nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2007‒12‒19
six papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
University of Maastricht

  1. Repeated Games with Frequent Signals By Fudenberg Drew; David K Levine
  2. Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally Robust By Jose Apesteguia; Steffen Huck; Jörg Oechssler; Simon Weidenholzer
  3. A Connection Between Correlation in Game Theory and Quantum Mechanics By Adam Brandenburger
  4. The Strategic Value of Recall By Ron Peretz
  5. Uniform vs. Discriminatory Auctions with Variable Supply - Experimental Evidence By Damian S. Damianov; Jörg Oechssler; Johannes Gerd Becker
  6. How Are Preferences Revealed? By John Beshears; James Choi; David Laibson; Brigitte Madrian

  1. By: Fudenberg Drew; David K Levine
    Date: 2007–12–13
  2. By: Jose Apesteguia (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Steffen Huck (University College London, Department of Economics); Jörg Oechssler (University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics); Simon Weidenholzer (University of Vienna, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: A well-known result by Vega-Redondo implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior.
    Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imita- tion; Cournot markets; Information; Experiments; Simulations
    JEL: C72 C91 C92 D43 L13
    Date: 2007–11
  3. By: Adam Brandenburger
    Date: 2007–12–12
  4. By: Ron Peretz
    Date: 2007–12–12
  5. By: Damian S. Damianov (University of Texas-Pan American); Jörg Oechssler (University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics); Johannes Gerd Becker (ETH Zürich, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller. Somewhat surprisingly but again predicted by theory, it also yields a higher number of transactions, which makes it the more efficient auction format.
    Keywords: auctions, experiment, discriminatory, uniform
    JEL: D44 C92
    Date: 2007–11
  6. By: John Beshears; James Choi; David Laibson; Brigitte Madrian
    Date: 2007–12–12

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