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on Game Theory |
| By: | Kumabe, Masahiro; Mihara, H. Reiju |
| Abstract: | Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness. Further classify them into sixty-four classes in terms of finiteness (existence of a finite carrier) and computability. For each such class, we either show that it is empty or give an example of a game belonging to it. We observe that if a type contains an infinite game, then it contains both computable infinitegames and noncomputable ones. This strongly suggests that computability is logically, as well as conceptually, unrelated to the conventional axioms. |
| Keywords: | Voting games; infinitely many players; axiomatic method; complete independence; algorithms; Turing computability; recursion theory |
| JEL: | D90 C69 D71 C71 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:440&r=gth |
| By: | Fugarolas, Guadalupe |
| Abstract: | We consider a two period pure exchange economy with a finite number of states of nature at the second date. The economy consists of a real asset structure and a finite set of durable goods in the initial period that depreciate; we suppose that there is only one single good available in each state of nature at the second date. In this paper, we demonstrate that the spot-financial equilibrium can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium of a market game in which the strategies of the players consist in suggesting prices and quantities for both goods and assets. |
| Keywords: | Incomplete markets; market games; Nash equilibrium; strategic outcome functions |
| JEL: | D52 C72 |
| Date: | 2006–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:470&r=gth |
| By: | Puppe, Clemens; Tasnádi, Attila |
| Abstract: | We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a "cyclic permutation domain" which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. The cyclic permutation domains are exactly the maximal domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof (when combined with every tie breaking rule). It turns out that the Borda count is monotonic on a larger class of domains. We show that the maximal domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity are the "cyclically nested permutation domains." These are the preference domains which can be obtained from the cyclic permutation domains in an appropriate recursive way. |
| Keywords: | Maskin monotonicity; Borda count; restricted preference domains |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2006–11–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:775&r=gth |
| By: | Jack Ochs; John Duffy |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:234&r=gth |
| By: | Jack Ochs; In-Uck Park |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:233&r=gth |
| By: | Gomez-Rua, Maria; Vidal-Puga, Juan |
| Abstract: | In the context of cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, we introduce a property called No Advantageous Merging. This property implies that no group of agents can be better off claiming to be a single node. We show that the sharing rule that assigns to each agent his own connection cost (the Bird rule) satisfies this property. Moreover, we provide a characterization of the Bird rule using No Advantageous Merging. |
| Keywords: | Minimum cost spanning tree problems; cost sharing; Bird rule; No Advantageous Merging |
| JEL: | D61 C71 D7 |
| Date: | 2006–10–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:601&r=gth |
| By: | Carmen Herrero (Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante); Ricardo Martinez (Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante & Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide) |
| Abstract: | We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents' preferences are single-peaked. We propose natural rules (called up methods) to solve such a class of problems. We analyzed the properties those methods satisfy and we provide a characterization of them. We also prove that these methods can be interpreted as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called equal-distance rule. |
| Keywords: | Allocation problem, indivisibilities, single-peaked preferences, standard of comparison, up method. |
| JEL: | D61 D63 D74 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:06.30&r=gth |
| By: | Eckbo, B. Espen (Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College); Thorburn, Karin S. (Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College) |
| Abstract: | We analyze bidding incentives and present evidence on takeover premiums in mandatory Swedish bankruptcy auctions, where three-quarters of the firms are sold as going concerns. The bankrupt firms’ main creditors (banks) cannot bid in the auction and thus cannot directly influence the winning price. However, we find that the banks often finance bidders. We show that the optimal bid strategy for a bank-bidder coalition mimics a monopolist sales price, in effect getting around the institutional constraint on direct bank bidding. The final auction premium increases with a measure of the bank’s debt impairness observed at the beginning of the auction. Cross-sectional regressions with the auction premium as dependent variable support this prediction. There is no empirical support for the proposition that the auctions lead to fire-sale prices, where we use the number of bidders, the degree of industry-wide financial distress, and the business cycle as proxies for auction demand. Moreover, premiums in transactions where insiders repurchase the firm (salebacks) are on average indistinguishable from premiums in sales to company outsiders, which fails to support self-dealing arguments. |
| Keywords: | Bankruptcy auctions; Optimal bid strategy |
| JEL: | D44 |
| Date: | 2004–12–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2004_016&r=gth |