nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2007‒07‒27
eight papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
University of Maastricht

  1. Best response adaptation under dominance solvability By Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
  2. The Evolution of Coorporation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence By Pedro Dal Bo; Guillaume R. Frechette
  3. On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes By Roy, Sunanda; Sabarwal, Tarun
  4. Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine By Georgy Artemov; Takashi Kunimoto; Roberto Serrano
  5. Unique bid auctions: Equilibrium solutions and experimental evidence By Rapoport, Amnon; Otsubo, Hironori; Kim, Bora; Stein, William E.
  6. A Note on Optimal Auctions By Vasiliki Skreta; Nicolas Figueroa
  7. Optimal Auctions with General Distributions By Vasiliki Skreta
  8. Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation By Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten

  1. By: Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
    Abstract: Two new properties of a finite strategic game, strong and weak BR-dominance solvability, are introduced. The first property holds, e.g., if the game is strongly dominance solvable or if it is weakly dominance solvable and all best responses are unique. It ensures that every simultaneous best response adjustment path, as well as every non-discriminatory individual best response improvement path, reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The second property holds, e.g., if the game is weakly dominance solvable; it ensures that every strategy profile can be connected to a Nash equilibrium with a simultaneous best response path and with an individual best response path (if there are more than two players, unmotivated switches from one best response to another may be needed). In a two person game, weak BR-dominance solvability is necessary for the acyclicity of simultaneous best response adjustment paths, as well as for the acyclicity of best response improvement paths provided the set of Nash equilibria is rectangular.
    Keywords: Dominance solvability; Best response dynamics; Potential game
    JEL: C72 C73
    Date: 2007–07–13
  2. By: Pedro Dal Bo; Guillaume R. Frechette
  3. By: Roy, Sunanda; Sabarwal, Tarun
    Abstract: This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be strategic complements. The main result here is that the equilibrium set in such models is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there is a unique equilibrium. Indeed, for a given parameter value, a pair of distinct equilibria are never comparable. Therefore, with multiple equilibria, some of the established techniques for exhibiting increasing equilibria or computing equilibria that use the largest or smallest equilibrium, or that use the lattice structure of the equilibrium set do not apply to such models. Moreover, there are no ranked equilibria in such models. Additionally, the analysis here implies a new proof and a slight generalization of some existing results. It is shown that when a parameter increases, no new equilibrium is smaller than any old equilibrium. (In particular, in n-player games of strategic substitutes with real-valued action spaces, symmetric equilibria increase with the parameter.)
    Keywords: Monotone comparative statics; Non-increasing functions; Never increasing correspondences; Strategic substitutes; Equilibrium set
    JEL: C61 C72 C62 C60
    Date: 2006–12
  4. By: Georgy Artemov; Takashi Kunimoto; Roberto Serrano
    Date: 2007
  5. By: Rapoport, Amnon; Otsubo, Hironori; Kim, Bora; Stein, William E.
    Abstract: Two types of auction were introduced on the Internet a few years ago and have rapidly been gaining widespread popularity. In both auctions, players compete for an exogenously determined prize by independently choosing an integer in some finite and common strategy space specified by the auctioneer. In the unique lowest (highest) bid auction, the winner of the prize is the player who submits the lowest (highest) bid, provided that it is unique. We construct the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium solutions to the two auctions, and then test them in a sequence of experiments that vary the number of bidders and size of the strategy space. Our results show that the aggregate bids, but only a minority of the individual bidders, are accounted for quite accurately by the equilibrium solutions.
    Keywords: unique bid auctions; equilibrium analysis; experiment
    JEL: C92 C72
    Date: 2007–07–16
  6. By: Vasiliki Skreta; Nicolas Figueroa
    Date: 2007–07–22
  7. By: Vasiliki Skreta
    Date: 2007–07–22
  8. By: Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten
    Abstract: We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects’ performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer’s type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects.
    Keywords: individual preferences, inequity aversion, experimental economics, public goods
    JEL: C91 C92 H41
    Date: 2007

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