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on Game Theory |
| By: | Reuben, Ernesto (Northwestern University); Suetens, Sigrid (Tilburg University) |
| Abstract: | We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation. |
| Keywords: | reputation building, strong reciprocity, conditional cooperation, strategic cooperation |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D74 |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4107&r=gth |
| By: | Ballester, Coralio (University of Alicante); Calvó-Armengol, Antoni (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona); Zenou, Yves (Stockholm University) |
| Abstract: | Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. Using the network model developed by Ballester et al. (2006), we characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy, which targets the delinquent who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate delinquency reduction. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal for delinquency reduction, the key player, to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex since it depends on wages and on the structure of the network. |
| Keywords: | social networks, delinquency decision, key group, NP-hard problem, crime policies |
| JEL: | A14 C72 K42 L14 |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4122&r=gth |
| By: | Abigail Barr; Chris Wallace; Jean Ensminger; Joseph Henrich; Clark Barrett; Alexander Bolyanatz; Juan Camilo Cardenas; Michael Gurven; Edwins Gwako; Carolyn Lesorogol; Frank Marlowe; Richard McElreath; David Tracer; John Ziker |
| Abstract: | Data from three bargaining games - the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game - played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergencies between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling. |
| Keywords: | Bargaining games, Cross-cultural experiments, Inequality aversion |
| JEL: | C72 C9 Z13 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:422&r=gth |
| By: | Roland Pongou (Brown University); Roberto Serrano (Brown University and IMDEA Social Sciences) |
| Abstract: | We study the dynamic stability of fidelity networks, which are networks that form in a mating economy of agents of two types (say men and women), where each agent desires direct links with opposite type agents, while engaging in multiple partnerships is considered an act of infidelity. Infidelity is punished more severely for women than for men. We consider two stochastic processes in which agents form and sever links over time based on the reward from doing so, but may also take non-beneficial actions with small probability. In the first process, an agent who invests more time in a relationship makes it stronger and harder to break by his/her partner; in the second, such an agent is perceived as weak. Under the first process, only egalitarian pairwise stable networks (in which all agents have the same number of partners) are visited in the long run, while under the second, only anti-egalitarian pairwise stable networks (in which all women are matched to a small number of men) are. Next, we apply these results to find that under the first process, HIV/AIDS is equally prevalent among men and women, while under the second, women bear a greater burden. The key message is that anti-female discrimination does not necessarily lead to higher HIV/AIDS prevalence among women in the short run, but it does in the long run. |
| Keywords: | fidelity networks; anti-female discrimination; stochastic stability; HIV/AIDS; union formation models |
| JEL: | A14 C7 I12 J00 |
| Date: | 2009–04–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2009-03&r=gth |
| By: | Matthias Sutter; Peter Lindner; Daniela Platsch |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the influence of third-party observation and third-party reward on behavior in an experimental prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. Whereas the existing literature on third-party intervention as a means to sustain social norms has dealt almost exclusively with third-party punishment, we show that both third-party observation and third-party reward have positive effects on cooperation rates, compared to a treatment where no third party is involved. Third-party reward is more effective in increasing cooperation than third-party observation. However, rewards are given too late to prevent a steady downward trend of cooperation rates. |
| Keywords: | Social norms, third-party reward, third-party observation, prisoner’s dilemma experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2009-08&r=gth |
| By: | Weese, Eric |
| Abstract: | Political coalition formation games can describe the formation and dissolution of nations, as well as the creation of coalition governments, the establishment of political parties, and other similar phenomena. These games have been studied from a theoretical perspective, but the models have not been used extensively in empirical work. This paper presents a method of estimating political coalition formation models with many-player coalitions, and then applies this method to the recent heisei municipal amalgamations in Japan to estimate structural coeffients that describe the behaviour of municipalities. The method enables counterfactual analysis, which in the Japanese case shows that the national government could increase welfare via a counter-intuitive policy involving transfers to richer municipalities conditional on their participation in a merger. |
| Keywords: | Coalition Formation, Municipal Mergers, Japan |
| JEL: | C71 H77 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:ccesdp:5&r=gth |
| By: | Eriksen, Kristoffer (University of Stavanger); Kvaløy, Ola (University of Stavanger); Olsen, Trond (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | , |
| Keywords: | Tournaments |
| JEL: | A10 |
| Date: | 2008–09–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:stavef:2009_005&r=gth |