nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2008‒05‒05
five papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
University of Maastricht

  1. A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core By Jesus Getan; Jesus Montes
  2. Stable Allocations of Risk By Péter Csóka; P. Jean-Jacques Herings; László Á. Kóczy
  3. Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency By Kazuhiko Hashimoto; Hiroki Saitoh
  4. Nash’s Bargaining Formula Revisited: A Note on Self-Referential Logic By James Gander
  5. Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position? By Soubeyran, R.

  1. By: Jesus Getan; Jesus Montes (Universitat de Barcelona)
    Abstract: Cooperative TU-games with large core were introduced by Sharkey (1982) and the concept of Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme was defined by Sprumont (1990). Linking these two concepts, Moulin (1990) introduces the notion of large monotonic core giving a characterization for three-player games. In this paper we prove that all games with large monotonic core are convex. We give an effective criterion to determine whether a game has large monotonic core and, as a consequence, we obtain a characterization for the four-player case.
    Keywords: aspiration, pmas, cooperative games, monotonic core
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2008
  2. By: Péter Csóka (Department of Economics, Maastricht University); P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Department of Economics, Maastricht University); László Á. Kóczy (Budapest Tech)
    Abstract: The measurement and the allocation of risk are fundamental problems of portfolio management. Coherent measures of risk provide an axiomatic approach to the former problem. In an environment given by a coherent measure of risk and the various portfolios' realization vectors, risk allocation games aim at solving the second problem: How to distribute the diversification benefts of the various portfolios? Un- derstanding these cooperative games helps us to find stable, efficient,and fair allocations of risk. We show that the class of risk allocation and totally balanced games coincide, hence a stable allocation of risk is always possible. When the aggregate portfolio is riskless, the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of exact games. As in exact games any subcoalition may be subject to marginalization even in core allocations, our result further emphasizes the responsibility involved in allocating risk.
    Keywords: Coherent Measures of Risk, Risk Allocation Games, Totally Balanced Games, Exact Games
    JEL: C71 G10
    Date: 2007–06
  3. By: Kazuhiko Hashimoto (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University); Hiroki Saitoh (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)
    Abstract: In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare and budget-balance.
    Keywords: Queueing Problems, Strategy-Proofness, Anonymity in welfare, Efficiency
    JEL: D63 D71
    Date: 2008–04
  4. By: James Gander
    Abstract: The note focuses on the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) in Nash’s product formula solution to bargaining and why the formula works. Two simple examples from duopoly and bilateral monopoly are used to demonstrate that the MRS’s for both players are implicitly in the contract curve and the product formula. They are equal in the former by design. They become equal in the latter in equilibrium. The self-referential logic is evident. The bargaining model or system is self-contained and circular and is analogous to the proposition given by x = F(x).
    Keywords: Bargaining, Pareto Optimum, Self-Referential Logic
    JEL: C71 C78 C65
    Date: 2008–10
  5. By: Soubeyran, R.
    Abstract: Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? Recent works answer by the affirmative (Groseclose 1999, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000, Aragones and Palfrey 2002, 2003). We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods). ...French Abstract : Cet article traite de l'entrée dans une industrie dans laquelle les firmes partagent une réputation collective. Premièrement, nous montrons que l'entrée libre n'est pas socialement optimale, il existe un besoin de régulation à travers l'imposition d'un standard minimum de qualité (par exemple). Deuxièmement, nous montrons qu'un standard minimum de qualité peut inciter des firmes à entrer sur le marché. Contrairement à la pensée commune, un standard minimum de qualité ne doit pas être toujours considéré comme une barrière à l'entrée.
    JEL: C72 D72
    Date: 2008

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