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on Game Theory |
| By: | Friederike Mengel (Universidad de Alicante) |
| Abstract: | In this paper (reinforcement) learning of decision makers that face many different games is studied. As learning separately for all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents are assumed to partition the set of all games into analogy classes. Partitions of higher cardinality are more costly. A process of simultaneous learning of actions and partitions is presented and equilibrium partitions and action choices characterized. The model is able to explain deviations from subgame perfection that are sometimes observed in experiments even for vanishingly small reasoning costs. Furthermore it is shown that learning across games can stabilize mixed equilibria in 2×2 Coordination and Anti-Coordination games and destabilize strict Nash equilibria under certain conditions. |
| Keywords: | Game Theory, Bounded Rationality, Reinforcement Learning, Analogies. |
| JEL: | C70 C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-05&r=gth |
| By: | Rene Saran; Roberto Serrano |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-01&r=gth |
| By: | Bettina Klaus; Flip Klijn; Markus Walzl |
| Abstract: | We extend Jackson and Watts's (2002) result on the coincidence of S-stochastically stable and core stable networks from marriage problems to roommate problems. In particular, we show that the existence of a side-optimal core stable network, on which the proof of Jackson and Watts (2002) hinges, is not crucial for their result. |
| Keywords: | core, networks, roommate problems, stochastic stability |
| JEL: | C62 C78 |
| Date: | 2007–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:694.07&r=gth |
| By: | LE BRETON, Michel; ORTUNO-ORTIN, Ignacio; WEBER, Shlomo |
| JEL: | C71 D71 Z1 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:6451&r=gth |
| By: | Michihiro Kandori (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | The present paper introduces the notion of weakly belief-free equilibria for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This is a tractable class which subsumes, as a special case, the belief-free equilibria, which have played a major role in the existing literature (Ely and Valimaki (2002) and Ely, Horner, and Olszewski (2005)). An example is presented, where a simple weakly belief-free equilibrium outperforms the belief-free equilibria. The present paper also introduces the notion of reduced games of a repeated game and shows that weakly belief-free equilibria admit a recursive structure in the space of reduced games. The example embeds the chicken game, as the reduced games, in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf491&r=gth |
| By: | Vincent P Crawford; Nagore Iriberri |
| Date: | 2007–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000001005&r=gth |
| By: | Bergemann Dirk; Morris Stephen |
| Date: | 2007–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000001000&r=gth |
| By: | ROCHET, Jean-Charles; TIROLE, Jean |
| Date: | 2006–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:1992&r=gth |
| By: | Grether, David M.; Plott, Charles R. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1253&r=gth |
| By: | Manfred Königstein (University of Erfurt and IZA); Gabriele K. Ruchala (ELSE, University College London) |
| Abstract: | Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may, first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose work effort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for both tasks as offered by the principal. The rational solution of the game implies that contract design may not induce agents to select GT and provide positive effort in GT. Furthermore it predicts equal behavior of agents with different productivities. In contrast, considerations of trust, reciprocity and cooperation - the social-emotional model of behavior - suggest that contract design can influence the agents’ willingness to join groups and provide effort. We analyze the data by applying a two-step regression model (multinomial logit and tobit) and find that counter to the rational solution, contract design does influence both, task selection and effort choice. The principal can increase participation in work groups and can positively influence group performance. Larger payment increases the share of socially motivated agents in work groups. The selection effect is larger than the motivation effect. |
| Keywords: | principal-agent, experiment, work group, selection, motivation |
| JEL: | M5 J3 C7 C9 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2697&r=gth |