nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2008‒04‒21
fourteen papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
University of Maastricht

  1. The Strategic Value of Recall By Ron Peretz
  2. Convex Interval Games By Alparslan-Gok, S.Z.; Branzei, R.; Tijs, S.H.
  3. The Open-Loop Linear Quadratic Differential Game for Index One Descriptor Systems By Engwerda, J.C.; Salmah, Y.
  4. ON BERGE EQUILIBRIUM By Tarik Tazdaït; Moussa Larbani; Rabia Nessah
  5. Towards a Characterization of Rational Expectations By Itai Arieli
  6. Characterization of Revenue Equivalence By Heydenreich Birgit; Müller Rudolf; Uetz Marc; Vohra Rakesh
  7. Information Revelation in an Online Auction with Common Values By Sascha Füllbrunn
  8. Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing By Alejandro Saporiti
  9. Strong Berge and Pareto Equilibrium Existence for a Noncooperative Game By Tarik Tazdaït; Moussa Larbani; Rabia Nessah
  10. “Ingroup Love" and “Outgroup Hate" as Motives for Individual Participation in Intergroup Conflict: A New Game Paradigm By Nir Halevy; Gary Bornstein; Lilach Sagiv
  11. "Bayesian Estimation of Entry Games with Application to Japanese Airline Data" By Sugawara, Shinya; Yasuhiro Omori
  12. Strategic Partitioning of Emissions Allowances. Under the EU Emission Trading Scheme By Christoph Böhringer and Knut Einar Rosendahl
  13. "Voluntarily Separable Prisoner's Dilemma with Reference Letters" By Takako Fujiwara-Greve; Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara; Nobue Suzuki
  14. Zum Erklärungsgehalt der verhaltensorientierten Spieltheorie By Markus Pasche

