enhances cooperation in repeated public-good games, heavy punishment in early rounds leads to average period payoffs below the non-cooperative equilibrium benchmark. In an environment where past payoffs determine present contribution capabilities, this could be devastating. Groups could fall prey to a poverty trap or, to avoid this, abstain from punishment altogether. We show that neither is the case generally. By continuously contributing larger fractions of their wealth, groups with punishment possibilities exhibit increasing wealth increments, while increments fall when punishment possibilities are absent. Nonetheless, single groups do succumb to the above-mentioned hazards.
    Keywords: Public good; Dynamic game; Punishment; Endowment endogeneity; Poverty-trap; Experiment
    JEL: H41 C91 C73
    Date: 2010–03–15
  6. By: Kenji Fujiwara; Ngo Van Long
    Abstract: Does a country strictly gain if it acts as a leader in a resource market under bilateral monopoly? Using differential games, we show that the answer is "yes" when leadership can be exercised globally (global Stackelberg leadership), but possibly "no" when it is exercised only at each stage (stagewise Stackelberg leadership). On the other hand, world welfare under Nash equilibrium is strictly higher than under global Stackelberg equilibrium. Regardless of which country is the leader, world welfare under stagewise Stackelberg leadership is higher than under global Stackelberg leadership. <P>Quand un pays est un leader dans un marché d’une ressource non-renouvelable, est-ce que son niveau de bien-être devient plus élevé? On montre que la réponse est affirmative quand il s’agit d’un leadership global, mais elle peut être négative dans le cas d’un leadership par étapes. Par contre, le niveau de bien-être mondial sous l’équilibre de Nash est supérieur à celui qui est le résultat de l’équilibre global de Stackelberg. Du point de vue du bien-être mondial, l’équilibre de Stackelberg par étapes est meilleur que l’équilibre global de Stackelberg.
    Keywords: dynamic game, exhaustible resource, Stackelberg leadership. , jeu dynamique, ressources non-renouvelables, leadership de Stackelberg.
    JEL: C73 Q34 F18
    Date: 2010–04–01
  7. By: Javier Arin (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico-UPV/EHU); Juan Miguel Benito (Departamento de Economía-UPNA)
    Abstract: The paper presents a unified framework where claim and cost sharing problems are jointly analyzed. Both problems have the following common characteristic: given a proposal the agents valuate the suitability of the proposal in two ways, checking how much they loss and how much they gain. Taking this into account, we construct the vector of awards and losses for any proposal and we use different egalitarian criteria to select among these vectors. We use the Lorenz, the Least Square and the lexicographic criteria and we analyze the solutions arising from the application of these criteria in the sets of vectors of awards-losses. In particular, we characterize the members of two families of solutions: the family of Weighted Least Square Solutions and the family of Imputation Selector Weighted Least Square Solutions. The second family includes between its members well-known solutions as Constrained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses solutions.
    Date: 2010
  8. By: Alfred Galichon (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X); Bernard Salanié (Columbia University - Columbia University)
    Abstract: We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on characteristics that the analyst does not observe. The social optimum must therefore trade off matching on incomes and matching on educations. Given a exible specification of the surplus function, we characterize under mild assumptions the properties of the set of feasible matchings and of the socially optimal matching. Then we show how data on the covariation of the types of the partners in observed matches can be used to estimate the parameters that define social preferences over matches. We provide both nonparametric and parametric procedures that are very easy to use in applications.
    Keywords: matching, marriage, assignment.
    Date: 2010–04–14
  9. By: Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R
    Abstract: We examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding between them: majority voting and shouting. In majority voting, the choice with the most votes wins. With shouting, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. For other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values.
    Keywords: majority voting; voting procedures; social efficiency
    JEL: C70 D72
    Date: 2010–04–14
  10. By: Bruno Decreuse (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)
    Abstract: Searching for partners involves informational persistence that reduces future traders' matching probability. In this paper, traders that are no longer available but who left tracks on the market are called phantoms. I examine a discrete-time matching market in which phantom traders are a by-product of search activity, no coordination frictions are assumed, and non-phantom traders may lose time trying to match with phantom traders. The resulting aggregate matching technology features increasing returns to scale in the short run, but has constant returns to scale in the long run. I discuss the labor market evidence and argue that there is observational equivalence between phantom unemployed and on-the-job seekers.
    Keywords: Endogenous matching technology; Intertemporal and intratemporal congestion externalities; Information persistence
    Date: 2010–04–13

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