nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2007‒07‒13
seven papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
University of Maastricht

  1. Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces By Jean-Francois Mertens; Abraham Neyman; Dinah Rosenberg
  2. Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players By Alexander Matros; Wooyoung Lim
  3. Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples By Klaus Bettina; Klijn Flip; Nakamura Toshifumi
  4. Voting on a sharing norm in a dictator game By Christoph Vanberg
  5. Smith and Rawls Share a Room By Klaus Bettina; Klijn Flip
  6. Convergence in Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning By Thomas VALLEE (LEN - IAE Nantes); Murat YILDIZOGLU (GREThA)
  7. Learning Spillover and Analogy-based Expectations: a Multi-Game Experiment By Philippe Jehiel; Steffen Huck; Tom Rutter

  1. By: Jean-Francois Mertens; Abraham Neyman; Dinah Rosenberg
    Date: 2007
  2. By: Alexander Matros; Wooyoung Lim
    Abstract: We study Tullock`s $n$-player contests where each player has an independent probability $0 < p \le 1$ to participate. A unique symmetric equilibrium is found and its properties are analyzed. In particular, we show that \emph{the individual equilibrium spending} is single-peaked in the probability $p$ for a given number of players and satisfies a single-crossing property; but \emph{the total equilibrium spending} is monotonically increasing in the probability $p$ and in the number of players. We also show that over-dissipation is a natural feature of the equilibrium in our model. Our model has another interpretation: $n$-player private-value contests where each player has two possible values $0$ and $V$. Each player can have value $V$ with probability $0 < p \le 1$.\\
    JEL: C72 D72 D82
    Date: 2007–07
  3. By: Klaus Bettina; Klijn Flip; Nakamura Toshifumi (METEOR)
    Abstract: We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
    Keywords: microeconomics ;
    Date: 2007
  4. By: Christoph Vanberg (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany.)
    Abstract: I conduct an experiment to assess whether majority voting on a non- binding sharing norm affects subsequent behavior in a dictator game. In a baseline treatment, subjects play a one shot dictator game. In a voting treatment, subjects are ï¬rst placed behind a 'veil of ignorance' and vote on the amount that those chosen to be dictators 'should' give. The outcome of the vote is referred to as a 'non-binding agreement.' The results show that a norm established in this fashion does not induce more 'fairness' on the part of those subsequently chosen to be dictators. In fact, dictators were signiï¬cantly more likely to offer nothing under the treatment. I outline a simple model to account for this 'crowding out' effect of a norm that may demand ‘too much’ of some subjects.
    Keywords: Dictator game, communication, voting, promises, agreements, behavioral economics, guilt aversion, reciprocity, fairness, obligations
    JEL: C91 C92 D63 D64 D70
    Date: 2007–07–06
  5. By: Klaus Bettina; Klijn Flip (METEOR)
    Abstract: We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the “lonely wolf” theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. Second, and related to the title of this paper, we show how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems.
    Keywords: microeconomics ;
    Date: 2007
  6. By: Thomas VALLEE (LEN - IAE Nantes); Murat YILDIZOGLU (GREThA)
    Abstract: Convergence to Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly is a problem that recurrently arises as a subject of study in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics and the evolutionary stability of the equilibria of the Cournot game has been studied by several articles. Several articles show that the Walrasian equilibrium is the stable evolutionary solution of the Cournot game. Vriend (2000) proposes to use genetic algorithm for studying learning dynamics in this game and obtains convergence to Cournot equilibrium with individual learning. We show in this article how social learning gives rise to Walras equilibrium and why, in a general setup, individual learning can effectively yield convergence to Cournot instead of Walras equilibrium. We illustrate these general results by computational experiments.
    Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; Learning; Evolution; Selection; Evolutionary stability; Nash equilibrium; Genetic algorithms
    JEL: L13 L20 D43 C63 C73
    Date: 2007
  7. By: Philippe Jehiel; Steffen Huck; Tom Rutter
    Date: 2007

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