  1. By: Ron Peretz
    Abstract: This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results [Lehrer, Neyman and Okada] on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.
    Date: 2007–11
  2. By: Alparslan-Gok, S.Z.; Branzei, R.; Tijs, S.H. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this paper, convex interval games are introduced and some characterizations are given. Some economic situations leading to convex interval games are discussed. The Weber set and the Shapley value are defined for a suitable class of interval games and their relations with the interval core for convex interval games are established. A square operator is introduced which allows us to obtain interval solutions starting from classical cooperative game theory solutions. It turns out that on the class of convex interval games the square Weber set coincides with the interval core.
    Keywords: cooperative games;interval data;convex games;the core;the Weber set;the Shapley value
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2008
  3. By: Engwerda, J.C.; Salmah, Y. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
    Keywords: Linear quadratic differential games; open-loop information structure; descriptor systems.
    JEL: C61 C72 C73
    Date: 2008
  4. By: Tarik Tazdaït; Moussa Larbani; Rabia Nessah (LEM - Lille Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR8179)
    Abstract: Based on the notion of equilibrium of a coalition P relatively to a coalition K, of Berge, Zhukovskii has introduced Berge equilibrium as an alternative solution to Nash equilibrium for non cooperative games in normal form. The essential advantage of this equilibrium is that it does not require negotiation of any player with the remaining players, which is not the case when a game has more than one Nash<br />equilibrium. The problem of existence of Berge equilibrium is more difficult (compared to that of Nash). This paper is a contribution to the problem of existence and computation of Berge equilibrium of a non cooperative game. Indeed, using the g-maximum equality, we establish the existence of a Berge equilibrium of a non-cooperative game in normal form. In addition, we give sufficient conditions for the<br />existence of a Berge equilibrium which is also a Nash equilibrium. This allows us to get equilibria enjoying the properties of both concepts of solution. Finally, using these results, we provide two methods for the computation of Berge equilibria: the first one computes Berge equilibria; the second one computes Berge equilibria which are also Nash equilibria.
    Keywords: Berge equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, individually rational, g-maximum equality
    Date: 2007–10–20
  5. By: Itai Arieli
    Abstract: R. J. Aumann and J. H. Drèze (2008) define a rational expectation of a player i in a game G as the expected payo of some type of i in some belief system for G in which common knowledge of rationality and common priors obtain. Our goal is to characterize the set of rational expectations in terms of the game's payoff matrix. We provide such a characterization for a specific class of strategic games, called semi-elementary, which includes Myerson's "elementary" games.
    Date: 2008–01
  6. By: Heydenreich Birgit; Müller Rudolf; Uetz Marc; Vohra Rakesh (METEOR)
    Abstract: The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent.
    Keywords: computer science applications;
    Date: 2008
  7. By: Sascha Füllbrunn (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
    Abstract: The Hard Close auction has become a familiar auction format in online markets and in a private value framework this dynamic second-price auction format has experimentally been tested in recent studies. Considering a common value framework, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) demonstrate that in the Hard Close auction format bidders, using a sniping strategy, do not provide information during the auction. We provide contrary results from a laboratory experiment. Bidders provide information during the bidding process, resulting in different bid functions that depend on the bidders private information rank.
    Keywords: auctions, electronic markets, experiments
    JEL: C73 C9 D44
    Date: 2008–04
  8. By: Alejandro Saporiti (School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Arthur Lewis Building, M13 9PL Manchester, United Kingdom)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n - 1 fixed ballots located at the end points of the set of alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. And it offers a strategic foundation for the so called "single-crossing version" of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences.
    Keywords: Strategy-proofness; single-crossing; median voter; positional dictators
    JEL: C72 D71 D78
    Date: 2008–03
  9. By: Tarik Tazdaït; Moussa Larbani; Rabia Nessah (LEM - Lille Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR8179)
    Abstract: In this paper, we study the main properties of the strong Berge equilibrium which is also a Pareto efficient (SBPE) and the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). We prove that any SBPE is also a SNE, we prove also existence theorem of SBPE based on the Ky<br />Fan inequality. Finally, we also provide a method for computing SPBE.
    Keywords: Strong Berge equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, strong Nash equilibrium, Ky Fan inequality
    Date: 2007–12–05
  10. By: Nir Halevy; Gary Bornstein; Lilach Sagiv
    Abstract: What motivates individual self-sacrificial behavior in intergroup conflicts? Is it the altruistic desire to help the ingroup or the aggressive drive to hurt the outgroup? This paper introduces a new game paradigm, the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) game, designed specifically to distinguish between these two motives. The game involves two groups. Each group member is given a monetary endowment and can decide how much of it to contribute. Contribution can be made to either of two pools, one which benefits the ingroup at a personal cost, and another which, in addition, harms the outgroup. An experiment demonstrated that contributions in the IPD-MD game are made almost exclusively to the cooperative within-group pool. Moreover, pre-play intragroup communication increases intragroup cooperation but not intergroup competition. These results are compared with those observed in the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game, where group members' contributions are restricted to the competitive between-group pool.
    Date: 2007–12
  11. By: Sugawara, Shinya (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo); Yasuhiro Omori (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)
    Abstract: This paper proposes a Bayesian estimation of the payoff functions in entry games using Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation. In order to deal with the multiple Nash equilibria, we describe the econometric model with a latent variable that represents the player's choice of an equilibrium among the multiple equilibria. The statistical incoherency problem considered in previous studies is also discussed for our entry game model, and we provide an alternative justification for the previous estimation procedures. Our proposed methodology is applied to Japanese airline data, and model selection based on the marginal likelihood is conducted to investigate the nature of the strategic interaction between two major Japanese airline companies. Finally, we predict the entry probabilities of two airline companies for the Shizuoka airport that is currently under construction.
    Date: 2008–04
  12. By: Christoph Böhringer and Knut Einar Rosendahl (Statistics Norway)
    Abstract: The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emission trading regimes across multiple jurisdictions. Since the EU ETS covers only some industries, it implies a hybrid emission control scheme where EU member states must apply complementary domestic emissions regulation for the non-trading sectors of their economies in order to comply with their national emission reduction targets. The EU ETS thus opens up for strategic partitioning of national emissions budgets by the member states between trading and non-trading sectors. In this paper we examine the potential effects of such strategic behavior on compliance cost and emissions prices. We show that concerns on efficiency losses from strategic partitioning are misplaced if all the member states behave in a Nash-Cournot manner. However, if a single country takes the official partitioning of the other countries as a reference point, there is substantial scope for exploiting market power.
    Keywords: Emissions Trading; Allocation of Quotas; Strategic Behavior
    JEL: C61 C72 Q25
    Date: 2008–04
  13. By: Takako Fujiwara-Greve (Department of Economics, Keio University); Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo); Nobue Suzuki (Department of Economics, Komazawa University)
    Abstract: We consider voluntarily separable repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in which a pair of players meet randomly and repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma only by mutual agreement. Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2007) consider the case that once a partnership is dissolved there is no information flow to other partnerships. We consider the case that players can issue a reference letter to the partner if they entered cooperation periods, but the content of a letter is not verifiable. We show that the sheer existence of a letter shortens the trust-building periods of new matches and thus improves efficiency in equilibrium.
    Date: 2008–03
  14. By: Markus Pasche (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät)
    Abstract: Zusammenfassung: Es gibt eine wachsende Literatur zur "verhaltensorientierten" bzw. "psychologischen" Spieltheorie. Die meisten dieser Ansätze beziehen verschiedene Vorstellungen von Fairness, Ungleichheitsaversion oder andere intrinsische Motive in die Nutzenfunktion ein, um empirisch beobachtbare Verhaltensmuster erklären zu können. Das Papier diskutiert kritisch den Erklärungsgehalt solcher Theorien. Es werden methodologische Argumente aufgeführt, die Zweifel begründen, ob solche präferenzbasierten Theorien geeignet sind um ökonomisches Verhalten zu verstehen. Als Alternative werden Modelle regel-basierten Verhaltens diskutiert.
    Keywords: Rationalität, verhaltensorientierte Ökonomik, intrinsische Motive, Nutzentheorie, Regelbindung.
    JEL: B41 B52 C70
    Date: 2008–04–08

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