nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2007‒09‒24
thirteen papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
University of Maastricht
  1. Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value By Roberto Serrano
  2. Belief Free Incomplete Information Games By Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris
  3. Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof By A. van den Nouweland
  4. Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation By Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten
  5. Implementation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics By Roberto Serrano; Antonio Cabrales
  6. Trust and Reciprocity: Implications of Game Triads and Social Contexts By James C. Cox
  7. Are cooperators effciency- or fair-minded? Evidence from a public goods experiment By M. Vittoria Levati; Matteo Ploner; Stefan Traub
  8. The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation By Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris
  9. Trust in cooperation or ability? An experimental study on gender differences By Christiane Schwieren; Matthias Sutter
  10. Exogenous Targeting Instruments under Differing Information Conditions By John Spraggon
  11. Risky Punishment and Reward in the Prisoner’s Dilemma By Peter Duersch; Maros Servátka
  12. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World By Allan M Feldman; Roberto Serrano
  13. Lavish Returns on Cheap Talk: Non-binding Communication in a Trust Experiment By Avner Ben-Ner; Louis Putterman; Ting Ren
  1. By: Roberto Serrano
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-11&r=gth
  2. By: Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Stephen Morris (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University)
    Abstract: We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.
    Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, Rationalizability, Ex post equilibrium, Belief free types, Payo types, Belief types, Supermodular games, Potential games
    JEL: C79 D82
    Date: 2007–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1629&r=gth
  3. By: A. van den Nouweland
    Abstract: I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player’s actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1003&r=gth
  4. By: Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten
    Abstract: We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects’ performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer’s type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects.
    Keywords: individual preferences, inequity aversion, experimental economics, public goods
    JEL: C91 C92 H41
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:6088&r=gth
  5. By: Roberto Serrano; Antonio Cabrales
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-10&r=gth
  6. By: James C. Cox
    Abstract: null
    Date: 2007–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2007-08&r=gth
  7. By: M. Vittoria Levati (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany); Matteo Ploner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany, and University of Trento, Italy); Stefan Traub (Department of Business and Economics, University of Bremen, Germany)
    Abstract: We use a two-person public goods experiment to distinguish between efficiency and fairness as possible motivations for cooperative behavior. Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the high-productivity player to increase group payoffs when contributing positive amounts. Asymmetric contributions, however, yield unequal individual payoffs. To assess a priori cooperative preferences, we measure individual 'value-orientations' by means of the decomposed game technique. Overall, our results indicate that fairness (or inequality aversion) is more influential than efficiency in driving behavior.
    Keywords: Public goods experiments, Conditional cooperation, Fairness, Efficiency, Value orientations
    JEL: A13 C92 D63 H41
    Date: 2007–09–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-067&r=gth
  8. By: Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Stephen Morris (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University)
    Abstract: We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents' reporting strategies are strategic complements with negative informational externalities and strategic substitutes with positive informational externalities. We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation in common prior type spaces and contrast this with our earlier results without the common prior. In the case of strategic complements the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation do not depend on the existence of a common prior. In contrast, with strategic substitutes, the implementation conditions are much weaker under the common prior assumption.
    Keywords: Common prior, Correlated equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Mechanism design, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Strategic complements, Strategic substitutes, Uniqueness
    JEL: C79 D82
    Date: 2007–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1628&r=gth
  9. By: Christiane Schwieren; Matthias Sutter
    Abstract: We examine gender differences in trust in another party’s cooperation (CC) or its ability (AC). While men and women do not differ concerning trust in cooperation, gender has a strong influence when trust in another subject’s ability is required.
    Keywords: Trust, Gender, Experiment, Cooperation, Ability, Stereotypes
    JEL: C72 C91
    Date: 2007–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2007-20&r=gth
  10. By: John Spraggon (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
    Abstract: This paper tests the ability of an exogenous targeting instrument to induce compliance when the principal cannot observe the actions of individual agents. A number of papers show that although these instruments are able to induce groups to the target outcome, they are not able to induce individuals to make socially optimal decisions in a number of different controlled laboratory experiments. This study investigates whether the information individuals have about others’ payoffs affects how they make their decisions in this environment. Ledyard (1995) suggests that when subjects have less information in public goods experiments they are more likely to choose the Nash equilibrium decision. However, as he points out, this effect differs between groups with homogeneous and heterogeneous payoff functions. The results show that reducing information reduces efficiency although there are no significant effects on the absolute level of group decisions at the aggregate level. At the individual level, reducing the information players have complicates the environment resulting in subjects choosing either lower decision numbers or more randomly. Moreover, these effects seem to be more serious for subjects whose Nash decisions are on the boundary of the decision space.
    Keywords: Moral Hazard in Groups, Exogenous Targeting Instruments, Experiments, Information
    JEL: C72 C92 D70
    Date: 2007–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dre:wpaper:2007-10&r=gth
  11. By: Peter Duersch (University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics); Maros Servátka (University of Canterbury, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: We conduct a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with a punishment/reward stage, where punishments and rewards are risky. This is compared with a risk free treatment. We find that subjects do not change their behavior in the face of risky outcomes. Additionally, we measure risk attitude and the emotions of subjects. While we find a strong influence of emotions, individual risk aversion has no effect on the decision to punish or reward. This is good news for lab experiments who abstract from risky outcomes. From the perspective of social preferences, our results provide evidence for risk neutral inclusion of other player’s payoffs in the decisionmaker’s utility function.
    Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma, risk, punishment, reward, emotions, experiment
    Date: 2007–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0451&r=gth
  12. By: Allan M Feldman; Roberto Serrano
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-12&r=gth
  13. By: Avner Ben-Ner; Louis Putterman; Ting Ren
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-15&r=gth
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