nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2006‒12‒04
three papers chosen by
Laszlo A. Koczy
Universiteit Maastricht
  1. Estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed-bid auctions: the case of timber auction data By Lu, Jingfeng; Perrigne, Isabelle
  2. TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GAME-THEORETIC CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONS By David Dequech
  3. The social norm of leaving the toilet seat down: A game theoretic analysis By Siddiqi, Hammad
  1. By: Lu, Jingfeng; Perrigne, Isabelle
    Abstract: Estimating bidders’ risk aversion in auctions is a challeging problem because of identification issues. This paper takes advantage of bidding data from two auction designs to identify nonparametrically the bidders’ utility function within a private value framework. In particular, ascending auction data allow us to recover the latent distribution of private values, while first-price sealed-bid auction data allow us to recover the bidders’ utility function. This leads to a nonparametric estimator. An application to the US Forest Service timber auctions is proposed. Estimated utility functions display concavity, which can be partly captured by constant relative risk aversion.
    Keywords: Risk Aversion; Nonparametric Identi.cation; Nonparametric and Semipara-metric Estimation; Timber Auctions.
    JEL: D44 C14
    Date: 2006–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:948&r=gth
  2. By: David Dequech
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2006:77&r=gth
  3. By: Siddiqi, Hammad
    Abstract: We model the toilet seat problem as a 2 player non-cooperative game. We find that the social norm of leaving the toilet seat down is inefficient. However, to the dismay of “mankind”, we also find that the social norm of leaving the seat down after use is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Hence, sadly, this norm is not likely to go away.
    Keywords: Trembling-hand perfection; social norm
    JEL: C7
    Date: 2006–11–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:856&r=gth
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